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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the English language press and its coverage of protest struggles and backlash, 
border wars and related militarisation of society in the critical years of South African political change 
between 1976 and 1988. The widespread reputation of Natal liberalism has led researchers to debate the 
extent to which the independent Natal Witness was a politically oppositional paper and raises interesting 
questions about the construction ofliberalism itself as a political doctrine. I examine the Natal Witness 
as a case study - an English language newspaper based in the province that was then called Natal. In this 
study, I focus on key events related to violent political conflict to determine how this newspaper 
reported on the apartheid state's police response to protest, its military campaigns, perceived security 
threats to the nation, the issue of military conscription, and the increasingly violent provincial politics 
fought between the followers of the United Democratic front (UDF) and Inkatha. I describe the 
coverage of the Witness at length and show how various mediums (news articles, letters, and opinion 
pieces) and various sources conveyed events to its readership. I assess the content and its ambiguities to 
paint a complex and detailed picture of how discourses shifted with events and over time. 
4 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Thembisa Waetjen, for all her hard work that went into helping and 
supporting this thesis. Throughout this process, she has demonstrated herself to be a top-class 
supervisor, and must be lauded for the large amount of dedication in helping me complete the thesis. Dr 
Waetjen has always been easily approachable and willing to devote much of her time, despite her many 
other commitments and heavy workload. There has never been a time in which I felt that I could not 
approach or speak to her about my thesis. She has also given much guidance to me and been a 
tremendous help in shaping ideas. In addition, I must thank her for her endless encouragement and 
motivation throughout this time. 
Professor Catherine Burns has been another lecturer in the History Department who has been very 
helpful with my work. She has always given me much encouragement and support throughout my years 
at the UKZN History Department. Professor Bums also played a fundamental part in the early stages of 
my thesis and has continuously provided me with new ideas on how to shape my thesis. It is not for 
nothing that she has a reputation for creativity and imparting good ideas. 
Another special mention must go to Kyla O'Neill for her tireless proofreading of this thesis. She spent 
many hours editing and checking for typos, syntax and my footnote structures. For this, I am deeply 
grateful to her for going the extra mile in making this work the best it could be. 
My gratitude also goes to the other lecturers in the UKZN History Department such as Keith 
Breckenridge, Vukile Khumalo, Julie Parle, Kalpana Hiralal, Marijke Du Toit, and Goolam Vahed for 
all their assistance to me. They, together with Thembisa Waetjen and Catherine Bums, have made me 
feel very much a part of the History Department at UZKN. They have all shown heartfelt kindness to 
me and I cannot forget that. 
5 
My fellow graduate students at the History Department have also played a huge role in making my life 
very happy in the department. Students such as Khayelihle Dlarnini, Kriska Nepaul, Sachil Singh, Joe 
Guy, Karthi Gopalan, Kyla 0 Neill, Surya Chetty, Hannah Keal, Eva Jackson, Dylan Lindsay, Jo-Anne 
Tiedt, Hannah Carrim, Abigail Donaldson and Jennifer Upton. These fellow students, although not 
playing a direct role in my thesis, have nonetheless contributed by relaxing and encouraging me and 
thus helping me to attain completion of my work. In between doing my thesis we have had much 
lighthearted fun and had many moments of humour, which I will cherish and greatly miss. We have 
together produced some interesting and unusual (to say the least) discourses and ideologies on a range 
of topics such as popular culture and world politics. 
My friends outside the department have also given much encouragement and emotional support 
throughout my thesis. Friends such as Paul Court and Trevor Court, Melissa Van Oordt and Justin 
Visagie, to name just a few of them, have shown me great kindness and they have made my life much 
easier in assisting me with various difficulties. They have been huge morale boosters when I have 
needed it and will always have a special place in my heart. 
Thank you to our various administrators, Claire Hull, Sandy Thompson and Pearl Harris all of whom 
have been encouraging as well as attending to the vital administrative aspects of my thesis, about which 
I had many questions. In terms of accessing my primary resources, I must pay tribute to the staff at the 
Natal Witness who gave me access to their archives. They have been very friendly and accommodating 
to me during my visits. I also have much gratitude to staff at the Pietermaritzburg Resource Centre who 
let me have full access to their newspaper archives. 
Last, but certainly not least, a huge thank you to my parents for all their support both fmancially and 
emotionally in my tertiary education. They have provided much moral support and encouragement 





















List of Abbreviations 
African National Congress 
Angolan Press 
African Teachers Association of South Africa 
Azania Peoples Organisation 
Christian Institute 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Confederation of South African Trade Unions 
End Conscription Campaign 
Federation of South African Trade Unions. 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
National Party 
Organisation of African Unity 
Pan African Congress 
Progressive Federal Party 
Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia 
Royal Air Force 
















South African Associated Newspapers 
South African Council of Churches 
South African Bishops Conference 
South African Defence Force 
South African Police 
South African Press Association 
South West Africa People ' s organisation 
South West African Territorial Force 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
United Democratic Front 
United Nations 





This thesis investigates the English language press and its coverage of protest struggles and backlash, 
border wars and related militarization of society in the critical years of South African political change, 
between 1976 and 1988. It employs a case study of the Natal Witness to consider how contexts of 
political violence in this period were represented in news and opinion, and how these informed the 
discourses of political liberalism that were advanced in opposition to key governmental policies. The 
widespread reputation of Natal liberalism as an oppositional discourse has led researchers to debate the 
extent to which the independent Natal Witness was a politically oppositional paper and raises interesting 
questions about the construction of liberalism itself as a political doctrine. This thesis seeks to answer 
the question: How did contexts of political violence shape the public discourses of liberal political 
opinion in the medium of this Anglophone newspaper? 
In this study, I focus on key events related to violent political conflict to determine how this newspaper 
reported on the apartheid state's police response to protest, its military campaigns, perceived security 
threats to the nation, the issue of military conscription, and the increasingly violent provincial politics 
between the followers of the United Democratic front (UDF) and the Zulu-identified movement, 
Inkatha.
1 
Anglophone newspaper coverage of the South African border wars and other conflicts has 
been under-researched in South African historical studies. Research on media responses to political 
conflict and violence has largely focused on either the Afrikaans language nationalist press, or the 
alternative press in South Africa. Michael-Graaf, for example, in his book The Pro and Anti-
conscription Press in South Africa comments briefly on the English 'mainstream' response to the End 
Conscription Campaign (ECC) but his primary concern is with alternative and Afrikaner nationalist 
I Inkatha was founded in 1975 by Mangosutho Buthelezi, a former member ofthe African National Congress 
CANC) and chief of the homeland Kwa-Zulu, north of Nata!. The Inkatha organisation was founded on the 
original aims of cultural Zulu Nationalism where it aimed to socially uplift Zulu speakers within South Africa 
as well as oppose the apartheid policies of the South African government. It took a moderate approach in its 
opposition towards apartheid choosing to oppose apartheid from within the system itself as well as negotiate 
reforms with the government. Inkatha was initially allies with the ANC until a breakaway resulted over various 
disagreements concerning the nature of opposition towards apartheid as well personality clashes between 
senior leaders of both organisations. The former partnership turned into a massive rivalry, which resulted in a 
full scale war between Inkatha and an ANC key ally, the UDF. 
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press coverage. 2 Another work, Censorship of the press in South Africa during the Angolan war: a case 
study of news manipulation and suppression by Graeme Addison addresses the censorship laws and 
embedded journalism of the South African Defence Force (SADF). 3 Addison also briefly describes the 
response of the English language press to this situation. Keyan Tomaselli and Eric Louw focus on the 
militarization of the media in South Africa: they suggest that from 1976, the media adopted the 
hegemony of militarization, owing to the shift in the hegemony of the Nationalist Party government to a 
more militaristic mindset.4 Furthermore, they theorize that the media were used to prepare the national 
consciousness for conflict. Yet, none of these studies set out specifically to explore mainstream English 
language press coverage of South Africa' s militarization during the period in question. 
I will, to some extent, be engaging the much-debated question of whether (and to what sense) the 
English language press placed itself in an oppositional role towards the National Party government in 
this period. Media historians such as Ruth Tomaselli, Les Switzer and Eric Louw have associated 
liberalism with the English language press in South Africa. Science historian Saul Dubow connected 
liberalism with the English dominated institutions when he spoke about the success ofliberalism' s 
survival. "The remarkable resilience of many of these [liberal] institutions has perhaps less to do with 
individual moral heroism (though there were many instances of this) than with the fact of their deep 
imbedded ness in an Anglophone public culture that was itself never directly threatened by Afrikaner 
Nationalism.,,5 The construction and dissemination of Anglophone public culture was, in part, an 
effect of its print media. Newspapers, as the primary transmitter of news, opinion and debate 
surrounding current national and global events are, as theorized originally by Benedict Anderson6, the 
means through which political life is articulated and imagined. 
2 Michael Graaf. The pro- and anti-conscription press in South Africa (Durban: University of Natal , 1988) 
3 Graeme Norris Addison. Censorship of the press in South Africa during the Angolan war: a case study of 
news Manipulation and Suppression. (MA. Thesis, Rhodes University, Grahamstown: 1988) 
4 Tomaselli, Keyan and Eric Louw. Militarization, Hegemony and the South African Media 1976-1986. 
(Presented at the ASSA Conference, Durban: 1988) 
5 Saul Dubow. A commonwealth of knowledge: science, sensibility, and white South Africa, 1820-2000. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) pp 9-10. 
6 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. (London: 
Verson, 1990) 
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While this is not a line of discussion I pursue in this research, it is worth mentioning that the nature of 
what constitutes an opposition or alternative press is currently a matter of public debate in South Africa, 
with the tabling of the Protection of Information Bill and the proposal for a media tribunal creating 
controversy this year (2010). Other national contexts produce some interesting bases for comparison 
that I wish to briefly note. One example is opposition and the promotion of democratic ideals by the 
press in Zimbabwe. Several writers point to the relevance of this comparative case study to my own 
research, given the country's recent history of authoritarianism and extreme government suppression of 
dissent under the Mugabe regime. In the same way as the apartheid South African government tried to 
suppress the press, the Mugabe regime does today. 
Dumisani Moyo analyses the oppositional role of the Daily News, detailing its opposition to the 
authoritarianism of the Mugabe government as well as the complex nature of imagined identities.7 This 
work raises issues over the nature of liberalism and its various controversies, one that has similarities to 
my own research into the Natal Witness. The first issue I can note is the way liberals have seen their 
own identity as being a bulwark against authoritarianism. This is illustrated in a description of the Daily 
News, which "became a stringent critic of the Mugabe government, exposing corruption and holding the 
government accountable to its actions,,8. The other issue raised was that of social class and a Western 
connection being associated with racialised liberalism. In particular, the issue of foreign shareholders, 
she points out, was a controversial issue in the country. This led the Daily News to become rhetorically 
identified with colonialism and the suppression under British Rhodesia. Stanford D. Mukasa in the 
African Quarterly also touches on this case, and the issue of foreign ownership, noting that 60 percent of 
the shares belonged to foreign companies.9 As I will note in my analysis, Natal liberalism unabashedly 
looked to Western social values as hegemonic confIrmation of its position in relation to governmental 
and anti-colonial strategies, and has (more recently) similarly been accused of promoting foreign ideas 
in an African context. The assumed readership of the Natal Witness, evidenced in the content I examine, 
is an Anglophone (white) middle class in Natal. 
7 Dumisani Moyo. 'The 'independent' press and the fight for democracy in Zimbabwe: A critical analysis of 
the banned Daily news' (Westminster Papers in education Vol 7. London, 2002) 
8 Dumisani Moyo. 'The 'independent' press and the fight for democracy in Zimbabwe: A critical analysis of 
the banned Daily news' 
9 Stanford D. Mukasa. 'Politics and press in Zimbabwe' (African Studies Quarterly, 2007) URL 
http://www.africa.ufl.eduJasq/v7/v7i2a9.html accessed on 8 November 2010. 
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Mukasa raises another issue: that of the social class interests of the Zimbabwean Independent press. He 
asserts that independent newspapers, because of their linkages to big businesses, do not give adequate 
coverage to workers' rights. "Their orientation towards the business community means that while these 
papers sometimes have a no-holds-barred attitude in the way they criticize government, they tend to be 
more restrained in advocating workers' rights at the expense ofbusiness."lo He also views the 
independent press, along with the government press, as out of touch with people in rural areas. Similar 
criticisms have been levelled at the South African English language newspapers during the militarized 
periods of the apartheid era, particularly in the 1980s. This is also interesting when you compare it to the 
Natal Witness whose ownership, though comparative small, was still linked to a capitalist social class. 
An aim in this study is to consider the public articulation of Natal liberal imagination in relation to key 
historical events in South Africa. What vision of political change was envisioned through reports and 
editorials in the newspaper, the Natal Witness? What themes emerged in the vocabulary of reporting on 
violence of various kinds? How were these related to regional issues, for example, conscription? There 
are some good reasons to explore these questions in relation to the province that was in this period 
called Natal. Natal was the province where the unofficial war between Inkatha and the UDF was most 
deadly - the only province that experienced regular and devastating violence during South Africa's 
'peaceful revolution'. It was also the site of the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba, which looked towards an 
alliance between white capital and black politics. Natal was the only province in which the National 
Party (NP) lost elections. Its regional identity has at times been a source of separatism. Saul Dubow 
emphasized that "in Natal the possibility of secession was to be seriously, albeit unrealistically, entertained in 
the first half of the twentieth century. "II Natal claims an important role in white liberal history, and Paul 
Rich has described how the region became a power base for the development of the politics of social 
welfare in the 1920s.1
2 
In addition, D.A Moffatt, in her MA thesis, asserts that the Natal section of the 
10 Stanford D. Mukasa. 'Politics and press in Zimbabwe' 
:~ Saul D~bow . ~ commonwealth o!knowledge:.science, s.ensibility, and white South Africa, 1820-2000, p 193. 
Paul RIch. White power and the ltberal conscience: racwl segregation and South African liberalism 
(Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1984) 
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Liberal Party of South Africa played a principal role in the party, having a major influence in the 
direction of its policies. 13 
Yet, there has been only scant research on the Natal press as a cultural or political organ or a vector of 
liberal political views. A confirmation of this point can be seen in the work of a prominent analyst of 
the South African press, Les Switzer. In his several studies on the South African press, Switzer's focus 
on the middle-to-Iate 20th century press in Natal, especially the English language press has been 
minimal. 14 This is not to say that the press in Natal has been neglected as a subject of research. Many 
biographies have been written, including some specifically pertaining to the Witness. IS For example, in 
1996, Simon Haw published an overview of the Natal Witness commissioned for its 150th anniversary, 
from its beginnings in 1846. He documented the newspaper's early growth under Dennis Buchanan and 
argued that it maintained an uneasy relationship with the Natal colonial government in the 1850s. He 
briefly describes the Natal Witness's support for the British forces in both the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 
as well as the South African War from 1899 to 1902, as well as for South African participation in both 
World Wars. That the Natal Witness was consistent in its support of the British cause through key 
national and international conflicts is relevant to my study. A communalist or English ethnic element in 
the newspaper appears to remain relevant in the period I will be focussing on, though the picture is far 
13 Debra Moffatt. From 'conscience politics' to the battlefields of politi cal activism: The Liberal Party in Natal, 
1953 to 1968. (MA Thesis, Durban, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal: 1999) 
14 Les Switzer. Media studies and the critique of development (Durban: University of Natal, 1987); Media and 
dependency in South Africa a case study of the Press and the Ciskei homeland. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University, 1985); Politics and communication in the Ciskei, an African Homeland in South Africa: a case 
study of the Press and the Ciskei "Homeland". (Grahamstown: Rhodes University, 1979) , 
South Africa's resistance press: alternative voices in the last generation under apartheid. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University, 1997); South Africa's alternative press: voices of protest and resistance, 1880s-1960. (Athens, 
Ohio: Ohio University, 1997); The Black press in South Africa and Lesotho: a descriptive bibliographic guide 
to African, Colored, and Indian newspapers, newsletters, and magazines, 1836-1976. (Boston: Hall, 1979) 
15 Maria Arcache. An assessment of the role played by the English Press (especially the Natal Mercury) in 
Natal during 1948. (Honours Thesis, University of Natal, Durban: 1992); Duncan Du Bois. The 'Mercury' and 
the Indian question in Natal, 1860-1897. (MA Thesis, University of Natal, Durban: 1989); Simon Haw. 
Bearing Witness; K.M Kilfoil. The Natal Witness and the confederation issue in the period 1874- 1881. 
(Honours Thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg: 1972); Mary Lawhon. Environmental issues in the 
South African media: a case study of the Natal Witness. (Masters Thesis, University ofKwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg: 2004); Balasundram Naidoo. David Dale Buchanan as editor of The Natal Witness 1846 to 
1856. (Masters Thesis: Durban-Westville University: 1972.) Terry Wilks. For the love of Natal: the life and 
times of The Natal Mercury, 1852- 1977. (pinetown: Robinson, 1977) 
Christopher Coldrey. Open testimony: an introduction to the Natal Witness, South Africa's oldest newspaper. 
(Pietermaritzburg: Natal Witness, 1972) 
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from simple particularly in the early half of the 20th century. For example, reflecting on the views of 
George Harold Caplin, an editor during the Second World War, Haw writes, "He [Caplin] remained a 
staunch supporter of Afrikaner aspirations, the realisation of what he saw as an essential factor in the 
creation of that Broad South Africanism, which was in his view at the heart ofthe United Party." 16 In 
this quote, Caplin is identified as a key supporter of South Africanism, which advocated ethnic harmony 
between English and Afrikaners. Haw infers that this was part of what predisposed the Natal Witness to 
be in opposition towards the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and its apartheid platform. 
During the period of 1948 to 1988, Haw saw the Natal Witness as oppositional to apartheid. In the 
period that is researched in my study, the 1970s and 1980s, the Natal Witness is demonstrated by Haw 
to have held various positions. With regard to the Rhodesian civil war close to the South African border, 
Haw asserted that, "the Witness tended to follow popular opinion in South Africa by supporting Smith ' s 
beleaguered regime.,, 17 Whose 'popular opinion' is referred to here is unclear but the statement shows a 
context of anxiety about the South African border situation among English-speaking Witness readers. 
Smith ' s regime, with its large population of people of English ancestry, was seen by many as a buffer 
against insurgent movements closer to home. Haw dedicates only a page of analysis to the Natal 
Witness' s coverage of the Soweto uprisings. According to Haw, the response of the Witness to the 
conflict "showed scant sympathy for the government' s position on the violence.,,18 The Natal Witness 
rejected the government line that the cause of the violence was "agitators" and argued that government 
policy was the real cause of the violence. Overall, in his analysis, Haw portrays a Natal Witness 
strongly opposed to government policies. However, he does not scrutinize the nature of the opposition 
and fails to analyze the contradictions in the Witness as a producer of public culture. I would argue that 
a fuller understanding of white racial hegemony during the apartheid era demands that Natal ' s 
liberalism be scrutinized through the crucible of militarization and racialised violence of the 1970s and 
1980s. My study examines a key part of this issue, by documenting how the militarization of South 
African society was portrayed and related through the public discourses of the English language news 
media in the 'liberal ' province of Nata\. 
16 Simon Haw. Bearing witness: the Natal Witness 1846-1996. (Pietermaritzburg: Natal Witness, 1996) p 226. 
17 Simon Haw. Bearing witness: the Natal Witness 1846-1996, p 259. 
18 Ibid, P 301 . 
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The Natal Witness had a significant and growing readership in the period in which my study is situated, 
centred as it was in the provincial capital of Pi eterma ritz burg. In 1976, it claimed an estimated 
circulation of 33,000 copies; by 1988, this had risen to a distribution of 55,000.
19 
Another interesting 
factor concerning the Natal Witness was the nature of its ownership. The Natal Witness was an 
independent paper and not linked to large industrialist or mining companies in contrast to many other 
English language newspapers in South Africa at the time. The Craib family established the Natal 
Witness paper under their private enterprise the Natal Witness Publishing Company. Stuart Craib was a 
third generation owner of the Natal Witness when he took over from his father in 1979. 
As will be shown later in this chapter, some media theorists have speculated that media companies are 
primarily profit driven, with market interests taking precedence over ethical journalism that could 
threaten its economic base. Mazzoleni and Schulz, for example, argue that, "The media are 
organisations with their own aims and rules that do not necessarily coincide with, and indeed often clash 
with, those of political communicators. Because of the power of the media, political communicators are 
forced to respond to the media's rules, aims, production logics and constraints" .20 Based on their theory, 
editorials and columns by political columnists in the Natal Witness could well have been compromised 
if it conflicted with its advertising sponsors and interests as a business. However many social media 
theorists have stated that it is particularly large media companies with industrial and economic interests 
who have been the main culprits in suppressing media. Andrew 6 Baoill, in his journal article, 'The 
effect of ownership structure on the media agenda' writes about how large media companies have 
indirect control over issues focused upon in the editorial content, especially in terms of what issues are 
in the media agenda. He states that commercial advertising interests influence these. 0 Baoill in his 
case study of the US media cites Bagdikian, that "33 percent of American newspaper editors said they 
would not feel free to print an item damaging to the parent fmn".21 But, in the case of the Natal Witness, 
the Craib family maintained all the shares during this period, and (unlike other Anglophone South 
African newspapers) was not linked to large industrial and mining interests, like Anglo-American. This 
19 Figures supplied by the Circulations Department of the Natal Witness. 
20 Mazzoleni Gianpieto and Winfried Schulz, 1999. "Mediatization " of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy? 
(Political Communication, Volume 16) p 247. 
21 Andrew 0 Baoill. 'The effect of ownership structure on the media agenda' (Funferal Publications, 2009) 
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makes it an interesting case for consideration of its content during the embattled periods of apartheid. 
While Ruth and Keyan Tomaselli22 write about how large industrial interests have often had an effect on 
the nature of the media content, it is important to consider the specific case of the Natal Witness to 
determine how class and cultural values emerge in its pages. 
What was the nature of English newspaper opposition to the apartheid regime? 
Many have assumed the English language press, to have an oppositional stance in relation to the 
Nationalist government during the apartheid years. There has, however been significant contestation 
over the nature and degree of the English press's opposition towards the National Party in South Africa. 
Participants in this debate have been influenced by wider theories of Marxism and liberal orthodoxy. 
Those with liberal or social democratic leanings have shown optimism over newspapers' potential role 
in creating and maintaining democratic systems, in keeping with theorists such as Jurgen Habermas. 
Habermas put forth the claim that the formation of a public sphere has played a vital role in promoting 
democracy and accountability of government. He defines the public sphere as an arena in which people 
may discuss issues that affect them and their society. Newspapers have served an important function in 
allowing citizens to operate with a shared knowledge base for debate. While his ideal model of a public 
sphere was the Greek system of public debate, he does acknowledge its weaknesses such as prohibited 
female participation.23 Similarly, Alex de Tocqueville has noted that newspapers assist in democratic 
practices, having the ability to unite and mobilize people towards a common goal. In Democracy in 
America, he explains that newspapers can unite people who are geographically distant as well as provide 
a means of participation for those who are willing but need guidance to do so. 
The principal citizens who inhabit an aristocratic country discern each other from afar; and if they wish to unite their 
forces, they move towards each other, drawing a multitude of men after them. In democratic countries, on the 
contrary, it frequently happens that a great number of men who wish or who want to combine cannot accomplish it 
because as they are very insignificant and lost amid the crowd, they cannot see and do not know where to find one 
another. A newspaper then takes up the notion or the feeling that had occurred simultaneously, but singly, to each 
of them. All are then immediately guided towards this beacon; and these wandering minds, which had long sought 
22Muller, Johan, Ruth Tomaselli and Keyan Tomaselli. Narrating the crisis: hegemony and the South African 
press. (Johannesburg: Lyon, 1987) 
23 Jurgen Habennas. Structural transformation of the public sphere: an enquiry into the nature of bourgeois 
society. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) 
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each other in darkness, at length meet and unite. The newspaper brought them together, and the newspaper is still 
h . d 24 necessary to keep t em umte . 
Tocqueville states that the newspaper can enable people to communicate with each other, defeating the 
hindrance of geographical distances. From these factors, he concludes that the newspaper is vital for 
both producing and maintaining a democracy. 
Karl Marx put forth quite a different idea about information and knowledge, with his views about links 
to the ruling classes creating a new school of thought. Marx states that in a capitalist society the 
principal group dominates the formation of discourses and mentalities. He explains that their wealth 
and political connections to the state allow them exclusive access to the means of ideological production 
in society. 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of 
society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class, which has the means of material production, also 
has the means of mental production, so that thereby generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of 
mental production are subject to it.25 
In Marx' s view, the material dominance of the ruling class allows them to produce, distribute, and shape 
ideas, which determine the ideology in a society. "It is self evident that they do so in its whole range, 
hence among other things rule as thinkers, as producers of ideas and regulate the production and 
distribution of those ideas" .26 Noam Chomsky is an influential scholar whose views about media and 
politics Marx has shaped. He states that the media are aligned heavily to commercialized interests and 
largely run with profit making at heart. Consequently, large corporations dominate the content of the 
media through various mechanisms. 
In short the major media - particularly, the elite media that set the agenda that others follow - are corporations 
selling privileged audiences to other businesses. It would hardly come as a surprise if the picture of the world they 
present were to reflect the perspectives and interests of the sellers, the buyers, and the product.27 
24 Alex Tocqueville. Democracy in America . (Chicago: Vintage Books, 1990) p 134. 
25 Engels, Friedrich and Karl Marx: The German Ideology. (New York International Publishers, 1988) p 64. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Noam Chomsky. Necessary illusions: thought control in democratic societies. (London: Pluto Press, 1989) p 
8. 
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Robert McChesney, also a Marxist, holds a similar perspective on the media. He argues that private 
owned media are less about public knowledge and democratic practice than about financial, profit-
making interests. In a capitalist society, the media rely on advertising revenue from corporations for its 
main source of income and, consequently, are compelled to serve their interests for fmancial prosperity. 
Furthermore, content that undermines the interests of advertisers is frequently filtered out. He 
concludes that the private media therefore hurt the public interest. For example, the American media -
for a long time - would not air discussions on the unhealthiness of smoking for fear of alienating 
tobacco-producing sponsors. Newspapers and other media that hold a critical view of the system, which 
favour the wealthy elite, would be reduced to the alternative media, which operate on a much smaller 
scale.28 
These broad discussions on the political role of newspapers are relevant in the debates about the nature 
and extent of the opposition provided to the apartheid government by the English language press. The 
dominance from 1948 of the National Party into all spheres of South African community in conjunction 
with the decline of the United Party, led to the English press becoming the primary opposition of the 
South African ruling party. This is certainly the view of Elaine Potter who viewed the Afrikaans press 
as a supporter of the South African government, debating issues with the government but ultimately 
aligning itself to National Party principles.29 These principles included apartheid policies such as 
separate living spaces and public facilities for designated races, exclusion from political power and other 
civic rights for black people, as well as job reservation for white men. According to this view, the 
English language newspapers became the opposition when Afrikaner nationalists ascended to political 
power and furthered the marginalisation of the majority. 
The English press ... , through an opposition organized independently of government became the official opposition 
by default, for in the final analysis the real opposition was the African. It was the total exclusion of the African 
from constitutional politics, which cast the English press into the role of the opposition.30 
28 Robert McChesney. Rich Media, Poor democracy: communication politics in dubious times. (Urbana: 
Uni versity of Illinois Press, 1999) 
29 Elaine Potter. The Press as opposition: the political role of South African newspapers. (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1975) 
30Elaine Potter. The Press as opposition: the political role of South African newspaper, p 27. 
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The English language press was, in Potter's view, predisposed to supporting the opposition's 
perspective because of their willingness to air criticism.31 Potter holds a sympathetic and stereotypical 
perception of the English newspapers - this being that they advocated tolerance and were open-minded. 
She argued that the English press increasingly tried to give a 'voice' to the African people. "As an 
institution within the white domain, the English press was able, by articulating what it saw as the 
interests of the African, to extend the boundaries ofthe political system" .32 Potter' s sense is that English 
language newspapers ' spoke for' those without a formal voice. 
Potter claims that the English press opposed the government by being a critic of government. "The 
basis of the English language press and the government had variable levels of antagonism, varying in 
intensity according to the policy of newspapers and their editors" . 33 A measure of the strength of its 
opposition was that, to counteract the power of these newspapers, the government tried to clamp down 
with censorship laws. For example, descriptions of prisoner abuse were prohibited and political 
criminals recognized as ' banned ' by the government were not allowed to be quoted. Despite these 
limitations, English dailies like the Star, and the Sunday Times constantly searched for ways to expose 
what they saw as gross injustices. Other English papers like the Rand Daily Mail, and the Daily 
Dispatch often ignored the law in publishing stories of prisoner abuse. 
When Potter published her book in 1975, the National Party was in power and had implemented much 
of its apartheid policy. All serious opposition, both black and white, was being suppressed, often 
violently. The late 1960s and early 1970s were a time of stagnation for extra-parliamentary groups in 
South Africa, as the oppositional struggles of the 1960s and the government had clamped down on the 
mass protest action. The detention of important leaders in the African National Congress CANC) and 
Communist Party, such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, as well as a law banning the anti-
government movements, were vital to suppressing dissent. The official opposition, the UP, was 
diminishing in strength because of its failure to provide an alternative system to apartheid while the 
31 Ibid, P 28. 
32 Ibid, pp 28-29. 
33 Ibid, P 153 . 
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Liberal Party, another main parliamentary opposition, was banned because of its multi-racial 
membership. These factors certainly influenced Potter' s belief that English newspapers represented a 
strong opposition to apartheid, since the press was at least operational and effective at disseminating 
needed alternative views and knowledge. In her view too, the black press was too weak to represent 
strong opposition - her analysis coming before the Soweto uprising in June 1976 in which youth 
sparked the revival of mass black action against the National Party government, culminating in the form 
of widespread mass consumer, rental, and school boycotts organized by various anti apartheid 
organisations across the country. It is possible that Potter' s viewpoints on the English press as the main 
hope for opposition politics would have been changed by these events. 
Potter believed that the Anglophone press was the only realistic opposition in South Africa. Writing six 
years later, Richard Pollak held a very similar view but one that was more sceptical of the English press, 
taking a somewhat Marxist critique of it. He viewed apartheid South Africa as a totalitarian society. 
The English press singularly tempered this reality: "More than any other powerful force in the country 
these newspapers stand almost alone between the Afrikaner government and totalitarian darkness. ,,34 
He described the role of the press in providing information to the public: "Inside South Africa, 
newspapers serve as the lone megaphone of dissent. Without the moderately free press to promulgate 
news and unpopular ideas, the country' s political lopsidedness would be complete." 35 A few examples 
include calling for public facilities, like baths, to be open to all races and for an end to the curfews for 
black people in the main city centres. Pollak is also interested in the oppositional position of the English 
language press in relation to the apartheid state that he described as an emotionally charged a 
relationship: "In South Africa a fury that borders on mutual hatred characterizes the nationalists and the 
English language press.,,36 
Pollack, however, had a strong critique to offer. He saw the English press as two-sided. He argues that 
despite the support for an end to apartheid English newspapers only functioned as a limited opposition 
to the government because of their invaluable ties and relationships with the large industrial interests 
34 Richard Pollak. Up Against Apartheid: The role and plight of the press in South Africa. (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Louis University Press: 1981 , p 3. 
~~ Ri~hard Pollak. Up Against Apartheid: The role and plight of the press in South Africa, p 2. 
IbId, pp 1-2. 
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who possessed them. "Consequently the newspapers are disinclined to offer political programmes that 
might jeopardize their patron's financial hegemony. Since an end to apartheid would mean granting full 
political rights to the overwhelming non-white majority, editorials in the English press tend to beat 
round the thorny bush.,,37 In this argument, he takes the Marxist line of capital ultimately constructing 
the political hegemony of society as a whole. He therefore sees the English language press as only 
supporting changes in the social order that would not hurt the major fmancial and industrial interests, for 
example the removal of 'petty apartheid'. Such calls to actions would not have challenged the capitalist 
system, which caused the exploitation and poverty of millions in South Africa. 
An interesting element to Pollak's argument is the information scandal of 1978. This scandal involved 
politicians in government circles such as Connie Mulder, then Minister of Information, and Esche1 
Rhoodie, then Ministry of Information secretary, who used millions of public funds to fmance 
clandestine activities, such as buying out media outlets and newspapers to create propaganda. These 
were set to counter negative press coverage about the government both locally and internationally. 
Funds were extracted from the Department of Defence because defending the country was seen as a 
holistic measure, which would involve spreading propaganda for the government. Rhoodie attempted a 
coup d'etat of the news agency South African Associated Newspapers (SAAN), but was thwarted by 
shareholders in the company. He then combined his funds with those of Louis Luyt (a wealthy South 
African executive and founder of both the TriomfFertilizer company and Louis Luyt Breweries) to form 
an English language paper called the Citizen. The Citizen operated under the fa~ade of being an 
independent newspaper but was really government owned. The Rand Daily Mail was the first paper that 
leaked information of this scandal. Other English language papers followed in their speculation about 
the Citizen. This led to an investigation into Rhoodie ' s activities and the English language press were 
eventually vindicated in their allegations. 
Pollak's book was published during the period of crucial militarization in South Africa, i.e., between 
1976 and 1990. However, it was published before the States of Emergency in 1984 and 1986. It was 
written in a period when the state had full monopoly over broadcasting such as radio and television, 
37 Ibid, P 9. 
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which was a powerful medium of communication. These circumstances help contextualize his 
viewpoint that the English language press was the only major anti-government player. The English 
language press had access to large amounts of money via ties with large financial and industrial interests 
that gave them power but also limited their democratic nature. Despite his critique of the impact of 
capitalist interest, Pollak saw the English language press as invaluable in its opposition to government 
because of its airing of needed information, also internationally: " ... the role of the English-language 
press is critical because it provides a highly visible forum for information and ideas inside South Africa 
and because its reporting has been relayed around the world by a corps of sympathetic foreign 
correspondents" .38 
Johan Muller, Ruth Tomaselli and Keyan Tomaselli, co-editors of the book Narrating the crisis: 
hegemony and the South African press, take a similar line of argument to Pollak in their Marxist angled 
criticism of the English press's ties to big financial interests.39 The Tomasellis and Johan Muller cite 
the Steyn Commission' s concession "that the English language press had done a good job in articulating 
black aspirations in the absence of truly independent black press.,,40 The authors concur with this point 
of view but also argue that the opposition to the government was meagre and that its ties with large 
industrial and mining interests outweighed a commitment to change and genuine representation of black 
workers and the poor. "Considering the composition of the holding companies and the directors who 
serve them it is not surprising that the English language press is closely associated with the aims, 
objectives and interests of the hegemonic bloc as a whole.,,41 The authors evidence this limitation when 
they describe the press's treatment of poverty in black residential and commercial areas. They contend 
that, overall, the English language press took a weak interest in black poverty and offered limited 
solutions. The authors add that this press did not look at the fundamental causes of the problem like the 
exploitative nature of the capitalist system, and they tended to treat the problem from a paternalistic 
approach. Their analysis of coverage showed that 
38 Ibid, P 9. 
39 Muller, Johan, Ruth Tomaselli and Keyan Tomaselli. Narrating the crisis: hegemony and the South African 
press. (Johannesburg: Lyon, 1987) 
40 Tomaselli, Ruth and Keyan Tomaselli. 'The Political Economy ofthe South African press ' , in Muller, Johan 
Ruth Tomaselli and Keyan Tomaselli (eds). Narrating the crisis: hegemony and the South African press. 
(Johannesburg: Lyon, 1987) p 61. 
4lTomaselli , Ruth and Keyan Tomaselli. ' The Political Economy of the South African Press', p 57. 
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The structural causes of the conditions of poverty are seldom probed, and the plight of destitute urban blacks has 
been treated in a humanist and piecemeal fashion, although this does not necessarily indicate that all reporters are 
unaware of structural processes behind black poverty. In addition to this, commonsense of newsworthiness, which 
dictates that events are of greater importance than processes, there are 'human interest' stories. These are seen to 
·d ·d I 42 operate outS} e} eo ogy. 
Simon Burton's chapter in this same edited collection, 'Ideology on the Beat: Labour and the English 
Language Press' discusses the limited and misguided support of the English language press towards 
labour issues and trade unions. According to Burton, the English press did not investigate labour 
conditions and took to dismissing the trade unions as agitators. Burton writes: "It has not provided the 
background to worker demands, seeing them largely as attacks on a stable society, disruption of the 
economy and threats to the basically contented majority ofblacks.,,43 He also contends that the press 
failed to research the organisation of labour as a process and a build up, consequently citing strikes as 
spontaneous and irrational. 
The press has not provided a view of trade union as a process, nor is it in a position to do so as long as it accepts the 
dominant ideas about worker organisation and reflects workers problems in an 'event' orientated way. It cannot 
explain 'events' and contributes to the general view of worker action as 'irrational' . In many cases the history and 
process of worker organisation is concealed within the structure of the news. 44 
Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli also cite the English language press's use of 'Extras' to further illustrate the 
English press's ambivalent opposition to apartheid. These Extras were weekly supplements to the main 
body of the newspapers. They were set out to cater for the black, Indian and coloured readership, 
because of their perception that they had different (that is, racialised) interests and needs. For them, 
this is a form of racial segregation, which they suggest stands in contrast to their professed stance 
against segregation. Here, the Rand Daily Mail illustrated their point: 
The contradictions that were outlined earlier in the analysis of the English language press were manifested here in 
the Rand Daily Mail: on the one hand, it was a liberal and integrationist paper; on the other hand, it represented 
egregationist news. This was clear in its publication of a separate issue as well as Pogrund's rationale explanation 
for its existence: Total integration is obviously desirable but is our readerships ready for it?45 
42 Ibid, P 63 . 
43 Simon Burton. 'Ideology on the Beat: Labour and the English Language Press', in Ruth Tomaselli , Keyan 
Tomasell i and Andrew Muller (eds). Narrating the crisis: hegemony and the South African press' 
(Johannesburg: Lyon 1987) p 180. 
44 Simon Burton. 'Ideology on the Beat: Labour and the English Language Press' , p 180. 
45 Tomaselli , Ruth and Keyan Tomaselli . 'The Political Economy of the South African press ', p 74. 
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The authors note that although the government probably disliked the extras it never clamped down on 
them as a politically challenging alternative press. "While the Extras may contribute to the overall 
government dislike of the more liberal newspapers, they have not been singled out for the same 
authoritarian treatment as has been dispensed to newspapers wholly aimed at black readership.,,46 
The Tomasellis and Muller published their collection at a time of many political developments in South 
Africa. At this stage, there was a growing black middle class explicitly encouraged by government and 
large corporations in South Africa. In conjunction with the rise of the black middle class was the rise of 
a strong black press in the 1980s. The UDF47 was central in organising and creating various anti-
apartheid newspapers. The organisation produced many of its own journals and newsletters, which it 
used to spread its message of liberation from apartheid. In tandem were community presses, created in 
black townships across the country. According to Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, they were called 
community presses because of their discourse, which allowed people to identify themselves with a 
certain community. It was also at the height of reform where certain oppressive laws were being 
disbanded. However, critics who wanted more than window dressing changes and were hoping for a 
more egalitarian society continued to be sceptical of these reforms and of the deliberate policy of 
government to create an African middle class. Many saw the South African mainstream press as 
supporters of the large industrialists, whose desire to avoid a socialist or economically uncertain future 
overrode their willingness to join forces with radical opposition movements. Tomaselli, Tomaselli and 
Muller' s critique of liberalism and ofthe English language press is shaped by concerns of this nature. 
46 Ibid, p 75 . 
47 Created in August 1983 at Mitchell ' s Plain, the UDF was an anti-apartheid coalition of various resistance 
groups such as workers, community activists, women and student groups who joined forces . Prominent 
members of the organisation included Desmond Tutu, Alan Boesak and Helen Joseph. The UDF aim was to 
create a broad multi-racial front against the apartheid regime and it adopted the policy of the Freedom Charter. 
It expanded quickly and by 1987 had many affiliate organisations across the country. The UDF activities 
included rent boycotts, mass protests and worker stay-aways. Prominent organisations aligned to the UDF 
included the End Conscription Campaign (ECe). It also formed a partnership with the ANC, which activated 
its war with Inkatha in Natal. 
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However, Elspeth Mackenzie disputes the theories that the English language content was ultimately 
decided on by the big industrial and commercial companies in South Africa. 48 She concludes that 
editors are free to make their own decisions regarding their newspaper content, saying that the 
viewpoints were too diverse between the English language papers on an issue, to conclude that they 
were dictated by commercial directors. Citing the example of the English newspapers ' stance towards 
the 1983 referendum on the new constitution, she writes that: "The different opinions expressed in the 
newspapers showed that there was neither regional conformity nor unanimity within either of the 
publishing houses.,,49 Based on interviews with former editors of the Cape Times , Ken Owen and 
Harvey Tyson, and on their stories, she concludes that they had control over the newspaper content. 
Eric Louw has seen a racialised interest at work in the mainstream press. He argues that despite the 
differences between the Afrikaner and English language presses, they both serve the same racial aim. 
Both are owned by and largely staffed by elements of the same (White) ruling elite. Both clearly paint a picture of 
the world that reflects the interests of the various white ruling class elite "class factions." Hence, both justify the 
status quos (though in marginally different terms in the English and Afrikaans newspapers) to the White readership, 
and both serve to exclude alternative perspectives (that is to say perspectives fundamentally at odds with the ruling 
class). The latter point is important in serving to keep the subordinate classes disorganized.50 
Writing in the same decade, Gerald Shaw does not concede that English language press opposition was 
illusory. His assertion is that despite leftist charges that the English presses were part of the white 
dominated hegemonic system, the fact that Afrikaner nationalism and the government were hostile to 
them is sufficient confirmation of their opposition role. He asks: 
But why the intense hostility by Afrikaner nationalists toward the English language newspapers and why the 
corrosive suspicion and distrust that have led to the appointment oftwo commissions of inquiry into the press since 
1948 and a sustained barrage of anti press rhetoric, characterizing these newspapers as biased, slanderous, pro-
communist and unpatriotic?51 
48 Elspeth Mackenzie. 'The English-language press and the Anglo-American Corporation: an assessment' . In 
Klieo. (26, 1994). 
49Elspeth Mackenzie. ' The English-language press and the Anglo-American Corporation: an assessment' , p 
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50 Eric Louw. 'The English and Afrikaans Press in South Africa', in Communicatio. (10, 1984) pp 31-55. in 
Gordon S Jackson (ed). Breaking Story: The South African Press . (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1993) p 38. 
51 Gerald Shaw. 'The English-Language Press ', in Welsh, David, David Jeffery Butler and Richard Elpick 
(eds). Democratic Liberalism in South Africa its history and prospect. (Middletown: Wesleyan University 
Press 1987) p 293. 
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The English newspapers, he claims, were "liberal minded" and played an important role in South 
African society because of their ability to connect with all racial groups: "South Africa needs liberal 
minded newspapers which are in touch with readers in all communities". 52 Shaw also argues against 
accusations that the large industrial and financial companies controlled the editorial content of the 
English press. This press had its own institutional principles and organisational culture: editorial 
freedom was part of the liberal tradition that existed in the English language newspapers. He pointed 
out that once an editor was appointed it was very difficult to remove them especially if they were well 
respected. 53 In addition, ifthere had been editorial control, it would be harmful to the newspaper's 
credibility and lead to lower morale including a lowering of standards, thus making it imprudent for 
proprietors to interfere in the newspapers. 54 The notion of editorial freedom was closely associated with 
editorial excellence. 55 Shaw defined an alternative press to be one where the editors formed their own 
opinions, working in conjunction with their readership. "A newspaper operating in the liberal tradition, 
competing in the marketplace of ideas is much of the time reflecting the views of the readers as forming 
them, although it may, in times of crisis, move ahead ofthem.,,56 Thus, Shaw puts a strong argument 
for the moral legitimacy of the English press, specifically as a liberal press, in the role as an opposition 
to the apartheid government. Shaw wrote in 1987, apparently motivated by the increasing criticism of 
the English language press by the left - particularly the accusation that it was dictated to by its holding 
comparues. 
The National Party also accused the English language press of being the handmaiden of mining 
interests. However, there undoubtedly was a value system of independence deeply ingrained in the 
English press. This was also the view of Potter, who wrote that: "Newspapers in the mould of the 
English language press acquired an existence independent of their promoters, especially when the 
concept of editorial independence was so highly valued.,,57 Potter argues further that English 
newspapers' first priority was to serve the public interest on which they relied financially, and if the 
newspapers had been merely a mouthpiece for the large industrial companies, strong public interest 
52 Gerald Shaw. 'The English-Language Press ', 300. 
53 Ibid, P 290. 
54 Ibid, P 291. 
55 Ibid, P 291. 
56 Ibid, P 291. 
57 Potter, The Press as Opposition, p 78 . 
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would have been lost. Critics of the English press's domination by mining interests have tended to 
ignore the internal culture of newspapers as a factor operating in favour of public service journalism and 
against the exclusive representation of mining interests. 58 
Writing retrospectively, Jill Wentzel sees the English language press as assuming an unambiguously 
oppositional role to the apartheid government. She has a more radical position on this question, relative 
to the works of Shaw, Potter and Pollak, who all saw the English press as qualified in their oppositional 
power and subject to conditions. Wentzel argues, for example, that "[m]any of the reporters for the 
English language press were also supportive of the UDF and the ANC, so it was hardly surprising that 
the differences between mainstream and the commercial press were not profound.,,59 Moreover, she 
declares that the English language press was often biased in its support of the anti-apartheid 
organisations, and illustrates her point through an analysis of the coverage regarding township 
violence.6o Wenzel describes a substantial number of photographs of victims who suffered through 
police blUtality being published along with comprehensive interviews of police victims. This she 
compared to the few pictures and interviews of victims of violence by political activists. She maintains 
that attacks on the black councillors [collaborative with the government] by anti-government activists 
were often given scant coverage in the English language, liberal press. Wentzel highlights similarities 
between the English language press and the alternative press. She depicts the English press as lending 
full support to the UDF, using the example of the Star. "Though the Star was commonly accused of 
conservatism, it often read like the newsletter of the UDF".61 She argues that the paper gave the UDF 
full coverage, which included coverage of its campaigns, articles written by its members and the 
promotion ofUDF leaders. The Star also highlighted attacks on UDF members whilst, in contrast, 
giving rival organisations like AZAPO negative coverage. Wentzel concludes that the English language 
press was hardly a pawn of the industrial capitalists as proposed by its leftist critics. "I am merely 
pointing out that the English language press did not behave as critics of the capitalist monopoly said it 
did.,,62 
58 Ibid, p 78. 
59 Jill Wentzel. The liberal slideaway. (South Africa: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2001) p139. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, p 140. 
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Finally, and pertinent to my study, in an argument that supports the view that the English press played 
only a limited opposition role, Keyan Tomaselli and Eric Louw discuss how the militarization in South 
Africa affected the South African media in the 1980s. In a conference paper, these authors demonstrate 
how military hardliners had taken over the country' s internal and external affairs since the 1976 Soweto 
riots. They identify a shift that occurred when P.W. Botha, the former Minister of Defence, became 
president and appointed fellow military hardliners to his cabinet, such as Magnus Malan. Tomaselli and 
Louw list the following trends as especially crucial to this period: the sidelining of the extreme right 
wing; the class conflict between different factions within the ruling class being played down; attempts to 
undermine support for both the ANC and the UDF; overt racism being avoided; and growing infiltration 
of the military strategists which involved the formation of a siege mentality. Tomaselli and Louw also 
describe the media' s use of what they labelled 'boo' words (meaning those with negative connotations) 
and ' hooray' words (those with positive connotations). The ' boo ' words included 'communism', 
'UDF', ' terrorist' and ' total onslaught' whilst the ' hooray' words included 'private enterprise', 'boys on 
the border', ' reform' and 'privatization' .63 Their paper was presented at the ASSA conference in Durban 
in 1988, the same year as the Natal Indaba, as well as the ongoing violence in the province between 
Inkatha and the UDF, South Africa' s incursions into Angola, and uncontrollable civil unrest in South 
African townships. It was written during the State of Emergency where the police and army had extra-
judicial control over the country, and were able to detain for six months without trial merely based on 
suspicion. Their paper is therefore a response to these developments and an assessment of news 
coverage in that context. 
What this literature demonstrates is that there has been a scholarly debate about the nature and extent of 
the opposition to the apartheid government levelled by the English-speaking press in South Africa. 
They differ in their views regarding the nature and meaning of the news content, on the influence of its 
alliances to capital, and on the paternalism meted out to black readerships; however, all position the 
English press as a liberal institution. It is notable that both ' sides' ofthis debate clearly position English 
language newspapers as motivated by a fixed conception ofliberalism or ' liberal tradition', claiming 
63 Tomaselli and Louw. Militarization, Hegemony and the South Af rican p ress, p 5. 
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that tradition either as virtue or as a limitation. Liberalism, in the South African historiography is 
considered an endemic quality of English newspaper culture, to some extent emerging from its 
reputation a set characteristic of English South African-ness itself in the face of Afrikaner nationalist 
politics. 
What is the nature of Liberalism? 
In direct relation to the oppositional role of the English language press in South Africa, then, and for the 
purposes of my study particularly related to the period of militarization, is an understanding of the 
nature of liberalism. The role and nature of liberalism in South Africa has been another point of debate 
by academics and activists. South African liberalism is described by proponents, such as Helen Suzman 
and Ken Owen, as a humanist and nonconformist tradition, which was in steady opposition to the 
apartheid system. However, many critics, from Steve Biko in the 1970s to Kader Asmal in the early 
1990s, have attacked liberalism as counterproductive to the struggle against apartheid and even an 
oppressive tool used by privileged white people. In response to such critiques, David Welsh and others 
defend liberalism as playing a watchdog role in the apartheid years as well as contributing to the values 
of the new constitution. In the collection Ironic Victory: liberalism in post-liberation South Africa 
edited by R.W. Johnson and David Welsh, the authors attempt to refute the accusation that liberals were 
a hindrance to the struggle against apartheid and racial inequality in South Africa. Welsh lists the 
virtues of one interpretation of liberalism, including tolerance for all viewpoints, compassion, the end of 
social and economic inequality, a belief in the rights of the individual, as well as basic human rights and 
a rule oflaw that would ensure the above protection.64 He contends that liberalism's flexible approach 
enabled it to be both relevant and realistic for any society - a universal, both adaptable and dynamic. 
"Liberalism's very flexibility and its open-endedness within the broad parameters of its core values have 
enabled it to be dynamic, adaptable and pragmatic.,,65 Welsh also claims that when liberals aimed to 
reform a system that was unfair and exploitative such as the apartheid system, for example, they argued 
that racial conflict coupled with violence and bloodshed would occur if progressive changes in the law 
64 David Welsh 'The liberal inheritance', in Ironic victory: liberalism in post-liberation South A/rica, in 
Johnson, R.W. and David Welsh, eds. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998) p 1-2. 
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were not forthcoming. "For most liberals, this has been an important argument for the progressive 
extension of political rights. Continued exclusion, coupled with pervasive exploitation and 
discrimination, was the recipe for a dangerous backlash among the excluded.,,66 Welsh names as 
'liberals' during apartheid South Africa anyone who believed in giving equal rights to people of all 
races and were therefore opposed to any form of racial discrimination.67 He cites liberalism's origins in 
South Africa as dating from Union in 1910, when white liberals fought for black people's equality and 
enfranchisement in the voting system. He contends that that they fought against government's 
segregation of races, such as the 1913 Natives Land Act, which mapped out racialised territories and 
land ownership. Liberals also fought against the apartheid laws since 1948, which evolved from earlier 
segregation laws. In their continuing battle for equality, South African liberals were particularly against 
state centralization, preferring "a federal system for South Africa as a defence against an overweening 
central government.,,68 The book Ironic Victory: liberalism in post-liberation South Africa was 
published in 1998 - four years after the ANC had taken control over the country. This book is a 
response to the repeated attacks on liberalism in the second half of the 1990s by Marxist and Africanist 
writers. 
Liberals are said by some to have a commitment to the rule of law, defined as a set of principles based 
on a wide and fundamental humanist assumption of civil liberties such as freedom of speech.69 This 
view is asserted by John Dugard who also describes the rule oflaw as the belief that all people have the 
right to a fair trial and equal treatment under the law. He also proclaimed that many liberals in South 
Africa had embraced this concept. The rule of law and the advancement of civil liberties (or human 
rights in modem parlance) have always been among the main practices of liberals in South Africa.,,7o 
Debates about the politics of liberalism are also evident in the book Watchdogs or Hypocrites , which 
features both criticisms and justifications for liberalism. Published in 1997, it contains a collection of 
66 Ibid, P 4. 
67 Ibid, P 4. 
68 Ibid, p 6. 
69 John Dugard. 'Human rights and the rule oflaw I ' .' in Welsh, David Jeffery Butler and Richard Elpick 
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newspaper articles and papers from 1990 to 1996 representing arguments over liberalism' s role in the 
struggle of liberation. Many of these were written at the time of the transition to democracy and the 
period just before that, and therefore constituted a debate about liberalism' s role in liberation politics 
and the transition. In many of these debates, liberalism is constructed as a racialised, white, political 
philosophy. For example, Bennie Bunsie argued liberals were patronizing in their support for black 
people' s rights. "They entered the black struggle to teach us the superiority of their culture, into 
which they wished to assimilate us, without attempting to understand the culture, history and 
civilization of the African people.,,71 He elaborated that many black people had been alienated from 
liberalism. " It is this patron ism [sic] that blacks condemn and regard as dangerous. It was this attitude 
that induced Steve Biko and others to launch the Black Consciousness Movement."n 
Reprinted in the same volume is Kader Asmal and Keith Roberts' s argument from 1991 that liberals 
were not fully committed to the fight for racial equality in South Africa and were weak in their support 
for progressive organisations such as the ECC.73 The AZAPO chair, ltumeleng Mosala, went further in 
attacking liberals by describing liberalism as a tool of oppression. "It is a powerful tool by means of 
which black people can be paralyzed into perpetual slavery and dependence. ,,74 He asserted that, 
liberalism is a powerful weapon used by whites against anyone who attacked their ideology.75 Despite 
white liberals being in opposition to apartheid they failed to support the necessary alternatives and rather 
displayed lethargy. Alistair Sparks uses a quote from Williams to drive his point. 
Our South African brand of progressive liberalism failed largely because most times we were long on principle and 
short on practice. We stood for the rights of man but did not do enough for the women and children who were 
deprived of those rights, except to talk about them in the cosy confines of our homes, our meetings and in the 
cosiness of the Nationalist controlled political institutions.76 
7 1 Bennie Bunsie. 'Liberalism still taboo ', Sowetan, 19 June 1997. Extracted from F.N Stiftung (ed). 
Watchdogs or Hypocrites: The amazing debate on South African liberals and liberalism. (Johannesburg: 
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 1997) p 288. 
72 Bennie Bunsie. 'Liberalism still taboo ' 
73 Asmal , Kader and Keith Roberts. 'Liberal isms hollow core ', Sunday Times 1 October 1995. Extracted from 
F.N Stiftung (ed). Watchdogs or Hypocrites: The amazing debate on South African liberals and liberalism. 
(Johannesburg: Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 1997) p 92. 
74 lthumeleng Mosala. 'Focus on AZAPO', The Sowetan , 18 August 1993. Extracted from F.N Stiftung (ed). 
Watchdogs or Hypocrites: The amazing debate on South African liberals and liberalism. (Johannesburg: 
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 1997) p 14. 
75 h It umeleng Mosala. ' Focus on AZAPO', p 14. 
76 Sparks ' Yes it means the whole hog', p 3. 
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Helen Suzman and others have come to the defence of liberals and the ideology of liberalism during the 
apartheid years. In response to accusations that liberalism was an obstacle in the struggle, Welsh 
describes the liberal's 'watchdog role ' in South Africa during the apartheid era. He is adamant that 
liberals exposed the atrocities of apartheid system thus effectively being a thorn in the flesh of the ruling 
party. "Their incessant nagging, their ability to expose the human costs of apartheid and their unceasing 
championing of an alternative vision of society based on respect for human rights must have been like 
water torture for the Nationalists.,,77 He further states that liberals were responsible for bringing the 
Nationalist party to accept the principles of equality and justice for all in South Africa, which led to an 
aversion of violent conflict. "Liberals can take credit for removing the blinkers that blinded so many 
Nationalists for so long. For a minority to have yielded power to the majority without the devastation of 
a civil war was a process with few historical precedents.,,78 
Welsh also defends liberals against accusations that they were secretly, or in effect, supporting the basic 
status quo of white superiority whilst in opposition to apartheid, by asserting that liberals were ' realists ' 
who were against the revolutionary violence because of its futility to cause meaningful social change. 
Liberals, he said, took advantages of opportunities to work for reform. 
The accusation that they were covert defenders of the status quo is not only absurd but is insulting. True they were 
not revolutionaries, but realists who recognized that the state could not be overthrown by the efforts of the armed 
struggle. South African liberals have always been reformist, seeking incremental change of a cumulative nature 
and, where possible, seizing opportunities that created additional political space. 79 
John Dugard also defends the role of liberalism in South African society stating that it had a role to play 
in moving Afrikaner nationalism to a more flexible mindset. Notably silent on the role of black and 
racial opposition as a revolutionary force, he describes the liberal pressure exerted publicly among other 
factors in bringing about change. 
The liberal belief in the rule of law and the recognition of human rights as necessary pi llars of a decent society have 
at least penetrated Afrikaner nationalist thought and begun to influence the legal process and the constitutional 
debate. International opinion is partly responsible for this new approach. But liberals must take some of the credit. 
77 David Welsh ' Introduction ', in Johnson, R. W. and David Welsh (eds). Ironic victory: liberalism in post-
~g~ration South A/rica, Johnson, R.W. and David Welsh, eds. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998) p 
78 David Welsh ' Introduction ', p 5. 
79 Ibid, P 17. 
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Their perseverance and commitment to liberal values have to some degree triumphed over an ideology that exalted 
the state over the principle of equality and individual liberty. 80 
Dugard claims that since 1910 liberals had been actors in pressurizing the governments of the day to 
accept the principles of human rights and the rule of law. One later example is liberal efforts to protest 
the 1956 Separate Voter's Bill where coloureds were removed from the voting roll. Despite conceding 
that this action from liberals did not have much impact on the laws, Dugard states that the liberal 
propagation of the rule oflaw did have an impact on Afrikaner nationalists' mindsets regarding justice 
and human rights and moved these to ones that are more progressive. "Although most of the laws that 
run counter to the principles inherent in the rule of law remain unchanged, Afrikaner nationalist's 
attitudes towards notions of justice of human rights have certainly altered" .81 Paul Pereira also entered 
the fray, responding to accusations by Alistair Sparks for criticizing certain aspects of the ANC. In his 
defence of liberals, he states that the ANC shared similarities to the apartheid government in their 
methods of liberation. 
Mr. Sparks describes these liberals as conservatives. Yet conservatives would by their very nature, tend to defend 
the present style of governing and would fail to see the similarities between the government's censor boards and the 
ANC's cultural desks, between government officials shouting "communist" and ANC supporters shouting "sell 
out", between a government whose agents kill people and a liberation movement whose agents kill people in 
detention, between a government who relies on centralized power and the ANC who profess to do likewise, between 
the totalitarian concept of volk, and the concept of the people' s wil1.82 
Finally, in defence of liberals, high profile liberal Afrikaner Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert wrote that, 
" liberals have not only proclaimed and sermonized. They were active in civil society, business and 
politics and some of the more pragmatic good sense obviously prevailed until today.,,83 
Jill Wentzel, in a South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) publication, took a radically 
different stance from the above critics of liberalism. She has insisted that, since 1984, liberals in South 
Africa were too biased in favour of black liberation movements like the UDF and the ANC and thus not 
80 John Dugard. ' Human rights and the rule oflaw I ', P 271. 
81 Ibid, P 271. 
82 Paul Pereira. 'Response to Alistair Sparks ' , The Star 26 November 1991. Extracted from F.N Stiftung (ed). 
Watchdogs or Hypocrites: The amazing debate on South African liberals and liberalism. (Johannesburg: 
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 1997) p 7. 
83 Frederick Van Zyl Siabbert. 'Fashioning a new role for fashionable liberalism ', Sunday Times 6 June 1993. 
Extracted from F.N Stiftung (ed). Watchdogs or Hypocrites: The amazing debate on South African liberals and 
liberalism. (Johannesburg: Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 1997) p 10. 
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adhering to principles of objectivity. She partially blames the liberals for their failure to expose and 
address the atrocities and disruptions committed by the UDF and school students in their campaign 
against Bantu Education. She also states in her introduction that the 'miraculous' peace deal between 
the govemment and the ANC was not a result of liberal action. In this account, she avows that liberals 
lost their most important values, which had previously made them important and reliable sources of 
information during the 1960s and 1970s. A disturbingly large number of liberals - in fact most of the 
liberal constituency - lost their pragmatism, their critical facilities and their willingness to court 
unpopularity in the pursuit of truth and succumbed instead to the kind of romanticism they had always 
despised.84 
Wentzel argues that despite obvious changes in the social and political climate, the liberals were still in 
the mindset from the 'Verwoerdian era' of black victimization and the extreme advance of white 
privilege. With govemment reforms and the rise of a powerful liberation movement, liberals should not 
have continued to position blacks as helpless victims without voice. She partially attributes this attitude 
to timidity in the face of attacks on liberals by Africanist movements such as Black Consciousness, who 
viewed liberals as part of the white dominated system. It was a pattem of guilt and a desire to attain 
their anti-apartheid credentials that led liberals to an unbalanced bias towards the black liberation 
movements. The UDF caught the imagination and support of liberals. However, the dichotomous 
nature of the 1980s and liberals desire to boost their anti-apartheid credentials had liberals not wanting 
to question the UDF's often controversial policies and actions in its goal to overthrow the apartheid 
regime. They also, in Wentzel's account, ignored the controversial revolutionary rhetoric and its attacks 
on officials, blindly believing the UDF's intentions as being purely noble ones. 
Liberals were reluctant to admit that the UDF's campaign was to render the country ungovernable rather than to 
organise a nationwide campaign of peaceful protest. Largely they dealt with their misgivings by simply ignoring 
the revolutionary rhetoric and targeted attacks on black constables, policemen and political rivals that began early in 
the unrest. 85 
Most liberals refused to attribute the violence in the townships to UDF activists; instead choosing to 
blame the security forces exclusively even when, according to Wentzel, activists started the violence. 
This was done, repeats Wentzel, to maintain political credibility. 
84 Jill Wentzel, The Liberal Slideaway, pI. 
85 Ibid, p 34. 
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Rather than criticize or question the wisdom of some of the tactics of the UDF, churchmen and the liberals preferred 
to blame the bulk of the violence on people and organisations they could attack without damaging their anti-
apartheid credentials.
86 
Many liberals saw the organisation of consumer boycotts and worker strikes by the UDF as being 
conducted in a democratic fashion and blamed government and institutional violence for clashes that 
occurred. In Wentzel's view 
Even the very brutal methods of coercion were blamed on the effects of violence, and for this reason neither the 
Black Sash nor the English mainstream press, neither the PFP nor the churches, ever mounted a serious challenge to 
liberatory strategies that resulted in assault and murder.
87 
As a member of the Black Sash in the 1980s, Wentzel recalls certain silences in their meetings and 
accounts, for example, of people having their hands burnt and being forced to drink cooking oil for not 
participating in certain consumer boycotts. In ignoring the atrocities allegedly committed by activists, 
liberals were ignoring the hostile conditions, which township people had to face daily. She also accused 
them of having been out of touch with the sufferings of black people. 
The violence in the townships - the central issue of the times - was pushed off the centre stage. For liberals, living in 
their separate and more comfortable suburbs it was not the centre issue. For township residents it was the stuff of their 
daily lives. Though the victims of apartheid were also the victims of liberatory violence, it became impossible to say so 
without being accused of insensitivity to the suffering of black people. In this way, the rhetoric of the slideaway turned 
the truth upside down for liberals ' silence in the face of coercion and intimidation was the ultimate insensitivity to the 
suffering of black people.88 
Wentzels' The Liberal Slideaway was published in 1995 after the 1994 elections, when the ANC had 
taken power. She writes in the context of what was seen by many to be a miraculous agreement 
between the NP and the ANC, thus avoiding mention of the violent civil war waging in the province of 
Natal. Additionally, this book was also published before the documentations of victims' stories by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), so it illustrates the frustration that she felt about liberal 
ignorance of atrocities committed within the liberation movement and its civilian casualties. She is also 
writing in the context where township schools were still suffering from unrest and ill discipline - a 
result of the 1980s unrest and boycott disruptions in these schools. Wentzel concludes that liberals fell 
into the dichotic mindset of the 1980s, and lost their principled basis for an independent response. 
86 Ibid, P 49. 
87 Ibid, P 52. 
88 Ibid, P 121. 
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New questions for old answers 
Wentzel's analysis represents a relatively unique critique of the failures ofliberalism on its own stated 
terms. Otherwise, the debate is a roundly dichotomous one waged between critics and proponents of 
liberalism as a political strategy. Debates about the role of the English language press under apartheid, 
are paralleled with debates about the role of doctrines of liberalism and those who espouse their 
principles. These have been cast largely as moral arguments. Did the English language press constitute 
an opposition to apartheid? If so, how strong or weak was that opposition? If not, can it be described as 
a tool in the hands of white supremacist power? As paternalistic? As an expression of capital interests? 
These questions, to some extent, reflect a political impasse. They reflect certain assumptions about the 
way that liberalism is understood in South Africa as a racial, cultural, and class-based phenomenon. In 
the case of the Natal Witness, there has been the assumption that a liberal press naturally reflects the 
provincial character of 'white' Natal as a liberal, 'English' province. Yet, the English press has not 
really been explored for its role in generating the vocabulary of liberalism that acts as a referent for 
activists and civilians in relation to political change. Political discourses informing South African 
politics have surely not emerged apart from their relation to specific historical events. Abstract 
principles must be applied and utilized in prescribed actions and ongoing analysis in order to be realized 
as a political doctrine. The 'liberal public' cited in the above debates existed in relation to the organs of 
knowledge transmission and analysis, as readers of newspapers, as much as holders of principles. 
The formation of a 'liberal public' through cultures of 'print capitalism' represented in Natal by the 
'liberal' English language newspapers such as the Natal Witness, illustrates various culturalist theories 
on the news media. Benedict Anderson in his work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread ofNationalism89, speaks about the development of nationalist identities amongst peoples 
who come to imagine themselves to be a unified body. Print media enable different and diverse people 
to share a common sense of community. Shehla Burney in her journal article Manufacturing 
89 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism London: 
Verso, 1991. 
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Nationalism: Post September 11 Discourse in United States Media90 also writes about the power of the 
press and media, in this case creating an emotive nationalism in the United States. Burnley states that 
the, "US (A) vs. THEM discourse has been a mainstay of much representation in the media.,,91 She also 
asserts that cultural nationalism had become very much linked to what she sees as an imperial policy by 
the US towards the Middle East. 
Language is key in this formula, but so is the transmission of ideas about what constitutes 
newsworthiness and how news is analysed. Emerging in a colonial context like Natal with a strong sense 
of diasporic identification engaged over time, newspapers contribute to an ethno-linguistic sense of 
culture in dialogue with that of the - in Natal's case - British metropole. From this perspective, 
liberalism can be seen not merely as a political doctrine but also as a culture, that references itself in 
relation to the wider world of West em or British political values. English language newspapers, in this 
line of thought, serve as a vector of liberal cultural values in the face of local political events. This view 
illustrated points from Andrew Heywood in his work Political Theory: an Introduction, where he writes 
about Nationalism having a cultural entity.92 
This study documents, in detail, the construction of a political vocabulary of liberalism in relation to key 
events of militarization and political violence. It was in relation to such events, and to the methods of 
reporting and sourcing utilized, that this English language newspaper created (as Paul Rich has 
described liberalism) an adaptable and shifting discourse of moderation and 'responsible' social change 
that informed expressions of liberal political culture. Opposition to the government is most certainly 
apparent in the news coverage, opinion and letters that fill the pages of the Witness in the period I am 
focusing on. But the very polarisation of politics at this time helps show how the nature of this 
opposition was positioned within a regional 'imagined community' with concerns for class, family and 
Anglophone culture that reflect the socio-economic divisions within South Africa itself. 
90 Shehla Burnley. 'Manufacturing Nationalism: Post - September 11 Discourse in the United States Media' 
(University of Toronto Press, 2002). 
91 Shehla Burnley. 'Manufacturing Nationalism: Post - September 11 Discourse in the United States Media', 
p2. 
92 Andrew Heywood, Political Theory: An Introduction (Second ed). London: Macmillan Press, 1999. 
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Research methodology 
I have used a qualitative method in my research, which in contrast with quantitative research does not 
rely on numerical figures to determine significance. My adaptation of this approach included the 
formulation of sampling. I was required to consider how to select what I saw as key important events 
and to consider how to identify key issues within these events. It seemed advantageous to look to larger 
definitions of political violence, border war violence, and civil war brought directly into the Witness 's 
back yard, and into the families of its readership - to gain a sense of the press' s response. Quantitative 
research has its various advantages. With quantitative analysis, I would have entered key words using a 
search engine on scanned documents in a wider selection of years. This would have enabled me to get a 
sense of how much interest there was in the paper about the topics and would have provided me with a 
direct path to these topics. It would also have allowed me to cluster different key terms and drawn my 
attention to particular publications. However, for my Masters thesis, I strongly felt that a richer reading 
would come from selecting key periods and then examining clusters of papers in their context. I would 
have used a quantitative method only as an additional source of information, not as a primary method, 
and doing this would have required a different technical expertise, one too ambitious to consider for this 
particular project. R.C. Mishra's description of qualitative research as providing for situational and 
contextual understanding of the research fits what I have done in this thesis. 93 W.H. Weiss also states 
that qualitative research allows for a more holistic approach to research, which makes this method 
conducive to both my research, and historical research more generally.94 MQ Patton states the 
following about qualitative research. "Qualitative methods permit the evaluator to study selected issues, 
cases, or events in depth and detail. Data collection is not constrained by predetermined categories of 
analysis, allowing for a level of depth and detail that quantitative strategies can't provide.,,95 
Approaching my material, this way enabled me to consider aspects that I would not have noticed 
through a quantitative content analysis of a larger sample of issues. Thus, the use of qualitative analysis 
to investigate the Natal Witness between 1976 and 1989 allowed me to establish a concentrated 
93 R.C, Mishra. Exploring education research. (New York City APH Pub, 2005.) p 46. 
94 Carol Weiss. Evaluation methods for studying programs and policies (2nd ed.) (Upper Saddle River, 1998) p 
102. 
95 Michael Patton. Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3 rd ed.). (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2000.) p 56 . 
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understanding of the nature of liberal discourse and supposed governmental opposition of the Natal 
Witness concerning South Africa's militarization within this period. 
This research has involved an analysis of microfilm and hardcopies of the Natal Witness, with my data 
drawn from the Don Africana Library at the Liberty Life Towers and the Pietermaritzburg Resource 
Centre, as well as archives from the Witness office in Pietermaritzburg. A period of thirteen years of 
daily news requires a sample of newspaper coverage taken around events that, I argue, can reveal 
broader trends in discourse and coverage, though I am aware of the inevitable limitations and dangers of 
exclusion. I have chosen five events, or clusters of events, that I considered key, and my analysis was 
based on all issues of the newspaper published five to six weeks following, or surrounding, each of these 
event clusters. For each newspaper in the period selected, I describe the content in detail and provide 
some analysis, with particular attention to the first four pages where newspapers generally place what 
they consider the most important. In addition, I examine all opinions pages, editorials and letters. 
The first events I examine, written as Chapter One are the Soweto uprisings from 16 June 1976. This is 
considered by many South African historians to be a watershed moment in the country's history, 
regarding resistance to apartheid. The second set of turning points, represented in Chapter Two, is the 
South African Defence Force (SADF) operations in Angola, namely Operation Reindeer and Operation 
Protea, which took place in 1978 and 1981 respectively. Operation Reindeer was the first major military 
operation by the SADF in Angola. According to Tony Weaver, the Cassinga Raid (part of Operation 
Reindeer) stands out between 1975 and 1978 as a landmark event in the South African border wars as an 
example of South African aggression.96 She details the strong evidence behind claims by the South 
West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) that the attack by the SADF was on a refugee camp full 
of women and children. This controversy could have discredited the South African war effort and 
brought into question the conscription of white South African youth. Operation Protea, three years later 
was the biggest SADF military operation since World War II, where the SADF invaded Angola to attack 
SWAPO bases. This operation was highly successful for Nationalist government propaganda, with 
SADF troops turning up documents and Soviet weapons thereby proving a Soviet link to SWAPO. This 
96 Tony Weaver. 'The South African Defence Force in Namibia', in Jaclyn Cock and Laurie Nathan. War and 
Society: The militarisation of South Africa, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989) p 93. 
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operation might have pulled the debate on conscription the other way, as it underscored the State' s 
continual Cold War claim that the SADF were fighting communists. 
Chapter Three traces ideologies of Die Rooi Gevaar, ' total onslaught' and the battle of Cuito Cuanavale 
in Angola. The SADF entered Angola in September 1987 to take Cuito Cuanavale, which they 
considered a key base for SW APO insurgents and eventually pulled out of the battle in June 1988. The 
period I am researching in this battle is between November 2 and December 14 1987. This was one of 
the periods characterised by the heaviest fighting. In the same period, key political moments in Natal 
regional, and also national, life occurred: the Natal Indaba, which was set to negotiate an alliance 
between capital and black protest, and the release of Govan Mbeki, a key ANC political prisoner who 
served time on Robben Island for his conviction of treason by the state. 
Finally, Chapter Four explores conflict and militarization in the province of Natal, home of the Natal 
Witness, and documents the debate over conscription and the UDF-Inkatha conflicts that fall within the 




The Natal Witness's ambivalent approach to the Soweto youth uprisings 
On 16 June 1976, schoolchildren in the Johannesburg township of Soweto boycotted classes and 
marched on the streets bearing slogans as well as chanting anti-government choruses. What made this 
turn in historical events was their confrontation with the South African police force, who met the 
strikers at Orlando West Junior Secondary school where 50 police were situated. Police threw teargas at 
the crowd who responded by throwing stones. The police then opened fire killing some of the protestors 
- the dead included children. A highly publicized death was that of Hector Pieterson aged thirteen. A 
wave of international condemnation followed as pictures of his body, carried by a grieving classmate, 
were transmitted internationally. This day also set off a storm of violence in Soweto for the next year, 
ending only in late 1977, when the police finally put down the unrest. Acts of violence in Soweto 
between June 1976 and the end of 1977 included the setting alight of buildings, the looting of shops, the 
blowing up of vehicles and people representing oppression being attacked. The rebellion spread through 
different parts of the country from the Transvaal, to coloured and black schools in the Western Cape.97 
The government responded with a strong speech by Jimmy Kruger on 18 June. In addressing the world 
and South Africa, he stated that the government would not be intimidated by internal unrest and 
international pressure. Two days later this culminated in the extension of the Riotous Assembly's Act 
which imposed a national ban on all political meetings. In the same week, the violence continued 
against a backdrop ofB. J. Vorster's appointment with Henry Kissinger. From 24 June to 31 June, the 
conflict extended from areas around Soweto to the Rand. Many arrests were made. Between 1 July and 
7 July, the violence extended to places around Pretoria. During the period, the government debated the 
language issue. From 14 July to 28 July, the national ban on political meetings was extended to the end 
of the year and black children gradually returned to school. 
97 Brooks, Alan and Jeremy Brickhill. Whirlwind before the storm: the origins and development of the uprising 
in Soweto and the rest of South Africa from June to December 1976. (London: International Defence and Aid 
Fund for Southern Africa, 1980) 
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In this chapter, I explore how the Natal Witness covered the Soweto uprisings of 1976 and how that 
coverage bears on the construction of liberal discourse regarding political violence and the prospects of 
political change in South Africa. I will also be analyzing its stance towards the NP government and its 
policies as well as considering the nature ofthe paper's opposition. 
There are three key themes coming out of my research. The first one I will be addressing is how black 
protest was represented in the Natal Witness. The newspaper constructed a distinction between what it 
deemed 'responsible' black protestors, who believed in mediation and non-violent action, and 'radical' 
black protestors who were involved in violent struggle. The second theme is the use and representation 
of official sources and the official viewpoints, which included statements from high-ranking officials of 
government as well as the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF), 
regarding the uprisings and the protests. Here I will also examine the responses in the editorials, and 
columns including letters written by members of the public. The third theme I will cover is how the 
Natal Witness used non-official sources such as liberal individuals, non-governmental organisations and 
international sources. These themes show the newspaper's role not only in producing an idea of 
objectivity and balance in its reporting, but also in presenting an overall picture of viable change that 
gave meaning to emerging liberal political ideals. 
In examining my key themes, I analyze all daily issues of the Natal Witness that ran from 17 June to 28 
July 1976. Within this sample, I found eighty-three articles related to the unrest in Soweto, including 
the violence on June 16 and the aftermath. Among these were nineteen articles dealing with black 
demonstrators in Soweto and the Rand area and fourteen articles featuring official government 
statements on the violence. Seven articles covered statements from non-governmental groups and eight 
focused on statements from prominent members of South African society not connected to government. 
There were four articles on civil defence, which reflected concern over national security. In the opinion 
section, fourteen commentaries focused on the Soweto uprisings, eight of these being editorials whilst 
six were columns. I also found six letters, which represented public responses to coverage by the Natal 
Witness. 
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Various security laws made it illegal to report statistics on the uprisings from unofficial sources. The 
ftrst was the Official Secrets Act of 1956 - a law that curbed discussion on matters related to national 
security. This act was amended in 1965, (in a way which) criminalized the publication of information 
regarding police activities without permission from the Minister of Defence. In generating copy, the 
Natal Witness relied on several sources. One source of information was official newssheets released by 
the South African government. The paper also relied on the SAP to provide statistics. However, it was 
able to report the unrest without using police sources. For example, its reports of the violence in Soweto 
were taken from eyewitness journalists from their own paper, as well as other journalists. The World 
was also a prominent source of reporting from other newspaper ' s accounts. As a further source, the 
Natal Witness used the media agency, the South African Press Association (SAP A) for information and 
selected articles. 
War of words: Natal Witness reports on the Soweto uprising 
In their editorial and opinion pages, the Natal Witness took a strong stand against the South African 
authorities' actions concerning the Soweto youth protests. The ftrst article concerning the violence in 
Soweto was two days following the main events of 16 June.98 In condemnation of the government's 
role in the Soweto violence and the death of schoolchildren at the hands of its police, the Natal Witness 
published a number of editorials and columns, which collectively offered up a theory about the causes of 
violence and set up an oppositional discourse in relation to the official government line. On 18 June 
1976, an editorial condemned the government for its unfair racial laws and asserted that these were the 
cause for the violence. Entitled 'The government was warned' the editorial presented the view that, 
" [w]hile there are no doubt several contributory reasons for the Soweto riots, their proximate cause has 
been the authorities ' intransigent attitude, over a long period towards the use of Afrikaans as a medium 
of instruction in Soweto schools.,,99 The editorial pointed out that protests could not have come as a 
surprise since " ... the government had been warned between 1974 and 1976 by progressive organisations 
98 Significantly there were no reports from 16 June 1976. It is unclear why, but presumably the Natal Witness 
had already published its daily before news came through. 
99 'The govt was warned ' , Natal Witness, 18 June 1976, p 12. 
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such as the homeland leaders in March 1974, and the South African Teachers Association (ATASA), in 
January 1975.,, 100 The editorial concluded that for violence to end and racial tension to improve, 
'whites ' needed to know that they could no longer impose whatever they wanted on black people. 
"[U]n1ess the whites realize that blacks are people who need to be consulted about how they want to 
live; the prospects for peaceful coexistence between the races in South Africa are bleak." lOl The 
editorial displays some key ideas that were to be themes in later reporting in this period: the idea that 
violence was the inevitable institutional outcome of National Party race policy, which in tum precluded 
'peaceful co-existence', a notion that appears to affirm the idea of distinctive ' race groups' even as it 
denounces apartheid policies. 
The Natal Witness also published the government's own analysis of the causes of the Soweto uprisings 
and the conduct of the police force in the unrest. The government set out to deny that the uprising was 
the spontaneous action of children. Instead, they blamed the violence in Soweto on adult 'agitators' 
spreading misinformation and stirring up crowds into violence. Drawing upon Cold War rhetoric, which 
held purchase on the continent that had flashpoints of armed struggle in nationalist bids for 
independence, it portrayed the protestors as pawns of the Soviet Union, which clandestinely wanted to 
control South Africa because of its strategic position in the battle between communism and capitalism. 
The government also defended the conduct of the police force. On 19 June, the Natal Witness covered 
President BJ Vorster' s claim that the unrest was a planned attempt to create disorder and division in the 
country. "Mr. Vorster said that it was clear that the unrest was not of a spontaneous nature but a 
determined effort to cause panic and a polarization between white and black". 102 Spreading rumours, he 
continued, was also a tactic of the subversive forces. "The aim was to sow large-scale panic by 
spreading false rumours. The public should be wary of rumours of this nature which were very likely to 
be spread and which were circulated to spread panic." 103 
In the same issue, the Natal Witness published two opinion articles blaming the government and 
authorities for the unrest. One of these identified the proposed use of Afrikaans as the medium for 
100 Ibid. 
10 1 Ibid. 
102 South African Press Association SAPA. 'Unrest was planned ' Natal Witness 19 June 1976 p 3 
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teaching in schools as the activator of the unrest in Soweto. "The immediate cause is clear - the forcing 
of African secondary school pupils to study subjects difficult enough in themselves, through a language 
with which they and their teachers are most inadequately acquainted and for which they see little need in 
their lives." 104 Twentieth century conflicts between Afrikaans and English speakers, as well as 
undoubtedly deeply rooted ethnic prejudices, were clearly seen in overt and covert references by some 
of the voices that were to emerge in these weeks. The second opinion article was by Bob Thompson (a 
full-time weekly columnist employed by the Natal Witness who wrote on political life and linked it to 
Christian ethics based on his interpretation of the Christian bible), entitled 'Underneath the black 
iceberg'. He deemed the Soweto unrest an urgent message for a change in direction of South African 
society. "This week's events in Soweto are both a tragedy and a painful lesson for all who wish to hear. 
Unless we heed the alarm that has been sounded here, and change direction, we are in danger of running 
on to the rocks of serious social distress.,,105 This writer used the phrase 'running on to the rocks' as a 
nautical metaphor for violence just under the surface -similar to the 'black iceberg' in the title of his 
piece. He also stated that government violence would not solve the conflict, and rather a change in 
attitude from government was needed. 
The issues are far deeper than the question of Afrikaans medium teaching in black schools, and the response 
required is therefore more far-reaching than review of African education. The tragedy in the demonstration shown 
by the police, and even by the army, and the only answer South Africa has to the aspirations of the majority of her 
people is the loaded gun. But no man can shoot an ideal, and every bullet shot will mUltiply the frustrations of those 
who are left behind. Soweto has exposed the underneath of the iceberg of black passion. This has been costly but 
what can you expect when a people have nothing to lose but life and are prepared to pay the costs" .106 
This is a comment on the militarization of South African society and it demonstrated a strong 
antagonism to it. It also contains a sense of threat, the anger of a majority that has little to lose. There is 
a sense that these words addressed a fear rife within the community of readership of the radicalisation of 
the masses, who through frustration and violence were being shaped into a destructive body. 
Meanwhile, two days later, in an official statement summarized by the Natal Witness, the Minister of 
Justice and Police Mr. Jimmy Kruger praised the police, comparing them to the Royal Air force (RAF) 
fighter pilots in World War II. "The police action reminded him of Winston Churchill's praise for the 
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Battle of Britain pilots - never had so much been owed to so few." I07 Kruger defended his department's 
decision to use live ammunition, highlighting the official conception of the need for drastic political 
discipline: 
Mr. Kruger however discounted the use of rubber bullets, which he said would not work in South Africa. "The 
moment people in a riotous situation know you have rubber bullets it means in effect you have rubber guns. They 
must realize that if things get out of hand the police have no option but to keep law and order.,,108 
What is clear is that the sense of threat was agreed upon by both 'sides' in this debate over the nature of 
political violence. While Thomson laments the provocation of black anger into a threat that could sink 
society, Kruger is arguing on how that threat must be dealt with in order to 'keep law and order'. 
Denouncement of government provocation is a theme that emerges in a number of forms. In this same 
issue, the Natal Witness published a letter by an anonymous writer who called her or himself ' South 
African but not as proud as should be', which addressed the question of provocation as an 'ethnic' issue 
of Afrikaner Nationalism and the government use of Afrikaans. "The Afrikaans people are as proud of 
their language as any other nation, but a little restraint in trying to enforce it in this way will help avoid 
further bitterness and ill feeling. ,, 109 The writer further urged those in government to empathize with the 
black population over the language issue. "How would the average Afrikaner like the idea of being 
taught geography in Zulu or Xhosa? I have some very fine Afrikaans friends and am proud to number 
them as such, but they are not radicals and extremists."IIO This letter is a plea for the values of empathy 
and moderation, significantly defined and appealed to within a discourse emphasizing ethnic 
differences. 
Other letters published in the Witness were sympathetic to police conduct. On 21 June 1976, a letter by 
D.L Scannell which proclaimed with bitterness that the 'Police can never be right' was printed in the 
Natal Witness. The writer criticized Mr. Mosala' s viewpoints (which I discuss in the following pages) 
printed in the Natal Witness on 17 June. He stated that, "Mr. Mosala takes the police to task for having 
become involved, in that they confronted the students. If on the other hand the police - in response to 
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previous analogous situations - decided to stay away from Soweto and leave the Soweto students to run 
amok they would be accused of not raising a finger to control the crowds". III This contributor 
perceived a no win situation for the police and defended their actions. In contrast, another letter 
published the same day by F.J Van Wyk, who was at the time the director of the South African Institute 
of Race Relations (SAIRR), complained that the government had been warned by multiple 
organisations. Van Wyk blamed the government for not reacting to 'warnings': "[f]ailure to act wisely 
in time is the prime cause of the deaths and injuries, of destruction of property and a tragic disturbance 
of public order and race relations." I 12 Views of government failure to respond 'wisely in time' to voices 
of 'warning' suggest a broad sense of government as a rational actor, weighing the views of its critics in 
a reasoned way - a view that takes for granted a particular conception of political power-though in 
many ways such a view appears more a conceit than a genuine belief. 
The government made their own accusations. On 22 June 1976, the Natal Witness published an article 
featuring an attack by NP Member of Parliament, Mr F Herman on the English press and the Progressive 
Federal Party (PFP). He labelled the English language press in South Africa as "communist" and singled 
out the Sunday Times. "South Africa had the communist press to thank for recent disturbances he 
said.,,113 In the same article, Mr. Adrian Vlok, the Minister of Security in the South African government, 
was reported to have alleged that the PFP had links to the Soviet Union. "Mr AJ Vlok said progreffs 
"promoted communism" and said their members were "travellers of Moscow." 114 
Also on 22 June, Jimmy Kruger stated once again that unrest would need to be suppressed. "We cannot 
tolerate any extension of unrest; police will have to contain the disturbances".115 He also stated that not 
all the deaths in Soweto were due to the police violence and instead emphasized the brutal nature of the 
rioters. "The rioters in these places followed more or less the same pattern as in burning, looting 
buildings, throwing stones and other objects, burning vehicles and attacking members of their own 
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race.,,116 A day later, the Natal Witness reported on Jimmy Kruger's contribution to the verbal assault 
accusing the PFP of supporting subversive groups "He joined the concerted attack on the Progressive 
Reform Party and said Progrefs sympathized with Black Power movements and other pressure 
movements that wanted to bring down South Africa". II? The article also gave a summary of his 
accusations that the PFP were guilty of defamation of the police and racist against Afrikaners. 
Questions of race were clearly more explicitly at issue for some readers. While much of the analysis 
could be construed as implicit in its racial identification, on 23 June 1976, another anonymous letter 
showed that whiteness was a point of explicit solidarity for some readers. The writer defended the police 
actions, and contended there were no atrocities committed by police in Soweto. "Not shame at the so 
called atrocities of the police force but at the fact that certain white skinned, so called citizens still dare 
to criticize the police for their attempts to prevent further bloodshed" .118 The writer cast shame on 
'whites' who were ' selling out' . "No, I feel shame at the fact that I am expected to regard them as 
fellow South Africans. Shame at the thought that men are dying on the border to save their miserable 
lives".ll9 The author also berated some of the white press for allegedly selling out the white people. 
"Shame at the fact that some white owned papers that are adding to the white suicide.,, 120 
On the same day, the Natal Witness published two letters critical of the government and police role in 
the Soweto uprisings. The first one was by Peter Brown, a liberal stalwart in the 1970s. In previous 
years, he had helped found the South African Liberal party, a mouthpiece ofliberalism in the 1950s. He 
also assisted political prisoners and was eventually banned for a brief period in 1969 under the 
Suppression of Communism Act. Brown' s inclusion in the pages of the Natal Witness gives further 
indication of the range of voices the Natal Witness was attempting to air. In his letter, Brown asserted 
that police conduct in the Soweto uprisings was highly irrational in its response to the demonstrations, 
which allowed the situation to break into violence. "A sound psychological approach and the right 
equipment are both needed if a blood-bath is to be averted. Equally jumpy and probably racially 
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prejudiced, white policemen with automatic rifles when confronted by an incensed Black mob is sheer 
madness.,,121 Like other writers, he criticized the South African government's role in the violence and 
claimed that it was the biggest danger to the country. "The events of the last week show us that the 
threat to the security of our country is posed not by SASO but by the National Party Cabinet 
Ministers.,,122 Anton Gardner's letter, which questioned the conduct of the government and police, was 
also published in this issue of the Natal Witness. In his letter, he criticized the police shootings of 
people who were looting shops in the uprisings: "Why are looters shot dead when no rioting is going 
on? (Since when has death by firing squad been the penalty for theft?),,123 The government and whites 
must "learn their lessons": "lfthe government and most Whites, are too rigid and insensitive to learn the 
lesson, and if they are content with sniffing out agitators and blaming the whole thing on someone else -
then we are all doomed." 124 
In another discussion of the security forces, an editorial 'Law and order' published on 24 June criticized 
not the motives but the methods of the riot forces in the Soweto unrest. The writer maintained that the 
methods used by government to maintain law and order were a signal of its inadequacy. "It is a poor 
government which sees the maintenance of law and order in terms of ministerial fist and police 
enforcement" 125 The writer furthermore criticized the use of real bullets stating the view that rubber 
bullets would have provided an adequate alternative given that they cause immense pain and injury. It 
compared South Africa's methods to other countries, stating 
Our methods of riot control involve bloodshed on a scale not acceptable in civilized societies. We should review 
them. In doing so, we should draw on the experience of many harassed Eolice forces in other countries, which have 
similar problems and have had to find new ways of dealing with them. 1 6 
The editorial was an indication of the Natal Witness 's capacity to assemble a range of opinions on the 
causes of protests and use of police force on and following from the 16 June events. Yet, if the aim was 
to provide a 'balanced' and 'objective' form of reporting, it is clear that opposing sides often agreed on 
key points: it was government's role to discipline unrest, either through avoiding unrest through more 
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rational policies or through direct action; and South Africa was a time-bomb with a 'black iceberg' 
which posed the threat of a 'blood bath'. 
On 26 June 1976, Botha was again reported as blaming the Soviet Union for having instigated unrest in 
Soweto. "Mr. Botha said that Soviet expansionism was however the background against which South 
Africa's problems had to be seen."l27 He contended that the Soviet Union had strong incentives to 
control South Africa. "For Soviet influence to grow it had to control the Southern Hemisphere, and it 
was here that the world strategic influence was gradually moving - to countries like Brazil, Argentina, 
Australia and South Africa with growing industrial capacity and prosperity". 128 Botha also accused the 
PFP of being traitorous. 
Their party has become the mouthpiece of everything that is disloyal and un-South African. Black majority, as 
understood by the PFP, will bring the peace of the churchyard." Mr. Botha said he was sorry that the United Party 
was struggling because he did not want to see it lose its position as the official opposition. 129 
In response to government reports published on the 22nd and 26th of June, the Natal Witness published 
several opinion columns proposing other causes of the violence. On 26 June 1976 weekly columnist for 
the Natal Witness Donald Woods in his piece' Soweto signals', pointed out that Afrikaans was not the 
main issue behind the riots. 
To say that the Soweto Riots were over Afrikaans language instruction in Black schools is like saying that the 
American Revolution was over George Ill's Stamp tax. In each case, these were merely the trigger-issues in a 
boiling-up of wider general resentment. And in each case, official arrogance was to blame. 130 
He further declared that 
It was ironical that [left wing figures] Beyers Naude and Selma Browde were officially warned in effect not to say 
anything that would aggravate the situation. That warning should have gone to [right wing] Andries Treurnicht 
whose initial pronouncement on the language issue was provocative almost to the point of irresponsibility.131 
Woods also addressed Jimmy Kruger's stated concern over the growth of Black Consciousness and the 
potential danger to South African society. "But who started all the colour consciousness? Wasn't it 
those people who painted signs on park benches? Wasn't it those people who started laws emphasizing 
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race? Wasn't it those people who encouraged Black Nationalism?"l32 Woods took Kruger to task on 
his claims about agitators encouraging violence in the Soweto township. He stated that the apartheid 
laws and the neglectfulness of the government were the real agitators behind the revolts. 133 Thus, 
Woods provided alternative reasons for the Soweto violence, which were in direct contrast to the South 
African government line. Woods, a close friend of Steve Biko; had a series of confrontations with the 
South African government and was reported as scathing in his attacks on government policy. He was 
eventually banned for his columns in 1977 and in the same year got a toxic package sent to him 
allegedly by covert South African agents. 
On 26 June 1976, an editorial titled 'Who are to blame?' responded to government slurs about the 
English language press. The writer refuted the idea that it could be blamed for violent protest. Indeed 
the press served as a 'safety valve' on an explosive situation. Rather it was the legitimate social 
grievances themselves, which allowed communism to become popular. 
It is true that the South African press, in its day-by-day recording of the social and political scene has exposed the 
injustices and discrepancies of our racial laws; in doing so it has created a safety valve rather than contributed to the 
explosion. Communistic propaganda can thrive on only real grievances, and there are all too many ofthese. 134 
The writer blamed the government policies as the main instigator behind the Soweto unrest. 
The root cause lies in 28 years of bigoted doctrinaire legislation, 28 years in which less than one-tenth of our 
population has systematically imposed it's will upon the rest of us, in matters ranging from what books we may read 
and when we may see films (or part of them) to the bulldozing of homes and uprooting of settled communities. \35 
Such prose coming from editors of the Natal Witness indicated a strong anti-government discourse, 
which also attacked white complacency-the "SA" (the 'we') is clearly not a universal 'we' but a 
middle class white establishment 'we'. This is seen in an article by Ben Thompson, who criticized South 
African society for failing to see the corning violence. 
SA has blindness to the racial problems, 'Alles sal regte kom' is our laissez-faire philosophy when problems surface 
and so we do nothing about it. Or else we don't see the problems at all. Our myopic stubbornness seems to know no 
limits, so that when the explosion comes we have to confess that we didn't expect it.136 
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Also on 26 June, a writer ofthe public responded to the earlier item entitled 'Underneath the Black 
Iceberg' . The author called the piece "irresponsible" and stated that it would only perpetuate the already 
precarious situation in South Africa. The author claimed that the government did not suppress blacks 
and blacks in SA had no reason to be dissatisfied. "To imply that blacks of South Africa are frustrated 
and oppressed on the whole is not true. The blacks of South Africa are better off than the blacks in most 
other countries of the world.,, 137 The writer claimed that the government had done much for race 
relations. "Certainly after all the government has done, and is trying to do in the way of race relations, it 
is wrong to imply that the only answer SA has is through the barrel of a gun.,, 138 While this viewpoint is 
clearly more sympathetic to explicit racial white politics than Thompson's, it is clear that both authors 
similarly address themselves as if to white, middle class readerships, indicated the degree to which it is 
perceived that the public of the Witness is viewed as a particular cultural community. 
On 28 June 1976, the paper printed a letter from ' A Scholar' who wrote that there should not be protests 
against Afrikaans as a compulsory medium for black schools. He pointed out that Afrikaans and 
English were vital to learn as "blacks could not vote or participate in the economy if they could not 
speak any of these two languages and therefore these protestors were unjust. 139 On 1 July 1976, a letter 
was printed in reply to the ' Scholar'. The contributor informed the scholar that black people were 
forced to take Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. The author stated that this legislation was grossly 
unfair and that it would make passing matric highly unlikely. The writer also asked, rhetorically, if the 
scholar would want to write his exams in Zulu, making the assumption, in a province where Zulu 
speakers are a majority, that the writer was not a Zulu speaker. 140 
On 2 July 1976, Donald Woods devoted another article to criticizing the government for its narrow-
minded attitude. "The Soweto Riots started once Afrikaans was used as a compulsory medium of 
instruction in Black schools. Then agitators successfully exploited the situation inciting the mobs to tum 
the whole thing into an anti-white campaign of destruction.,, 141 He added that, he had "never worked 
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out why Mr. Vorster and Mr Kruger appear to think that if riots are planned or successfully exploited by 
agitators this somehow makes the situation less ominous. To me it is even more ominous, not less. 
Surely agitators cannot successfully agitate unless there is some mob predisposition regarding the points 
they can agitate.,,142 
On 7 July 1976, the Natal Witness published a letter by Pat Stillwell143 stating that social upliftment of 
blacks was needed to prevent future violence. "Who were the blacks who protected the whites, who 
assisted the authorities or, who assisted the police in clearing the streets? They were the taxi drivers, the 
middle class. Those who had something to lose if the riots continued.,,144 This was an idea introduced 
by government in the 1980s to build an African middle class as a buffer against revolution. It is 
noteworthy that the Natal Witness included this letter, as the idea drawn was compatible with protection 
of its own social class. A response came on 8 July, in a letter from an Afrikaans writer, who drew 
attention to the Anglophone class hegemony that appeared to be at work concealing from liberal writers 
the implications of their critique of the educational policy. H. Vermaak hit out at English criticism of the 
Afrikaners and more specifically the Afrikaner government. He stated that there was hypocrisy in 
English people's outcries over compulsory Afrikaans in black schools. "They [The English] seem very 
worried about blacks being forced to learn Afrikaans and yet their forefathers were the first to force 
(when after the Boer war children weren't allowed to even speak Dutch in schools.).,,145 
Some days later, the Natal Witness publicised Jimmy Kruger's justification of his decision to keep black 
schools closed. "Measures were taken because of continued agitation and intimidation in Soweto and 
other areas, aimed at starting more rioting when schools reopened despite the fact that the language 
issue had been resolved.,,146 On 17 June 1976, an editorial responded to government statements citing 
that government's closure of black schools was the wrong approach and that it failed to address the main 
causes of violence in Soweto. 
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The black people of South Africa and particularly those of our great urban centres have a mass of legitimate 
grievances against Nationalist legislation and Nationalist administration. The whole structure of Nationalist policy 
should be forthwith examined and reformed or South Africa will be condemned to a further series of explosions on 
the Soweto pattern. 147 
In its opinion section, the Natal Witness presented a range of views but editors took a strongly anti-
government line in relation to the response to political unrest. Where the government blamed agitators 
and the Soviet Union, the Natal Witness in its opinion section blamed the government and the social 
conditions for the uprisings. Another aspect of the reporting was the anti-police element in which the 
Natal Witness took a hostile line to the actions of the police during the Soweto riots. Its readers who 
conveyed a critical stand on government policy had a notably similar analysis of the situation. South 
African society was a clock ticking and what was needed was for government to 'learn lessons' , apply 
' sound psychology' and 'the right equipment' ; it must 'act wisely, in time' in order to ensure a 'peaceful 
coexistence between races'. Expressions of anxiety about the future and faith in a rational approach to 
national institutions were levelled in relation to both the protests in Soweto and government policies. 
The Natal Witness opinion pieces reflect a liberal antagonism towards the South African police force. 
They observed the treatment of protestors by police as inhumane, in particular voicing opposition to 
police shootings. Given that the SAPS were decidedly Afrikaner dominated at the time this reaction 
can be surmised as a display of an English liberal national identity in which its contributors saw the 
Natal Witness as an agent for civilised practices and a humane society, this in contrast to the believed 
inhumane methods of the Afrikaner Nationalist state. The issue illustrates a viewpoint from Anderson 
concerning how a community imagines itself. He states that, "Communities are to be distinguished not 
by their falsity/genuiness (sic) but the way in which they are imagined.,, 148 The ethnic element is 
further amplified by the Natal Witness's strong criticism of Afrikaner Nationalism to the extent that it 
was perceived by some as an attack on Afrikaners as addressed in a letter by a member of the public 
who criticized the English for their constant attacks on Afrikaners. Thus, the strong criticism of 
Afrikaner nationalism illustrated an imagined English liberal community in Natal alienated by 
perceived Afrikaner Nationalist dominance. This once again plays into Anderson's theory of how a 
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community would see itself as a separate entity. This also plays into what Paul Rich theorizes about 
Natal being a strong base for English liberalism, thereby the Natal Witness could have been a part of 
the solid base around an English liberalism at the time. 
Coverage of arguments from opposition parties 
Two characteristics of the opposition parties' statements reported in the Natal Witness were, criticism of 
the NP for causing the violence and recommendations to prevent further unrest. An emotive article 
appeared by the 'Parliament reporter' for the paper. The journalist reported Progressive Federal Party 
MP Dr Alex Boriane's accusations of nonchalance from the government. 
Warnings of the situation in urban African townships had been sounded with monotonous regularity. Not only the 
opposition parties but also many other sources had told the government that the townships were "seething with 
unrest" .149 
In the same article, Mr. Radcliffe Cadman, a leading member of the UP was quoted. He accused 
Minister of Defence PW Botha and Deputy Minister of Bantu Education Andries Treurnicht of 
negligence. 
The Natal head committee of the United Party yesterday condemned the government - and in particular Mr. M 
Botha and Mr. Andreis Treurnicht - "allowing a situation to develop in Soweto which would be exploited to 
promote demonstrations, riots and bloodshed,,150 
Cadman also praised what he termed "responsible" actions by black leaders for condemning violence as 
a political solution. "Responsible statements by black leaders and the Natal Students Representative 
Council condemning violence as a solution were welcomed and supported by the opposition.,,151 
Government's alienation of black people by their policies was the main cause of the unrest, he 
suggested. "Here lie the root causes of the dreadful sense of oppression and frustration in the hearts and 
minds of blacks. The Afrikaans language was not the main cause of the disturbances, but had been the 
trigger that had set off the riots".152 Four days later, the view of the leader of the UP, Sir De Villiers 
Graaf, was covered in the paper. He blamed the uprisings on the NP's policies of legally recognized 





racial discrimination. "South Africa would be foolish not to see that the tragedy of Soweto was the 
consequence of the Nationalist Government's policy of institutionalized racism on the grounds of 
colour."l53 Graafwas reported as arguing that it was propaganda from the government, which helped 
the situation in Soweto explode. Further, he called an end to the homeland policy and a new course. 
Graaf 
.. . urged the "obstinately dogmatic member" of the government who thought that their homelands policy was the 
beginning and end to think again before even worse disaster befalls South Africa. "As long as this government 
persists on its course so long South Africa must stand in dread of new bloody clashes and an escalating chain of 
violence. 154 
According to the Natal Witness, the government had been censured by the UP and PFP for its move 
further right on racial policies. The NP was not representative of its voters, its reports ran, as they 
tended to listen to small interest groups inside the party. In another report, Graaf asserted a fundamental 
part of what was needed for the 'white man's future' in South Africa. "The battle for the mind ofthe 
black man was the key to the white man's future in South Africa, but it was a key government was 
shown incapable ofusing.,,155 He stated that the situation of So we to was hopefully a reality check for 
the government, a sign that they must take another course because of the greater world struggle between 
capitalism and communism. 
Pointing out that all these things must now be lifted out of the more limited perspectives which were valid until the 
end of last year and seen in the broader frame of the East-West power-political conflict, Sir De Villiers said. 
"Whatever immediate disadvantages may have occurred in consequence of Angola, the dominating new fact is that 
southern Africa has suddenly been involved in the world power struggle. I 56 
This view coincided with a governmental discourse on the threat of communism in South Africa. 
On 3 July 1976, a joint UP and PFP statement on options to prevent further violence in the country was 
reported by the Natal Witness. The parties agreed that the government was inadequate to solve the 
situation, as any small change to its policy would be interpreted as a signal that violence was the key 
facilitator to change. The views of Harry Pitman, MP for the PFP, were summarized in the article. 
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The government was totally unable to save the situation, he said. "Any concession the government makes will be 
looked upon by the blacks as fear. Predicting that the government would have to back down on the language issue 
that sparked off the recent riots in Soweto, he said the government was telling people the only way to change 
h· b · I 157 anyt lllg was y VIO ence. 
On 7 July, the Natal Witness printed Mr. Cadman's viewpoints that the Soweto unrest was a 
consequence of government policies. 
"The grievances of the Black people were far deeper than the language issue. In Soweto, in particular, the people 
must be given a sense of belonging, the right to citizenship and home-ownership. Unless the government shows 
some adaptability on these issues, I do not think the real lesson has been learnt," he said. 158 
Opposition party leaders of the PFP and UP pointed to government failures as the reason behind the 
riots. Published in the Natal Witness, their views echoed the sentiments of its editors and a portion of its 
pUblics. It further cemented the Natal Witness 's position that South Africa was in for heavy conflict if 
the laws did not change. The prevailing view based on the opinion pages and coverage from the 
opposition parties was that South Africa needed change, however what change the Natal Witness 
advocated was unclear. This highlights an ambiguity in liberalism that on the one hand advocated for an 
end to the system of racial discrimination and oppression but the same time was undecided and fearful 
of the kind of change that could potentially take place. 
Coverage of international condemnation 
In addition to its reportage of opposition parties' censure of the South African government policy, the 
Natal Witness also covered world reactions and expressions of outrage at apartheid policies and, more 
specifically, the South African police conduct in the Soweto uprisings. This included statements by the 
United Nations (UN), the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and other world organisations. The 
first article features anger in Britain towards the violence in Soweto. The article started with the title 
'Fierce reactions to killings in London', which emphasized the animosity towards the South African 
authorities. The article described 300 demonstrators in the city chanting slogans and waving signs 
showing their opposition to the SA government. It also covered some labour MP's stating that the 
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'Soweto riots' were the worst indicator of repression in South Africa since the Sharpeville massacres as 
well as stating that the British government was deeply concerned at the conduct of the South African 
government. Importantly, it also covers which of the London based 'anti-apartheid movements' stated 
that this incident was a tragic one caused by the government's apartheid policies.
159 
On 21 June 1976, under the title 'Massive Violence and Killings Slammed by UN', it was reported that 
the Security Council had censured the South African government for, "massive violence against and 
killings of Africans stemming from last week's demonstrations". 160 The Council stated that the 
apartheid system was "a heinous crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and seriously 
disturbs international peace and security" .161 The Council gave formal recognition to black resistance 
movements and condemned the South African government for shooting its citizens as well as urging it 
to abandon the apartheid system and end racial discrimination. 
It recognized the "legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people" for the elimination of apartheid and racial 
discrimination. South Africa was called on "urgently to end violence against the African people and take urgent 
teps to eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination.,,1 62 
The article also confirmed that the UN "[ c ]ondemns South Africa for its massive violence and killings 
of African people including schoolchildren and students and others opposing racial discrimination.,,163 
The OAD also made statements of condemnation that were printed in the Natal Witness. "Africans 
killed rioting in South Africa were the victims of oppression and racism.,, 164 In another account, too, the 
broader context of racial oppression was flagged by the OAD. One senior official stated, "The three 
wounds of Africa, Namibia (South West Africa), Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Azania (South Africa), will 
be given first attention especially in view of the ruthless massacres in South Africa" . 165 
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In order to evade government laws against citing unofficial sources on unrest statistics, the Natal 
Witness printed figures from internationally accredited organisations such as the UN. For example, 
"[t]he UN committee against apartheid heard charges that 1000 blacks were killed in the recent violence 
in South Africa and not the approximately 140 officially reported,, 166 It reported on the observations of 
Mr Nicosia Valderrame who had been appointed to investigate the issues of the Soweto uprisings. The 
article revealed Mr. Valderrame's reports on the estimates of black people who died during the violence. 
"Leaders of the Black people estimate about 1000 Africans killed in the recent massacre.,, 167 Other 
suspicions were reported: "Mr. Valderrame said black leaders reported that bullets of that calibre [.22 
calibres used by the SAPS] were used by a white vigilante Citizens Reserve Force which was allowed to 
go into Soweto to murder the blacks". 168 Valderrame also stated that the term to use for the unrest 
would be better described as an ' uprising' rather than a 'riot'. "He said it was incorrect to term what 
had happened in South Africa a riot, since that implied a lack of clear purpose. It was not even a 
massacre but an uprising.,, 169 
The Natal Witness skirted censorship by the South African government by reporting on recognized 
global sources, even as the South African government tried to discredit foreign news agencies. By 
giving credibility to the UN, the OAU and their investigations, the newspaper was able to present 
alternative points of view that aligned to the perspectives of opposition parties and liberal pUblic. 
This further highlights a view in liberal thought that government activities had to be in the spotlight as 
part of its accountability towards the public and positioned liberal identity as being the guardian of free 
speech and expression against a totalitarian society. Thus, liberals positioned themselves against the 
censorship of government. It relates to what Pollak has stated about the English liberal press being the 
only defence against a totalitarian society. It further shows the promotion by liberals of the idea of 
media freedom being a fundamental pillar of freedom in a society as well as a pillar of resistance to 
authority. 





Statements from civil society 
The Natal Witness also publicized the views oflocal civil society actors, notably from the religious 
sector, including the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the Christian Institute, and the 
African Teachers' Association of South Africa (ATASA). This signified an alignment to what the Natal 
Witness saw as Christian principles, something that was also seen in columns and editorials, most 
explicitly in Bob Thompson's weekly columns. 
On 18 June 1976, the Nederduits Gereformeede (NG) Synod, a church that had officially rejected 
apartheid as morally wrong, was reported as not wanting Afrikaans to be associated with repression and 
urged it to be dropped from the curriculum. 170 On the same day, the SACCI?I stated that the political 
unrest emphasized the precarious situation South Africa was in. 
"The horror of the Soweto riot was the most dreadful evidence yet of the lateness of the hour in South Africa," the 
South African Council of Churches said yesterday. In a lengthy statement, the SACC expressed its support for the 
student protest against the offending regulations and deplored "the totally unwarranted actions" against them. 172 
The organisation declared that the demonstration could not be extinguished by violence because it was 
for a just cause and the nature of the Sowetan violence showed it was not just about the politics but a 
humanitarian problem. "The fact that this confrontation involved schoolchildren has the frightening 
implication that Black grievances are not only a matter of politics but have become a matter of intense 
and widespread agony, felt by even the children, that could escalate into a national catastrophe". 173 
On the same day, the Natal Witness aired the views of the Christian Institute, a multi-racial organisation 
opened in 1963 to oppose the apartheid system. This organisation suffered harassment by the state with 
a few of its members interrogated by police. The Christian Institute voiced solidarity with Soweto 
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protestors and documented its apology for not doing enough to oppose apartheid in previous years. It 
warned the government of trouble if it continued with its racial policies. The Christian Institute asserted 
that these 1976 riots surpassed the catastrophe of Sharpeville. The state response to the protests was 
described as brutal by the organisation. 174 The Natal Witness also reported that the Anglican Church had 
called for prayer. It declared that the riots "were a consequence of the oppressive policies from the 
government and a hideous symptom of failure to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of black people for a 
fuller and freer life.,,175 
Also on 22 June, the Natal Witness documented the views of Cosmas Desmond, a Catholic priest and 
prominent anti-apartheid and human rights activist. His viewpoints were taken from a funeral sermon, 
where he denounced racism in South African society and expressed solidarity with the victims of 
Soweto violence. [The article does not mention whether or not it was a funeral for victims of the 
violence.] Desmond proclaimed that although the apartheid laws and the police were the main 
perpetrators for the' Soweto riots' , all were to blame because of public apathy over injustices in the 
country. He declared that the 'Soweto riots' must rouse the public out of its apathy and steady it to fight 
for political, economic, and social justice. The newspaper further reported that 300 people were present 
at the funeral. 176 
Another anti-apartheid activist whose opinions were carried by the Natal Witness was Beyers Naude 
who was a cleric and a member of the Christian institute. Naude was prominent in organising South 
African churches' resistance against the apartheid government. He declared there was no thought in 
implementing Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of education and that the government should have 
learnt from its failure in the homeland system of government. Naude gave three recommendations to 
avert further violence in the country. The first was a comprehensive plan to take care of social needs for 
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blacks. The other two recommendations were giving permanent residency recognition to blacks in 
fB d 
. 177 
urban areas and a complete abandonment 0 antu e ucatlOn. 
The next day the Natal Witness reported the views of a combined statement by the leaders of the 
Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist and Congregational churches. They expressed their 
view that the reasons for bitterness among the black population needed to be addressed. "While we 
recognize that in any situation of violence, irresponsible elements will be involved, we earnestly urge 
our members to take note of the deep ground swell of bitterness and resentment that can be so easily 
fanned into violence.,,178 Also on 23 June, the paper provided comments on the Soweto riots from the 
Witwatersrand Council of Churches, another regional Christian organisation. This comment on the 
irresponsible elements once again pointed to the theme of responsible versus violent opposition. They 
stated that fighting would not solve the situation and that the unrest indicated the deep need for change 
and social reform to avert further violence. 
"The current events are a tragic sign of the urgent need for change in South Africa.", says a statement issued by the 
council. "The situation of urban Africans cannot be dealt with by the use offorce on both sides. The reasons for 
hatred and despair must be removed. The minister of Bantu education could defuse the situation by immediately 
withdrawing the regulation, which has given offence to so many black pupils.,,179 
The Natal Witness also covered declarations from the Students Representative Council (SRC) at the 
University of Natal, Durban. The two representatives of the SRC were Mr. Lees and Mr. McMillan. 
The paper reported Mr. Lees's assertion that government policies were leading the country into violence 
and Mr. McMillan' s contention that social and political suppression would only lead to more unrest. 
"We know exactly what we can expect if we continue to suppress the political and social frustrations of 
the people of South Africa". 180 
AT ASA was a teachers union, which although opposed to racial discrimination, had been criticized by 
some for its conservativeness. ATASA's criticism of government was chronicled in the Natal Witness. 
177 SAPA. 'Afrikaans and blacks ', Natal Witness, 22 June 1976, p 2. 




AT ASA slammed the government for its introduction of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium and called 
for reinstatement of all school board members who were fired because of their opposition to the policy. 
The article reported that more than 30 members had met with the Minister of Bantu Education. " It was 
clear that the blacks at the meeting laid [sic] the line that there could be no return to normal until 
Afrikaans had been dropped as a medium of instruction". 181 The board also emphasized that black 
leaders had constantly warned the government of unrest unless they dropped Afrikaans as a medium but 
that "[t]he department adopted an unsympathetic and unbending attitude and that certain circuit 
inspectors made ill advised comments and provocative remarks on the use of Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction." 182 
The acclaimed author Nadine Gordimer was also outspoken about these events. On 28 June 1976, her 
views on the Soweto uprisings appeared in the Witness. The article reported that she laid the blame 
fully on the government whom she believed had provoked the riots through its unfair policies. "The 
Afrikaans language is associated with the police and government officials are indeed a pretext, standing 
for wrongs as old as white supremacy.,, 183 The article also summarized her advice to the government 
commission investigating the causes of violence, where Gordimer stated that, " it should look no further 
than the government's divisive racial system. The agitator behirld the revolt of the children is apartheid 
itself." 184 
On 1 July 1976, the paper included the views of the moderate right wing voice of Professor W.P 
Esterhuyse of Stellenbosch University, who addressed the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB). The Natal 
Witness reported his views on the problems of white interaction with the other races. "Whites, he said 
were too accustomed to talking down to Africans, Coloureds and Indians.,,18s There was, he said, a need 
for dialogue between ' races ' rather than use of force. "Good will could not be won by guns but by 
contact. There should be more contact between teachers and ministers of religion of all races.,,186 He 
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advocated moderate racial separation. "Soweto and other large urban African cities in South Africa 
should be given status of states like, Monaco and Lichtenstein.,,187 He also said that 'total separation' 
was not viable. "Total physical separation was not possible and he did not think it was necessary.,,188 
This illustrates a willingness by the Natal Witness to report voices of the more moderate right wing. In 
an editorial focusing on his speech, the writer asserted, "there were passages that could have startled an 
ASB audience ten years ago.,,189 Nonetheless, the author perceived Professor Esterhuyse statements as 
reactionary and viewed the state's solution as simply another way to oppress the black population, and 
segregate them away from white society, as well as deny them citizenship and their rights. "As far as we 
can see, it is only an alternative procedure for depriving of the South African citizen, those Africans in 
Soweto who do not opt for Bantustans. As such it will never solve any problems." 190 Rejection of a 
moderate right wing view is another indication of the distinctive, liberal stance that the Natal Witness 
was creating at this time. 
These sources provide an indication of the anti-government discourse in the Natal Witness. They were 
also, in conjunction with the facet of Christianity, highlighted in the Natal Witness. It further 
underscores a facet of Christian humanistic ideology, which focused on individual freedoms and rights. 
This did not recognize the economic aspect and power politics in South African society. Furthermore 
the quoting of well-known liberal voices in its pages indicated the position it was attempting to take. 
Black agency, criminal and political 
Articles in the Natal Witness made a distinction between responsible, rational motives for protest in 
response to legitimate grievances and irrational, irresponsible lawlessness in reports on violent events in 
Soweto. The paper demonstrates a civic ideal of law and order of a particular kind. 
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On 17 June, the news headline of the Natal Witness read 'Soweto Slaughter'. The article graphically 
described the violent situation in Soweto and put a special emphasis on whites, some of them social 
workers, being attacked. 
Cars were overturned and set alight. Whites on the black township ' s roads were assaulted. At least two white men, 
officials of the West Rand Bantu Administration, were killed after being dragged from their cars. Four white 
women, all employees of the department of social welfare, were injured when a mob set upon their car. 191 
The article in some ways depoliticized some ofthe protests, reporting that criminal elements had "taken 
advantage" ofthe violence. "Reports from inside Soweto indicate thugs were taking advantage ofthe 
situation. Four bottle stores have already been 100ted."I92 Yet, as seen, it did distinguish them from the 
rest of the protestors. In an article on the same page, the story tells of violence by demonstrators against 
photographers. The article featured the story of a Sunday News photographer's account of the violence 
against him, emphasizing his racial identity as a 'black photographer'. "AlfKhumalo, a black 
photographer, was taking pictures of the student march before violence erupted. As the students clashed 
with police, he was dragged to the floor by students objecting to his taking photographs. "A boy who sat 
next to me was shot", he said. "Students were crying. They were in a fury.,,193 
Another report featured a denouncement of 'lawlessness' by Boputswana homeland leader Lucas 
Mangope. According to Mangope 
Such violence could be counterproductive to Africans. The wanton destruction of property, the kil1ings and other 
demonstrations are not only deplorable but in the final analysis rebound to Nowoane's [sic] advantage. In a 
situation of lawlessness and total confusion even dialogue which is in fact and should be the origin of redress, to 
genuine grievances. The destruction by fire of schools, post offices and clinics, amounts to a destruction of our 
children's progress. In fact this is the most effective method of retarding our own progress. 194 
On 18 June 1976, reports on the uprisings continued, with the article titled 'Riot Death Toll Soars'. The 
article reported that the chaotic situation in Soweto had spread. "Rioting blacks were also on the 
rampage last night in the African township of Kagiso, Krugersdorp, 25 km north-west of the Soweto 
townships".195 The article also depicted some protestors as criminally violent. "Following the looting 
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of beer halls and liquor stores, drunken youths rampaged through the streets. Armed with pickaxes, iron 
bars, knives, and sticks they indiscriminately attacked buildings and vehicles, while others manned 
roadblocks." 196 
Thus, in the days following events in Soweto, a picture emerged in the pages of the Natal Witness of 
black protestors as a danger to the public. The paper also emphasized the threat to white civilians in a 
story with the dramatic headline titled 'Berserk axe man fells 5'. 
The axeman first appeared in the Harry Hofmeyer Park on the West side of the city where he exhorted Blacks to 
"Bulala Mhlungu (kill the whites)." According to an Indian flower seller, the Africans left hurriedly and the axe 
man produced an axe from under his red and white striped shirt. "He didn 't even run he just went along chopping at 
whites, shouting that he was doing it for the children of Soweto.,,197 
Two days later, the Natal Witness reported on the protest violence, which had spread from Soweto to 
other parts of the country such as Pretoria, led often by civil rights student movements such as the South 
African Students Organisation (SASO)I98. The article reported, "There were several unconfirmed 
deaths and renewed violence yesterday in the Pretoria township ofMamelodi.,,199 It added that some of 
these occurred when a bottle store was attacked. "There were unconfirmed reports of six deaths in 
Mamelodi when the Yuma bottle store was razed and 100ted.,,2oo The article described incidents that 
happened in another township, also linking looting and arson with black protests. "There were isolated 
incidents of violence in the East Rand townships of KwaThema, near Springs, where a beer hall was 
burnt down and a primary school was set alight. The burning of the complex was sparked by a decision 
by the Bantu Administration board to withdraw the liquor supply.,,2ol The article further reported that, 
"firemen were able to prevent the school from being gutted, in spite of being stoned while fighting the 
fire.,,202 An editorial on 26 June, which commented on the uprisings, acknowledged that there were 
criminals taking advantage of the 'riots' in Soweto; however, it separated them from the protestors. "It 
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is true that some mob leaders and criminals have been active: bottle stores for example, are not sacked 
by idealists or for political ends, except very occasionally, by ardent teetotallers [sic]. But burglary and 
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This thread of news presented readers with lawlessness and wanton violence that accompanied black 
protest and were part of the aftermath of police violence. This was one very prominent representation of 
black struggle - the 'time-bomb' and threat to civil society that opposition party leaders, editors and a 
number of letter-writers decried in their conviction of the dangers of policy to social order. However, 
another face of black protest was also represented. Page one of the 17 June issue published statements 
from Mr. Mosala, who was a councillor of the Soweto Urban Bantu Council. He warned of 
consequences to come if no change was forthcoming. 
Mr. Mosala warned in the council earlier this week that enforcing Afrikaans in schools might result in another 
Sharpeville incident. "If the matter is not dealt with immediately." But the department merely delayed matters 
instead of dealing with the central problems which are student ' s unwillingness to learn both English and Afrikaans 
and the lack of qualified teachers to teach Afrikaans.,,204 
The article also reported that Mr. Mosala 
said yesterday police should not have confronted the protesting students. "The police should have realized that 
directly they moved against the students than the students would retaliate", Mr. Mosala said. He said the police 
should have consulted with the parents and school officials about how best to handle the situation rather than trying 
to handle the situation themselves.205 
In the same article the Natal Witness also published the frustrations of Anglican Church leader Desmond 
Tutu, representing the voice of black leadership 
The dean of Johannesburg the very Reverend Desmond Tutu said: "We black leaders have been warning 
government about something like this happening for a long time if they do not stop and listen." When he heard 
about the riots, he said, "For goodness sake, somebody listen to US,,206 
On 22 June 1976, the Natal Witness reported the views of another black leader, Mr. Moerane, who was 
president of the Association for Educational and Cultural Development for Africans - an organisation 
working for an expansion of urban rights to black people. This report was taken from Parliament in 
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which Moraone expressed his views to the government. The paper reported his 'warnings' of further 
violence if government did not change their policies. "Confrontation would be such a dimension that it 
would make the current unrest look like a Sunday school picnic,,207 The article summarized his view 
that, although violence was not the way to solve the problems, it would inevitably happen if the 
government continued on its present policies. 
The arbitrary and unilateral division [of the 1913 Native Lands Act] left Africans 13% of the land, "And that kind of 
order cannot last and will bring disaster to the land.,,208 He warned that some Africans had already considered 
conquest, as a way of counterassault. He also said that, "In his council fighting was not best way to deal with the 
ituation, dialogue should be used to solve problems, and accordingly we request the government, in consultation 
with us, seek ways and means of giving effect to this desire?09 
As well as covering the views of individual black leaders, the Natal Witness published a number of 
stories that illustrated humane interactions between black and white people during the chaos 
surrounding the Soweto events. The Natal Witness featured two examples of how blacks had helped 
save whites from harm and potential death. The first article documented a story of how a black family 
helped shield a white person who was a health official when he escaped from black attackers after they 
ambushed him in his car. The article explained that the family was able to smuggle Mr. Beehe into 
Johannesburg the next morning. In a second article, it was reported that 25 black victims of the violence 
were sent to a clinic in Sandton, with half of them receiving emergency operations. This story was 
addressed in an editorial titled 'The right way' .210 It also noted there was an exception in a midst of 
tragedy over the riots. 
It was one happy aspect of last week's violent confrontation that, to the best of our knowledge, not a single incident 
occurred of an injured person being denied treatment or compelled to wait from ambulance or hospital because he 
was not a member of the group which the ambulance or hospital was designed to serve.211 
It also implied that these actions would help racial harmony. "Twenty five African men and women, 
half of whom had to have immediate operations were given the necessary treatment and, when 
conditions permitted returned home or passed on to Tembisa. Patients and their families, we imagine, 
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will long and gratefully remember their reception at Sandton.,,212 These two stories, as well as the 
editorial, portrayed a civic ideal of humanistic racial harmony. 
The views of protest emerging from coverage in the Natal Witness make a distinction between valid 
political protest against an unjust social order and lawlessness and criminal violence that emerged in the 
chaos. The reports frequently went into graphic descriptions of violent activities from the youth in 
Soweto using strong words such as 'thugs' and ' mob ' to describe them. The articles tended to 
depoliticize some of the protestors, portraying them as being without a purpose. Nonetheless, they also 
portray a rational kind of political actor, with legitimate demands, seeking change. 
Issues around the Soweto uprisings 
In relation to coverage of the Soweto unrest, the Natal Witness also reported skirmishes of the security 
forces in southern Africa, internal terrorism trials in South Africa and civil defence plans. The South 
African government sawall these activities as being intrinsically linked with the Soweto uprisings as a 
Soviet plot to take over southern Africa. These issues contributed to a state of siege mentality. The 
Witness, also, emphasized a potential threat of violence to whites. An explicit example of this was 
coverage of a South African ' treason trial ' on 24 June 1976. The article entitled 'Liberal Whites will 
also be killed ', documented threats by a state witness, who reported a plan to eliminate all whites 
without exception. "A state witness, Mr. Wilson Wilberforce Sinxo, also told the court that in spite of 
the respect some Blacks had for white liberals such as Helen Suzman and white liberals on Robben 
Island, it had been decided that all whites, rich, poor, verkramp, and liberal would be massacred.,,213 
The article described plans for external training in military camps. "They are alleged, among others, to 
have tried to leave South Africa to get military training in Tanzania. It is alleged that their training was 
to have lasted for two years, but that they would have been able later to go to Russia or China for 
specialised training in sabotage.,,214 Thus, this issue gives an understanding of the Natal Witness's 
ambivalent stance towards black opposition, which it considered radical and militant. This issue is also 
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seen in Natal Witness ' s coverage of SWAPO, an organisation set up to free Namibia from South African 
rule and end racial discrimination for black people. It used military tactics to achieve their goals such as 
sabotage and the killing of soldiers and officials. The Natal Witness used words such as ' terrorists' to 
describe SWAPO militants and reported their using 'Russian made weapons' . An example ofthis is an 
article on 2 July in the Natal Witness , ' 3 more terror men die in S W A' . It reported a skirmish between 
the SADF and SWAPO. "Three more terrorists were killed and one severely wounded in a skirmish on 
Wednesday afternoon south ofOvambo, a joint statement by the South African defence headquarters 
and the South African Police headquarters said yesterday.,,215 
Another important theme the Witness took up from government discourse was the fear of Soviet 
infiltrati.on. On 2 July 1976, an editorial titled ' Keeping the Russians out', addressed the Western 
countries drive to keep the Soviet Union out of southern Africa. In the editorial the theme of changing 
South African internal policy to reduce the threat of communism and avoid international isolation is 
played out, as seen from the editorial quoted: 
It is far more like and fervently to be hoped, that Mr. Vorster promised changes in his racial policies that would 
allow Western countries to be seen in our company again. Yet the success or failure depends ultimately, not on 
Western help but on the people of Africa themselves. Unless Black Africans are made to perceive that their 
interests, as well as the whites have truly been accommodated, Dr Kissinger's ambitious scheme must fai1.2 16 
This quote shows the link perceived between the Cold War and the Soweto uprisings, where the 
editorial speculated that South Africa could be isolated in a war against Soviet influence with black 
people possibly supporting communism if its alienating apartheid policies were not changed. Thus, the 
coverage of treason trials and SWAPO adds insight into the nature of reporting on the Soweto uprisings, 
because of the similar themes emphasized. This provides further evidence of the liberal movement 
attempting to discredit stronger opposition to the apartheid government by portraying groups such as 
SWAPO as terrorists. There were also a number of common themes and linkages between the Soweto 
uprisings and these issues. These commonalities included the fear of black unruliness and violence as 
well as anxiety concerning an indirect Soviet attack on the country. 
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Conclusion 
Several issues can be raised in relation to the content of the Natal Witness in the weeks following 
the protests by students against Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, the police violence it was met 
with and the social chaos and clash of political voices that followed. Firstly, is the illustration of the 
Natal English-speakers as a community that viewed themselves as connected to each other. 
Anderson speaks about an imagined community, where the members of a nation have no connection 
to each other and have had no communication with each other, but nonetheless see themselves as 
unified with each other.217 Thus, part of the hostility towards the police force in South Africa could 
have been part of an English speaking Natal nationalist reaction against an Afrikaner authority that 
they saw as dominating. This is especially relevant given the province' s reputation as being the so-
called last outpost of British hegemony in South Africa, as well as considering popular sentiment 
over possible secession of Natal from the rest of South Africa in previous years. 
Secondly, with blame overwhelmingly placed at the feet of the government, a theme that emerges is of 
'warning'. The idea that rational voices from among the government critics had warned that violence 
would erupt (that a ' time bomb' would explode) if certain conditions were not met comes through 
loudly in these pages. It is assumed here that the nature of government is a balance of interests, 
maintaining law and order, and that by these criteria the NP government had failed. It attributes failure 
to lessons not learned and warnings not heeded ' in time' of the 'black iceberg' that will destroy society. 
Thirdly, it offers an ideal vision of society as one with good race relations, black and white people 
showing humanity to each other - a 'peaceful co-existence'; the idea that 'blacks are people' who 
should be consulted in the political process. In the 1976 period there is a seemingly strong endorsement 
of moderate black leaders, who with their non-violent but supposedly critical stance towards the 
government laws, are portrayed as the alternative to black anger. This fear of a black revolution 
highlights that the Natal Witness was influenced by racial ideologies entrenched in South African 
217 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism London: 
Verso, 1991 , p 8. 
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society at the time. Despite not being as extreme as the South African government, the Natal Witness 
demonstrated racialised thinking in its anxieties about black violence. 
Another of the prominent themes that came out in this period was the ethnic tensions between English 
and Afrikaner South Africans. Seen as promoting bigotries and attacked for its conservativeness, 
Afrikaner nationalism was depicted as a major cause of the Soweto uprisings. One possible reason for 
the explicit attack on Afrikaner nationalism could be an English South African nationalist backlash 
against the introduction of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of education. This may have been 
perceived as a further encroachment of Afrikaans into South African life. 
My study also illustrates assertions of Andrew Heywood who defines a nation as a "cultural entity, and 
not necessarily a political association, nor is it necessarily linked to a particular territorial area -
although nationalists argue that the boundaries of a nation and a state should, as far as possible, 
coincide.,,218 In some ways, this study further reveals that English liberalism was produced as a culture, 
in addition to its political personification in political parties such as the Liberal Party and the 
Progressive Federal Party. The English language press was essentially an agent of this culture, helping 
both its popularisation and spread. This relates to the view of Paul Rich who stated that Natal liberalism 
was effectively popularized and remained strong through its institutions such as the press. 
It is notable that the paper' s sources, that voice opposition, are broadly drawn from international 
organisations, Christian leaders and social welfare organisations. Its construction of a moderate, 
measured response is found in the airing of various views, but with special editorial emphasis that 
showed apartheid policy as dangerous to civic order. The Natal Witness also included voices of well-
known liberals, some strong oppositional figures to government such as Peter Brown and Donald 
Woods for example, which gives more indication of the type of discourse that the Natal Witness was 
attempting to include in its discourse. Furthermore, this type of discourse would have likely to be 
influenced by Richard Steyn who had taken over as editor of the Natal Witness in 1976 and continued 
his reign until 1990. He was a very strong proponent of liberalism as well as being praised by many 
218 Andrew Heywood. Political Theory: An Introduction (Second ed). London: Macmillan Press, 1999. pp 
97- 98. 
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writers such as Haw and Tomaselli as taking a courageous stand against the apartheid system. He is 
currently one of the founders of the Helen Suzman foundation, which illustrates further his liberal 
values. 
Finally, the Natal Witness did not cover more radical viewpoints, such as socialist and communist 
viewpoints. Its dualistic portrayal of black action illustrated the paper's ambivalent discourse on social 
and political change in South Africa. Therefore, as Tomaselli, Pollack and Louw surmised about the 
English language press in South Africa, the paper did conform to a particular positioning in South 
African society. It also contradicted Welsh's statement that the nature of liberalism included tolerance 
for all viewpoints. 
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Chapter 2 
Cold War anxiety on both sides of the border: 
Operation Reindeer, Operation Protea and conflicts closer to home 
This chapter concerns the Natal Witness's construction of a discourse of oppositional liberalism through 
its coverage of two key events in the so-called border wars. In this analysis, I will discuss the discourses 
created around terrorism, apartheid and the SADF role in southern Africa. More specifically, I will be 
discussing issues pertaining to reportage on SADF invasions into Angola in 1978 and 1981, as well as 
the South African occupation of South West Africa (now Namibia)?19 In my discussion, I will be 
interrogating two SADF operations that took place in these periods. The first was known as "Operation 
Reindeer", and was launched in May 1978. In this operation, the SADF invaded parts of Angola to root 
out SWAPO camps. They claimed success but both SW APO and independent observers 
counterclaimed that the supposed "base" was in fact a refugee camp. The second incursion under 
review in this chapter occurred three years later, was called "Operation Protea", and took place from 23 
August 1981 to 4 September 1981. This action was also claimed a success by the SADF as it cleared 
out the SW APO military camp. The first issue I will interrogate is the Natal Witness 's dialogue with 
governmental sources from their opinion pages. This will include responses by the editorials, columns, 
and letters to both South African government and oppositional statements concerning the subject of the 
border wars. 
In this analysis, it is important to note the international and local context at the time. During the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the Cold War spread to Africa with both the Soviet Union and the United States 
competing for influence on the continent. The Soviet Union assisted one of the liberation movements, 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)22o in Angola through providing weapons 
219 In thi s thesis, I will be using the name South West Africa, as it is the name used at the time. 
220 The MPLA were one of the liberation movements in Angola during Portuguese colonial rule. After the 
Angolan war of independence, they were involved in a civil war with over liberation movements for control of 
the country. 
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and military advisors. This was coupled with Cold War, anti-communist ideology in South Africa, 
which viewed Soviet expansionism as a significant threat. In relation to this issue, I will demonstrate 
the textual production of a recurrent ideological theme promoted by the newspaper: that apartheid was 
ironically perpetuating the threat of communism in South Africa, even as troops crossed national 
borders under the justification of defending the country from communist infiltration. The argument was 
that the government was making communism attractive to black populations through its unpopular laws. 
To explore these themes, I focus on the two mentioned military interventions that came to represent the 
fraught nature of war in the theatre of southern African border states. I analyse a six-week period of 
coverage following each of the events in question. My first sample on Operation Reindeer extends from 
13 May to 21 June 1978. The second sample focusing on discourses around Operation Protea covers 26 
August to 2 October 1981. The sources that the Natal Witness used included both official and non-
governmental sources. Official sources consisted of statements from government, and the security 
forces, which included the SAP and SADF. Non-governmental sources included international 
newspapers, opposition parties, and prominent individuals in South African society. The main sources 
of information the Natal Witness utilized were official, where a form of "embedded journalism" took 
place. The Defence Act of 1967 stipulated that any information or rumour regarding the SADF could 
not be published without consent from the Minister of Defence. This included information about 
mobilization of SADF troops or allies to a specific area, the production of weapons and any other 
information considered classified by the government during wartime. The Act also restricted the 
publication of any information considered hurtful to the integrity of the defence department and the 
SADF without prior consent of the Minister of Defence. The SADF set up a public relations office in 
which they provided news and information, which they regarded as suitable. Despite these measures, 
the Natal Witness managed partially to get around some of these restrictions by quoting international 
sources such as the UN and the president of Angola. They also used data provided by the main news 
industry, SAP A. 
In the sample of news content from 1978, nine articles were taken from official sources and twelve 
articles focused on non-governmental sources. There were also eight opinion section commentaries 
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focused on South African involvement with South West Africa and Angola. These consisted of six 
editorials and two columns. For my 1981 sample, the Natal Witness carried thirty-one articles, which 
consisted of eighteen articles from official sources and thirteen from non-governmental sources. There 
were also twelve opinion section commentaries concerning the issue: eight editorials and four opinion 
columns. 
Exchanges of discourse between official sources and opinion articles regarding Operation 
Reindeer 
Operation Reindeer took place on 4 May 1978. The SADF attacked a SW APO military base in 
Cassinga, a town on the southern border of Angola. Recently, author Dick Lord, who fought in the 
South African Air Force (SAAF) has declared that Operation Reindeer was a comprehensive victory for 
the SADF. "Although only 16 SWAPO cadres were accounted for, cross-border follow-up achieved a 
far greater result. It crushed the insurgency campaign on the Eastern Front; SWAPO never regained a 
position of strength in the Caprivi.,,221 This attack caused controversy as SWAPO claimed the attack 
was on a refugee camp for those displaced by the war in southern Africa. Despite South African 
denials, the Red Cross also declared it a refugee camp. As a result, international bodies such as the UN, 
OAU, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) heavily condemned South Africa. The 
condemnation was transmitted throughout the international media, further emphasising South Africa's 
reputation for state-sponsored violence, when it was already being criticized for the deaths of 
schoolchildren in Soweto. Also important were South African negotiations with the UN over Resolution 
435, which were in process at the time: the conditions included South Africa pulling out of South West 
Africa and a democratic election-taking place in the country. 
The government set out several themes in its position about the SADF role and about SWAPO. The first 
of these was a justification for its authorization of incursions into Angola, putting special emphasis on 
the Russian threat to southern Africa. The government saw these as necessary to protect South Africa 
and South West Africa from "terrorist activity" by SWAPO. The government also saw itself as having 
221 Dick Lord. Fromfledgling to eagle: the South African Air Force during the Border War. (Johannesburg: 30 
Degrees South, 2008) p152. 
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to defend against the greater threat of communism in the region. Finally, the government claimed that a 
legitimate election could not take place in South West Africa without the suppression ofSWAPO's 
military wing. Another aspect of the official sources was the denial that South Africa was expansionist 
in its aims. The government line was that South Africa was engaging militarily, purely to protect its 
borders. 
The fIrst government defence for Operation Reindeer published in the Natal Witness came from the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pik Botha. On 6 May 1978, he claimed that SW APO was not holding 
its side of the agreement in recent negotiations. "It has to be emphasized that SW APO had not only 
accepted the proposals of the Western powers, but that it had increased its acts of violence during recent 
days on a wide front. SWAPO's reply to South Africa's acceptance was to commit more violence.,,222 
Botha claimed the action was one of defence, stressing the necessity for South Africa to maintain its 
commitment to "protect" the people against insurgent violence. "South Africa cannot forsake its duty to 
give the people of the territory the necessary protection. Without that they will be entirely defenceless 
and become prey of merciless physical violence" 223 
On 8 May 1978, an editorial titled 'The strike into Angola' commented on the SADF raid on a SW APO 
camp based there. This editorial conceded it as a resounding military victory for the SADF and 
affirmed that South Africa had a right to defend its people. 
Judged in pure military terms the South African strike last week into SW APO bases in Angola appears without a 
doubt to have been successful. In Parliament, the opposition have expressed their support for the action. As Harry 
Schwarz, had argued, "it would only seem fair that South Africa should be entitled to protect her own troops and the 
people of SWAlNamibia against ambush, assassination and intimidation so that free and fair elections may be 
held.,,224 
Therefore, the writer advances the view that on a military level South Africa was within its rights to 
attack SW APO because of a military threat to peace and democracy in the region. In the next 
paragraph, the writer also criticized past actions of the government towards South West Africa claiming 
that its attempts to thwart democracy in the region had made the military invasion necessary. 
222 SAPA. 'World reaction' , Natal Witness, 6 May 1976, p 1. 
223 Ibid. 
224 'Th 'k' A I e stn e mto ngo a', Natal Witness, 8 May 1978, p 6, 
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It is indeed one of the ironies of history that South Africa finds herself the guardian of democratic processes which 
she has resisted for so long. It is one of the tragedies of history that her resistance to that process has largely 
contributed to the circumstances, which made military action necessary.225 
The writer therefore expressed a dual and ambivalent position, which, on one hand, saw South Africa as 
a protector of democracy and SWAPO as a threat to the region and on the other hand, was critical of 
South Africa's past foreign policy. 
On 13 May 1978, further official explanations of the government's actions in Angola were reported in 
the Natal Witness. The article disclosed Mr. Botha's reproach to the United States over its criticism of 
the incursion into Angola, where he stated that the US paid no heed to the "terrorist" activities of 
SWAPO. In this view, South Africa had both a right and a responsibility to protect the region from 
SW APO militarism and ensure that democracy was established in South West Africa. 
He said in an interview, I find it strange that Mr. Holding Carter, the state department spokesman should find South 
Africa's timing of the raid so unfortunate but that he does not find it unfortunate that SW APO terrorists are killing 
innocent civilians in South West Africa. Throughout a year of long discussion, I have personally urged the five 
Western governments to do their utmost to persuade SWAPO to stop its violence. The five Western nations know 
very well what SW APO is up to in the territory. They all have intelligence services.226 
Two days later the Natal Witness reported South African President BJ. Vorster's views on the situation, 
which reiterated the military operation as justified and a "right". He accused SWAPO of increased 
violence, asserting that, "SW APO had stepped up their terrorist activities from Angola, demanding 
military response.,,227 Vorster stated that, "[ c ]onsequently there was nothing else that could be done 
under the circumstances. ,,228 Vorster further claimed that South Africa was interested in a peaceful 
government for Namibia, and that it would "not tolerate" the region being used for facilitation of 
SWAPO attacks. "South Africa was interested firstly in good government in the territory and secondly, 
that the territory should not be used as a springboard for terrorist attacks on South Africa. Naturally if 
that happens, we will hit back which is the right of any country under those circumstances.,,229 
225 Ibid. 
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On May 201978, Tom Copeland (a columnist employed by the Natal Witness) conceded that the UN set 
double standards in its dealings with violence in the Southern African region. "Why, for example 
should South Africa's recent military raid be condemned universally, while acts of terrorism in South 
West AfricalNamibia and elsewhere raise hardly a protest?,,230 On 29 May 1978, an editorial titled 
'Two sides' attempted to interrogate both the issue of South West Africa and Operation Reindeer. The 
editorial, which indicated an alternative approach to the government, insisted that there were "two 
sides" to the issue. "Much as South Africans may believe in the correctness of the government's attitude 
they should understand that the other side does not. As McHenry [head of a Western delegation helping 
negotiations over Namibian independence] himself pointed out in his Press conference last week he and 
the Western contact group were regarded as pro- SWAPO by the South Africans but as pro South Africa 
by SWAPO".231 The editorial also charged that South Africa had to bear the consequences for its 
actions in Angola, given that it was a sensitive time for the SADF to invade. "The Ascension Day strike 
into Angola by South African forces has not helped the process of bringing about a settlement in 
SWAINamibia if for no other reason than it has added to the distrust of the South African government 
by the other side.,,232 This editorial indicates that the Natal Witness was formulating a middle ground 
discourse, a path between the South African government and SWAPO's anti-colonial strategies. As is 
typical of a liberal press, the 'objective' path (and truth) is perceived as lying between, or through a 
balanced consideration of, two positions. In this case, these editorials also give an indication of the 
ambivalence that the Natal Witness maintained in these early campaigns. It was not always homogenous 
on the subject. 
On 1 June 1978, the Natal Witness reported that Vorster had praised the West for seeking to strengthen 
NATO, in reaction to the 'Marxist threat'. He asserted that this threat was not only against South 
Africa, but was a menace to the entire Western world. Vorster also called for an end to arms sanctions 
against South Africa stating that the country was an integral part of the battle between 'Marxism' and 
'the West'. 
230 Tom Copeland. 'Even SA has double standards', Natal Witness 20 May 1978 p 4 
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I think I have the right to put this question to the West: taking into account the threat, which you know, exists and 
taking into account that the NATO defence has to be improved why do you withhold anns from the one stable 
country in this part of the world? What do you hope to achieve by befriending those who want to boycott South 
Africa? What cause do you serve by harming South Africa?233 
On the same day, an article appeared which featured a speech by F.W De Klerk, the Minister of Post 
and Communications, at the Republic Day in Pretoria on the threat to South Africa. De Klerk contended 
that, "South Africa needs a strong and motivated defence force on a continent where Marxist 
expansionism and Western escapism is evident and there is a build up of weapons on an unbelievable 
scale.,,234 In another Republic Day celebrations speech, reported by the Natal Witness, Minister of 
Information Connie Mulder stressed that South Africa needed to keep faith to avoid "Marxist 
insurrection", which occurred in countries on their borders. "If the people of South Africa lose faith in 
themselves the country will yield to communism in the same way as Angola and Mozambique.,,235 On 1 
June 1978, the Natal Witness published selected quotations from a speech by Dr Piet Koornhoff, the 
Minister of Sport and Recreation, at the Republic Day celebrations. He addressed accusations that South 
Africa was expansionist in its aims. The Natal Witness reported Koornhoffs statement that, "South 
Africa has never wanted death and destruction around its borders. Indeed the principle has as always 
been to prevent war, to grant another nation its right to live and to avoid death and destruction as much 
as possible.,,236 
On 12 June 1978, an editorial focused on the Walvis Bay issue in the negotiations. At the time Walvis 
Bay was one of the main talking points in the negotiations between the South African government and 
SWAPO. The writer asserted that South Africa would have nothing to lose in ceding Walvis Bay to an 
independent Namibia, warning that if they did not, it would potentially stall the negotiations. "To refuse 
to cede Walvis Bay - as it has stated it will- may well cause [SWAPO leader] Sam Nujoma to 
repudiate the Western proposals entirely. On the other hand, South Africa will hardly lose much in 
giving up Walvis Bay.,,237 
233 SAPA. ' West's change of heart welcome' , Natal Witness, 1 June 1978, p 13 . 
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Opinions expressed in the Natal Witness in this moment of 1978, regarding the violence on the South 
African borders, took a similar line to the government in relation to a 'communist threat' and the need 
for collaborative action. The fear of a potential revolution coincided with this anxiety. Despite this the 
Natal Witness still took a less aggressive, more moderate stance within its opinion pages as evidenced in 
its petitioning for increased negotiations in Southern Africa. This is in contrast with the South African 
government, which favoured a more hardline, militarist approach to the issues in Southern Africa. This 
once again demonstrates a lukewarm response by the paper concerning militarisation in 1978. It also 
provides commentary on the complex nature of liberal thought, which in itself was full of contradictions 
and double mindedness when it came to change in the system. It further provides indication of a 
conservative tone in liberalism despite attempts byliberals to set themselves apart as being thoroughly 
progressIve. 
Non-governmental voices 
The Natal Witness aired other sources, both international and local, contributing to a more open public 
discourse around the South African border operations. These included sources from prominent people 
in South Africa such as clerics and opposition MPs. International sources consisted of statements by the 
UN, the OAD, the Angolan Government, SWAPO, and prominent personalities internationally. These 
non-governmental sources were all in opposition to the South African government, which further 
indicated the distance its line, took it. 
On 8 May 1978, the Natal Witness quoted remarks by two prominent Namibian Anglican Bishops Ed 
Morrow and Heinz Humke, about South African conduct in South West Africa. Rev Morrow slammed 
Operation Reindeer as a crime against humanity. "The Ascension Day massacre in Angola of men, 
women and children has all but destroyed any chance of a peaceful settlement in Angola.,,238 In the 
same meeting, Heinz Hunke was reported as claiming that torture of political activists in South West 
Africa was commonplace throughout the country. 
238 Witness Reporter. 'SA raid blew peace hopes - SWA cleric', Natal Witness, 8 May 1978, p 9. 
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He said the torture was institutionalized - it was spread a\1 over the country, had been taking place consistently over 
the past 10 years, took place in special rooms with an interrogating officer present and special jargon was used 
I· d 'b ' 239 amongst po Ice to escn e vanous tortures. 
The Natal Witness also recorded Hunke's eyewitness evidence for his statements. 
On the credibility of reports of torture, Mr Hunke said several primitive people had accurately described the 
machinery used while having never seen the type of machinery before. Witnesses including Mr Hunke himself, had 
seen "bleedin~ people" coming from police stations and seen their scars and medical evidence indicated torture had 
taken place?4 
Two days later the Natal Witness reported on statements from a former Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) agent that the organisation and the SADF were responsible for the Cuban presence in Angola. 
"The CIA worked closely with South Africa in trying to wage a secret war in Angola two years ago and 
therefore helped legitimize the presence of large Cuban forces in Africa.,,241 
From another angle, however, on 11 May 1978, the Natal Witness published claims by Mr K Stanley of 
the Namibian National Front (NNF)242 that SWAPO were heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, thus 
diminishing their credibility as a national liberation organisation. 
He said SW APO now found itself in the company of the MPLA, the Cubans and the Russians. Even SW APO's 
bases in Southern Angola were named Moscow and Vietnam, which prompts one to question their credibility. Mr 
Stanley said Cuba, Russia and Angola were foreign to SW AlNamibia and because of SW APO's involvement with 
them, the NNF, a predominately black political umbrella organisation, could no longer support SW APO 243 
On the same page, a very different view was presented. Documentary filmmaker Michael Sanden put 
forth an alternative picture of the situation. 
239 Ibid. 
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Cassinga was a wel1-known refugee base, he said. It had a garage, clothes-maker and clinic. Only a few SW APO 
troops had been stationed there to guard the 5000 to 6000 refugees against UNITA soldiers. The South Africans 
bad raided Cassinga in order to provoke SWAPO to break off settlement with the five Western members of the UN 
Security Council.244 
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Thus, Sanden reported, the SADF Cassinga raid was a humanitarian disaster for the area. On 13 May 
1978, the Natal Witness recorded a motion by the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) 
declaring its condemnation of South African activities in South West Africa, presenting a petition with 
250 student signatories. "The motion ... condemns South Africa's presence in the territory and attempts 
to exclude SWAPO from the democratic process of change and supports the full participation of 
SWAPO in this process.,,245 Five days later, the Natal Witness published a review of a booklet by 
SWAPO claiming the authorities tortured Namibian people.246 "The South West African Peoples 
Organisation (SWAPO) has released a booklet in which it claims that South West Africans in South 
African prisons have been tortured and poisoned,,?47 The booklet further asserted, "South Africa had 
extended its security legislation in SWAIN amibia because of strengthened resistance by N amibians to 
its illegal occupation.,,248 
On 31 May 1978, the Natal Witness recorded defiant declarations from SW APO that they would resist 
oppression from the South African government. SW APO asserted that, "it will fight any government 
imposed on the people of Namibia by the South African government.,,249 The Natal Witness published 
SWAPO claims that it would continue with all its powers at its disposal against South Africa's 
"Balkanization".250 
SW APO also issued statements concerning South African occupation and the proposed forthcoming 
elections. 
The question of SW AlNamibia revolved on the "brute and illegal occupation of the territory in defiance of 
international opinion. Therefore talks about elections referred to by John Vorster are a mockery of all known 
election procedures and democratic requirements".25\ 
On 1 June 1978, the Natal Witness reported on a UN meeting concerning the South African incursion 
into Angola. The Angolan representative accused the SADF of using inhumane weapons. "South 
245 W· R Itness eporter. 'Local students protest SRC motion on SW A', Natal Witness 13 May 1978 p 1 
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African troops who invaded Angola on May 4 caused 'horrible deaths', using weapons of which the 
Angolans had no previous knowledge.,,252 On 12 June 1978, the Natal Witness reported a story about 
conservative students at the University of Cape Town disrupting a meeting addressing concerns over 
official actions in Namibia. The article included allegations of torture and illegal detentions committed 
by government officials in that region. "Two churchmen from SWAlNamibia told of torture, floggings, 
and detentions by 'officials' in the territory and called for an impartial inquiry into the allegations.,,253 
On the same day, the Natal Witness reported on a summit by African heads of states (those of Zambia, 
Botswana, and Kenya) regarding the South African occupation of South West Africa. It published 
discussions about the Walvis Bay situation, detailing that the communique wanted full protection for 
Walvis Bay as well as to prevent South Africa from using the area for military offensives. 
The frontline states urgently demand that the Security Council take measures to guarantee the territorial integrity of 
Namibia and return Walvis Bay rapidly to Namibia. The communique said any attempt by South Africa to use 
Walvis Bay to sabotage SWA \Namibian independence should be regarded by the council as a threat to international 
d 
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peace an secunty. 
They said that South Africa should be prevented from making incursions into countries such as Angola 
and Zambia from Namibian bases. "The frontline states condemn the use of military bases in Namibia 
to attack sovereign states as happened recently in Cassinga - a reference to last month's South African 
raid on a SWAPO camp inside Angola.,,255 On 24 June 1978, accusations by the Zambian government 
of brutal incursions into that country via South West Africa were also published in the Natal Witness. 
"Zambia has accused South Africa of using SWAlNamibia as a springboard for what the acting minister 
of foreign affairs called ' barbaric acts of aggression' against the people of Angola and Zambia.,,256 
These sources, aired in the Natal Witness, reflected and constructed a public discourse for its readership 
in relation to the South African border wars in 1978. Many of these sources were oppositional to the 
South African government approach on the border wars. They also attempted to expose government 
misconduct through its publication of allegations. One interpretation is that the Natal Witness was 
acting as a 'responsible opposition', to keep the South African government accountable. Yet, combined 
252 SAPA. 'SA troops caused horrible deaths'- claim', Natal Witness, 1 June 1978, p 7. 
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with much of the opinion expressed in its pages, it also supports the notion that the Natal Witness was 
trying to create a centrist, moderate approach to the border conflicts. 
1981 Operation Protea 
Three years later, in 1981, there was a marked change in the discourse of the Natal Witness regarding 
South African incursions into Angola. This gives insight into the gradual evolution of liberal discourse 
concerning the South African government's militarist approach to political conflict in the Southern 
African region as well as South African militarization in general. Such developments can be seen in its 
approach to Operation Protea, an incursion into Southern Angola, which started on 24 August and ended 
on 3 September 198 1. The SADF and South African government, claimed that the operation had cleared 
out the SW APO military camp and set the organisation's military capabilities back. One of the other 
objectives in the campaign according to former SADF soldier Granger Korff was to ensure that 
SWAPO's protection by the Angolan forces was taken away.257 As author Dick Lord puts it, "SWAPO 
forces could no longer be protected by the defensive umbrella provided by Angolan forces sited around 
these towns.,,258 Despite the international condemnation it received, this operation was much less 
controversial internationally than Operation Reindeer had been. The most significant aspect of 
Operation Protea was that the SADF found its first direct evidence of Soviet involvement by finding 
Soviet weapons as well as documents. This was a great success for the South African government's 
propaganda machine, which was attempting to convince the public that the Soviets were trying to 
infiltrate Southern Africa. However, Lord described a sobering message with this victory. "With the 
raising of the South African's confidence came the realization that subsequent operations would become 
much harder as captured or destroyed military equipment was replaced by newer and better 
weapons.,,259 
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Before the news was made public, editorials in the Natal Witness made clear their objections to SADF 
military operations in Angola as well as the secrecy surrounding them. An editorial on 27 August 1981 
addressed suspicions of a SADF incursion in Angola. "Since we were not told that our troops were in 
Angola during the last major invasion of that country, perhaps we should not be surprised if it happened 
again. But why should the people of South Africa, who after all pay for and do the fighting, not be told 
that our defence force is being deployed outside the country".260 The reporter also speculated on the 
possibility of igniting a direct war with Angola. "If the Angolan claims are accurate then it would seem 
that we are technically at war not with SW APO but with Angola. The repercussions of such a state of 
affairs are likely to be considerable and the probability of sanctions will have increased dramatically" ?61 
Two days later, the editorial went further in its criticism of the operation, as seen by the title 'SA's 
Vietnam'. The author conceded that the Operation Protea was 'justified', as it would hamper SW APO 
in their efforts. "From the military point of view, South Africa's recent incursion into Angola may have 
been justified. By destroying enemy bases the Defence Force has made it more difficult for SW APO to 
mount its own raids across the border".262 This illustrated that from a pure military perspective the 
editorial endorsed the SADF actions as correct. However, on another level the author warned of severe 
international and political ramifications to come. 
But from the political perspective the operation has been a disaster, because it has given our Afro-Asian rivals just 
the pretext they need to unite both the East and West against this country. From now on we can expect increased 
contributions to the SW APO war chest and a greater readiness to use Cubans and the MPLA to defend Angola, as 
well as a unanimous condemnation of South Africa's action in the General assembly.263 
The author also asserted that pre-emptive strikes into foreign territory had always been controversial in 
international opinion and gave the example of the Israel, which was under international condemnation 
for its refusal to allow Palestinian refugees into its territory, who had been evicted from their homes 
following a civil war in 1948. The author, however, stressed differences between these cases. 
South Africa's case is unfortunately much weaker than Israel's because she is regarded as being in unlawful 
possession of South West Africa. If there were hope of holding early elections acceptable to the UN and the 
republic and ending the bush warfare that benefits no one, then raids like these could be accepted as necessary 
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prelude to a settlement, but such prospects seem to be receding and advancing. The tragic possibility exists that the 
operational area will become South Africa' s Vietnam ?64 
Thus, the editorial put forward an ambivalent argument, which from one perspective saw action by 
South Africa as being correct militarily but not politically. In 1981, the same themes as in 1978 emerged 
regarding government sources on South African militarization. On 1 September 1981, a defence 
spokesperson commented that Angola's accusations of continued occupation by the SADF in the 
country were propaganda. He also declared that SADF troops needed to stay for humanitarian purposes. 
Security forces had also helped members of the local population to resettle in their homes after the operation, the 
spokesman said. They had also been given medical attention and food. He reiterated that Angola had been making 
propaganda, in view of the United Nations sitting, by saying that security forces were still occupied large tracts of 
Angolan territory.265 
On the same day, the Natal Witness conveyed the views of Magnus Malan the then Minister of Defence 
regarding Soviet and Cuban involvement in southern Africa. He stressed that there was definite proof of 
Soviet involvement in Angola and that it was therefore imperative to maintain internal arms industries in 
South Africa. 
I trust that the Western world has taken note that there is irrefutable proof that apart from Cubans, there are also 
Russian officers at the F APLA and SW APO headquarters. It has nothing to do with Russian liberation but rather 
Russian enslavement, General Magnus Malan said. The need for self-sufficiency and the value of the arms industry 
had again been emphasized by what happened in Angola last week.266 
Four days later, an editorial commented on Cuban and Soviet presence in southern Africa. It supported 
Resolution 435, which was an initiative by the UN for independence for South West Africa as well as a 
ceasefire between SW APO and the South African security forces. This resolution also attempted to 
ensure a free and fair election once the South African government had pulled out of South West Africa. 
The editorial predicted that if South Africa accepted the resolution it would ensure independence for 
South West Africa, facilitate free elections and end any viable reasons for Russian and communist 
involvement in the region. "Number one prize for the Reagan administration and the West is a 
settlement of the South West Africa question, which would finally remove whatever excuse the 
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Russians and Cubans have for being in Angola in such numbers".267 It also warned the South African 
government that it would face isolation if it failed to cooperate with plans for Namibian independence. 
Assured of US support in settling the details and perhaps in implementing them Pretoria may now be more inclined 
to let independence elections go ahead. If it is not and Mr. Reagan is left with nothing to show for his policies, our 
refusal to budge could mean the end of a short and promising friendship." 268 
This column thus showed strong support for a Western solution, rather than one, which looked to the 
liberation movements in South West Africa and South Africa. On 7 September 1981 Gerald Shaw, a 
Cape Times columnist whose works were regularly published in the Natal Witness, wrote that fear of the 
Soviet Union was exaggerated. Shaw claimed that South Africa's invasion into Angola had been a 
setback for Western aims in that region as well as South Africa's security because it would justify 
Soviet and Cuban involvement in the region. "The South African raid into Angola was a diplomatic 
setback for the West because it reinforced the pretext for Cuban; East German and Russian troops to 
remain in Angola They purport to be there to protect the land against South African invasion.,,269 He 
also stated that the Soviet hold over Angola was an exaggerated perception as Angola had financial 
incentives for good relations with the West and it was only the SWAPO war keeping Soviet and Cuban 
troops in the country. 
As it stands now Angola is by no means a Soviet puppet. It is the continuing war in SW AlNamibia with SWAPO 
enjoying a sanctuary in Angola, which has embroiled the country with South Africa militarily and created an 
opening for the Soviet/Cuban bloc. Economically Angola is wholly dependent on Western multi-national big 
business. Most of its national budget is financed by the Gulf Oil corporation ' s operations in Angola.27o 
Shaw also argued that the Soviet threat was always largely exaggerated in Southern Africa and asserted 
that the government could not distinguish between real and imagined threats. 
The big problem is the misplaced notion, which persists in Pretoria about the nature of the communist threat. There 
is an inability to distinguish between Black Nationalism and communism and between adherence to Marxist ideas 
and commitment to the foreign policy aim of the Soviet Union.271 
Shaw's column rejected the government line. A day later, an editorial addressed the potential 
confrontation in Southern Africa if the government did not support Resolution 435. The writer said it 
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was preferable for a SW APO government to come into power as opposed to continuation of a difficult 
war. "An election may well end in a SW APO victory at the polls, but even such an outcome would be 
preferable to an eventual full-scale confrontation between SA and the rest of Africa backed by Soviet 
and Cuban advisors.,,272 It suggested that a solution would halt Soviet involvement in the region. "An 
internationally recognized settlement, which would reduce Soviet mischief making in the subcontinent 
is very much in the long term interests both of South Africa and the West itself.,,273 This editorial was 
significant as it stressed an alternative to the increased militarization in the region. Shaw is a writer and 
proponent of South African liberalism who, since this period, has regularly had articles and books 
published which defended and promoted liberal values. His voice being quite prominent in the Natal 
Witness, gives insight into what values Natal Witness editors were trying to air. 
On 16 September 1981, the Natal Witness carried a report by the chief of the South African army Jannie 
Geldenhuys. He proclaimed the success of Operation Protea, contending that SW APO were unlikely to 
recover quickly from the disarray caused by the military offensive. "We have driven SW APO far north 
into Angola and they have suffered significant casualties. Their command structure has been disrupted, 
for the time being, and SWAPO' s logistical supports have been effectively broken.,,274 He also justified 
the attack on Angolan forces, claiming that they interfered on the side of SWAPO. "The security forces 
had launched a three-pronged pincer movement with one of its aims the prevention of involvement with 
Angolan forces. But the Angolan forces did not try to evade the security forces and intervened he 
said.,,275 A Witness columnist who was apprehensive about the South African raids into Angola was 
Anthony Delius, a literary writer and prominent liberal. In his article 'Russia is smiling', he made a 
number of points supporting the opinion that the Soviet Union in fact benefited from the South African 
attacks, as opposed to the contrary. Delius also speculated that the South African attacks made it 
unlikely that the ruling party in Angola, simply because of enticing trade offers by the West, would 
dismiss the Russians. 
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The South African invasion or incursion (call it what you will) could make it even less likely that Angola will push 
out Cuban and Russian troops in order to strike a big development and trading agreement with the USA. The more 
probable result will be an increase in both Cuban and Russian support, and a determined building up of radar air 
defences to shoot raiding South African aircraft out of the skies.
276 
On 18 September 1981, Natal Witness editor Richard Steyn described as 'fair' a perspective on the issue 
of political violence, aired in the British press. 
Perhaps the most fair evaluation of the situation in Angola is provided by Fred Brigland in the Spectator who points 
out that if South Africa have a great deal of violence to answer for, the same is true of Cuban, Soviet, American, 
British and African citizens in the region .277 
He described Brigland's view of the West's hypocritical behaviour towards South Africa, pointing out 
they unfairly singled out South Africa in their condemnation. 
The Cubans and Soviets have ruthlessly pursued power rather than liberty, Western policy has graduated from 
soppiness to opportunism. African policy is confused and ambiguously tom between a detesting of apartheid and an 
awareness of the Cuban and Soviet danger. But what unites and binds all of them is an astonishing hypocrisy of the 
assumption that South Africa must behave decently in Namibia, while they themselves have pursued practical 
foreign policy interests instead of high-minded idealism.278 
Steyn urged the South African government to follow up its success on the battlefield with a wise 
diplomatic front that would take in mind Resolution 435 lest South Africa find itself in a tumultuous 
situation in South West Africa. 
Unless our military successes are followed up by some farsighted diplomacy, which takes account of what the likes 
of Chester Crocker are trying to achieve in southern Africa there is a real risk of Namibia becoming a political 
quicksand from which we will not seriously try to extricate until it is too late.279 
Four days later, an editorial, titled 'New hope' , further voiced support for the implementation of 
Resolution 435. The writer praised the government's apparent willingness to venture elections in South 
West Africa under a Western settlement stating that it might have came to a realization that further 
conflict would be futile. 
If this means that our government is ready to risk an election in Namibia and is not merely going through the 
motions of negotiating then it must be commended for its realism. It appears that they [the South African 
government] have recognized that unless there is a negotiated settlement in the territory, South Africa will be sucked 
deeper in a confrontation we ultimately cannot win?80 
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Six days later, Gerald Shaw spoke about the desperate need for a Western settlement in South West 
Africa in his column titled' Sober Optimism on SWAlNamibia'. He claimed that a successful solution 
to the South West Africa situation would be extremely advantageous for South African interests in the 
region whereas a failed one could be potentially disastrous. "The advantages ofa Western-sponsored 
settlement of the problem are overwhelming. The cost of failure on the other hand, could be ultimately 
disastrous for the Republic and for the subcontinent.,,281 Shaw further asserted, "A co-operative South 
African attitude will earn this country a much closer relationship with Washington which would be a 
real gain for South Africa's security in a dangerous world.,,282 His analysis pointed to the way Cold 
War aggressions were manifesting as heated exchanges on the African continent. 
The Reagan administration is in much need of a striking coup in foreign policy, chalking up a few points against the 
Soviet Union. The departure of Cubans from Africa would represent such a coup, a rolling back of communism in 
southern Africa, as it were and would be much easier to achieve than a similarly advance of Western interests in 
Afghanistan or Eastern Europe.283 
Additionally, Shaw spoke about the futilities of South Africa continuing its military action in South 
West Africa claiming that 
... [a] Namibian dispute that drags on intermittently provides a pretext for further Soviet bloc interference and 
creates ideal conditions for communist exploitation. The last thing Soviet Russia wants to see in southern Africa is 
a negotiated Namibian peace coming after a Zimbabwean settlement achieved under British auspices, which was a 
notable setback for Soviet aims.284 
The Soviet Union, wrote Shaw, would benefit from a SWAPO military takeover of South West Africa, 
as it would strengthen Soviet justification for occupation in Angola. 
The current Soviet policy in this region is a Namibia liberated by a SW APO-led revolutionary war. For Soviet 
purposes, the longer the war drags on, the better and the greater the propaganda value and the disruption of Western 
interest. The SWAlNamibian impasse and the South African raids have already provided an excuse for the Cuban 
presence and the involvement of Russian technical advisors in the country.285 
Shaw also speculated about the possible implications for South Africa if no settlement was made for 
South West Africa's independence. He claimed that although the Nationalists exaggerated for their own 
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political purposes the Soviet threat was, after all, real. He claimed that South Africa could face isolation 
internationally if it failed and would be in even more danger of Soviet interference. He also elevated the 
Western solution as the most beneficial for the region. 
A Namibian peace under Western auspices would have a calming and stabilizing effect on the entire sub-continent. 
The departure of the Cubans would not only delight President Reagan. It would calm down South African anxieties 
to an extent at least. It would enable the South African government to pursue once again the rational goal of 
normalizing relations with Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola. In doing so, it would achieve more security of this 
country than any dirty tricks or military muscle can do?86 
Shaw also continued to believe that a SWAPO victory would not necessarily be a 'disaster' because 
South African dominance in the region could lead to good relations if the government managed the 
situation ' rationally'. 
The prospect must be faced that SW APO could well win UN-supervised elections. But this need not be a disaster as 
this column has frequently argued, and South Africa's relations with a SWAPO led government in Windhoek, if 
properly approached could be calm and business like. After all, South Africa has a giant's strength in this region 
interest.287 
He added that South Africa's economic and military hegemony in the region could offer them a lot of 
advantages in their diplomacy. "South Africa, if it tried, could probably learn to live with a SWAPO 
government as it learnt to live with Samora Machel in Mozambique, and given a modicum of intelligent 
diplomacy could do the same with Mr. Mugabe. The republic's military and economic muscle gives it 
great leverage in the subcontinent.,,288 His envisioning of a stable, inter-regional harmony between 
states differed strongly from the government line and supported the Western states' solution. 
An article, published on 6 October 1981 recorded the South African authority's defence of South 
African foreign policy towards Angola. It recorded words of an SADF spokesperson, who stated that 
the, "Angolan threats to call in the aid of friendly nations against South African troops still in Angola 
were a desperate attempt to seek a scapegoat for the chaotic situation in that country" .z89 The 




289 SAPA. ' SADF dismiss Angolan threats' , Natal Witness, 6 October 1981 , p 11. 
92 
repeatedly said that it is not occupying villages in Angola, and it has no reason to occupy towns and 
villages.,,29o 
In 1981, the dialogue between government sources and opinion articles continued to be engaged in the 
public space of the Natal Witness. One of the key themes emerging in the Natal Witness 's opinion 
section in 1981 was the vision of a pragmatic approach to diplomatic relations in the region and the 
notion that feared Soviet influence was in fact being bolstered by SADF actions in Angola. 
A key difference between 1978 and 1981 was the newspaper's growing support for the possibility of a 
SWAPO-Ied government. Another example of this approach was its petitioning the SADF to stop 
invading Angola. The secrecy of the South African government was also under fire by the Natal 
Witness, which advocated strong arguments against it even as it simultaneously conceded to the idea of 
a genuine Soviet threat. This signalled a gradual progression of cynicism concerning the legitimacy of 
the Soviet danger, frequently propagated by the South African government. Notably too, writers like 
Shaw looked to 'the West' for regional solutions and sought to de-legitimise political movements 
aligned to 'communist' support and ideals. 
These conclusions on the opinion pages of 1978 and 1981 provide evidence that liberal voices in the 
Witness were gradually altering their attitude to militarization in South Africa. Between 1978 and 1981, 
liberal discourse shifted from a measured response to South African militarization on its borders to 
adopting a very sceptical outlook on both the government's intentions and the viabilities of border wars 
in Angola and Namibia. Further reflected here was the growing disbelief by English speaking liberals to 
the supposed Soviet threat. 
Another aspect based on my analysis is that the Natal Witness supported a Western solution as well as 
Western humanism in general. This effectively reflected a desire to be a part of the Westernised world. 
This is indicative of how the Natal Witness created an identity for itself as well as English language 
speakers in the province. These points serve as a demonstration of Anderson' s point that a community 
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builds an identity around defining itself against an 'other' . Accordingly, the Natal Witness also might 
have sought to contrast the Nationalist Party government's ideology and methods against its own. Thus 
by defining the government' s viewpoints and actions as bigoted, it would have sought to define itself as 
open minded and flexible. This sort of hostility nonetheless illustrates a point by Anderson in which he 
states that no nation imagines itself as coterminous with humanity.291 Thereby the Natal Witness served 
as a vehicle for a liberal identity, aligning themselves to Western nations' ideologies. 
Non-governmental voices on Operation Protea 
In 1981 , the Natal Witness continued to extract information from both international and local sources 
not connected to the South African government. These included opposition MPs, the UN, the OAU and 
British newspapers. On 27 August 1981 , the newspaper recorded statements from a US spokesperson 
who said that, despite the US condemning the SADF's invasion; it had to be seen within the Southern 
African context. "The United States has deplored the attack by South African forces into Angola but 
says it must be viewed in the light of guerrilla attacks into SW AlNamibia and the presence in Angola of 
Cuban troopS.,,292 In the same article, the vocal international condemnation was highlighted. "South 
Africa's incursion into Angola was widely condemned yesterday with several countries calling for an 
end to the operation and others for severe diplomatic sanctions against Pretoria.,,293 The report also 
quoted a South African ambassador' s defence of the incursion. "We are not invading Angola. We are 
taking necessary action against terrorist bases in Angola and we are acting against terrorists and not the 
Angolan army and people.,,294 On 28 August 1981, Angolan claims of heavy and hi-tech fighting 
equipment being used by the SADF were reported in the Natal Witness. "Angola claimed yesterday that 
South African forces had thrown tanks and helicopters into heavy fighting near the provincial capital of 
N'Giva in the South of the country.,,295 The Defence Department in Angola also claimed they had shot 
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down South African air force planes. "The defence ministry in Luanda reported the Angolans had shot 
down a South African plane and helicopter.,,296 
On the same day, strong reactions on the incursion into Angola were reported by the Natal Witness. Dr 
Van Zyl Slabbert (a prominent liberal critic in South Africa who would later form the Progressive 
Federal Party, one of the main opposition parties after 1983) is quoted as stating that it was an SADF 
responsibility to be accountable to the public about its military operations. "Dr Slabbert said the SADF 
could not be expected to respond to every allegation concerning its military activities, yet an intolerable 
situation would occur if the Defence Force engaged in large-scale action and the South African public 
was kept uninformed about the true state of affairs.,,297 The Natal Witness also quoted Mr Jaap Marais, 
leader of the Herstigte Nasionale Party, who recalled the secrecy of previous SADF military operations, 
citing the example of the invasion into Angola in 1975. "Since the South African government had 
broken the law by entering Angola in 1975 and then claimed it had done so at the request of the US 
there has been a loss of confidence.,,298 
A day later, the Natal Witness documented the applause for SW APO by the governments of Botswana 
and India. Leaders of those nations complimented SWAPO on their tireless fight for justice against 
oppression. "A joint statement issued by the two countries at the end of a state visit by the Botswana 
President also praised SWAPO's heroic liberation struggle in SWAlNamibia.,,299 On the same page, 
Australian Minister Malcolm Fraser attacked the South African government for its policies, which he 
said encouraged Soviet intervention in southern Africa. This viewpoint was in line with the discourse 
familiar within the opinion pages of the Natal Witness. "He attacked South Africa saying their policies 
offered the best invitation to the Soviet Union to become involved in southern Africa.,,30o Once again, 
this time from the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, who, despite being differently placed 
geographically, was regarded as a 'Western' leader. On 1 September 1981, the Natal Witness 
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documented claims by the Angolan government news agency Angop that the SADF was invading 
Angolan cities. "South African forces were still occupying the towns ofN' Giva and Xangongo along 
with other areas in Angola's border province Angop said.,,301 The agency further alleged that several 
cities had sustained severe damage and a great number of lives were lost from bombing by the South 
African Air Force (SAAF). 
Angop said 81 buildings including schools and medical posts have been destroyed in the first bombing raid on 
Cabama on August 23 , the day before two South African motorised columns crossed the SWA\Namibian border to 
attack. The agency had been made homeless in the attack.
302 
These details in themselves represented an oppositional position because it was precisely such details, 
which the South African government denied or would not disclose. The government had maintained it 
had pulled out from the region, but these allegations directly contradicted its claims. Implications of 
these allegations, if true, meant a humanitarian crisis and crime against Angolan civilians. 
Representing the other end of the political spectrum, on 3 September 1981, the Natal Witness ran an 
article from the British press regarding an alleged capture of a Soviet soldier in Angola. The Times 
viewed it as conclusive evidence of direct Soviet Union encroachment in the area. "The Times said that 
it would be the first time that Soviet military involvement in southern Africa has been revealed. ,,303 It 
also printed the Time 's opinion that the Soviet Union had previously relied on working through the 
Cubans in countries such as Angola and Ethiopia. "The Times reported, ' Up to now Moscow preferred 
to operate through Cuban proxies so far as Angola is concerned. The same applied to Ethiopia in its war 
with Somalia, though massive supplies of Soviet weaponry were flown in. ",304 
On 4 September 1981, further accusations by Angola of SADF invasions and occupation of parts of 
Angola, were recorded by the Natal Witness. Despite South African claims of pulling out, the Angolan 
ministry again alleged that South Africa was still there and wanted permanent occupation to provide a 
bulwark between SW APO and MPLA forces . 
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The Luanda authorities say there is no indication that the South Africans are pulling back from known positions up 
to 150krn inside Angola and insist that Pretoria's objects go much further than simply attacking SW APO 
sanctuaries. Angola says the South Africans are destroying major targets such as roads, bridges, and government 
buildings in an attempt to tum the south of Angola into a buffer zone.
305 
The Luanda government claimed that the development would hamper both SW APO and MPLA efforts 
in the region. "This would make it more difficult for SWAPO to operate across the border into Namibia 
and easier for UNITA to establish themselves in that part of Angola. ,,306 Two days later, the Natal 
Witness reported the assertions of ' Western diplomats' (it gave no further details of who the sources 
were) that the SADF had moved into Angolan territory to supply rebel movements with ammunition. 
"A South African motorised column had thrust deep into Angola apparently to re-supply dissidents 
fighting the Marxist government, Western diplomats said yesterday.,,307 The SADF had invaded with 
the intention of, "destroying radar installations built along the Angolan border to give advance warning 
of South African air raids.,,308 The Natal Witness also printed the counter statement from a SADF 
representative. "In Pretoria a South African spokesman described reports of the third column in the east 
as ridiculous propaganda".309 On the same day, the newspaper published Nujoma' s denials ofSWAPO 
bases in Angola, as well as Soviet involvement with the organisation. He stated that, "SWAPO does not 
have any military bases in Angola, let alone Soviet personnel in its ranks. ,,3Io Another article announced 
that South Africa had been banned from the General Assembly meeting over the future of South West 
Africa because of its inability to cooperate with the UN over the matter. The Natal Witness reported the 
rumour that the UN Assembly had voted, with a huge majority, to exclude South Africa from the 
Emergency Special Session about the territory' s future.3lI 
On 9 September 1981 , the Natal Witness continued its publishing of viewpoints that were in clear 
opposition to the South African government line. Soviet authorities alleged that South Africa had 
deliberately misled the world over Cuban and Soviet troops fighting for SWAPO. 
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Yesterday the Soviet Communist Party newspaper said South Africa was trying to destroy and discredit SWAPO. 
Thus the South African propaganda services resort to open disinformation, declaring that SW APO has no bases in 
Namibia and that foreigners are fighting in the ranks of the liberation forces .
3J2 
On the same date, the British-based Guardian was reported as suggesting that South Africa was 
deliberately destroying southern Angola to create a bulwark against possible hostile forces. "South 
Africa's real aim is to devastate southern Angola and create a buffer zone north of the territory of 
Namibia which it illegally controls. It makes no difference to Pretoria who gets in the way.,,313 The 
following day, new accusations were reported from international governments. "The Soviet Union 
yesterday charged South Africa with waging war against its neighbours, and Sweden said South Africa 
seemed determined to turn the region into an area of big power rivalry.,,314 
On 14 September 1981, the Natal Witness recorded accusations from the OAU that South Africa' s main 
intention was to occupy Angola. An envoy stated that he was able to, "establish that this is not a simple 
attack, but an occupation, a violation of the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola, 
which shows South Africa' s clear will to continue and if possible extend its occupation.,,315 Also 
reported were calls by the OAU for military action against SADF troops in Angola. "Through the 
chairman of the OAU, we appeal to all member states to extend, as a matter of urgency, every possible 
assistance and in particular military aid.,,316 The organisation appealed for international assistance and 
condemned US President Reagan for supporting South Africa. 
The summit meeting appealed to the international community to give and step up assistance to the people of Angola 
for the defence of their country against South Africa. It condemned the Reagan administration for what it described, 
as support for the "South African white minority racist regime", thereby encouraging the country to be more daring 
in the perpetuation of its heinous criminal acts against Angola.317 
The Natal Witness also confIrmed that support for the South African government was forthcoming from 
within liberal political circles. On 14 September 1981 , a PFP Member of Parliament justifIed the SADF 
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incursion into Angola. He implied that the attack was necessary because of the build up of hostile 
guerrilla forces on the borders. 
Mr Cronje who recently visited the operational area said activity during the past few weeks was an attempt, by the 
SADF to de-escalate the guerrilla build up outside South Africa's borders. The amount of arms and equipment 
captured and destroyed by the South African army showed that, it was not quite small guerrilla type warfare.
318 
In Mr Cronje's view, "[t]he army existed basically to protect the country from action from across the 
borders or the overthrow of the government and to safeguard the security of the citizens.,,319 
On 14 September 1981, the Natal Witness recorded additional accusations from the OAU that "this is 
not a simple attack, but an occupation, a violation of the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of 
Angola, which shows South Africa's clear will to continue and, if possible, extend its occupation.,,32o 
On the same day, the Natal Witness printed further allegations of South African atrocities in the region. 
An Angolan official asserted that the SADF had stripped all the resources of occupied lands. "We know 
that they are taking everything from farm tractors, bulldozers, civil transport vehicles and cattle into 
Namibia - in fact all the technical means necessary for rebuilding the country.,,321 Four days later, the 
Natal Witness reported Angolan accusations that South Africa was demolishing structures in the 
country. "The Angolan communique said the South Africans had destroyed government buildings and 
the water tower at N'Giva, the capital of Kunene province.,,322 
On 24 September 1981, the Natal Witness documented the PFP leader Mr Schwarz's views on the 
SADF role in southern Africa. These were aligned with the NP conception of politics on the border. In 
parliament, Schwartz put forward the view that the SADF should protect the country from hostile 
external forces whilst South Africa dealt with its internal problems peacefully. "Mr Schwarz described 
the SADF as a shield to protect South Africa from aggression and violence while South Africans used 
peaceful means to find a solution for coexistence.,,323 
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On 1 October 1981, the Natal Witness recorded charges by Angola that the SADF was, "laying 
minefields among the frontier with SW AlNamibia.,,324 On the same page, the paper recorded an 
accredited observer who sympathized with the South African government geopolitics. 
He said there would be no early settlement because South Africa would have to be assured of its own security and 
would make efforts to ensure that a SW APO led government never got into power. Examples of this way of 
thinking were the pre-emptive strikes into Angola.,,325 
On 6 October 1981, the Natal Witness reported on statements by African leaders who stressed that the 
region would become embroiled in a struggle between the Soviet Union and Western powers. "Africa 
will be engulfed in an east-west struggle.,,326 They warned that conflict would prevail if the issues of 
South West Africa's independence were not resolved. "If the negotiations do not succeed and they have 
got to succeed, we would face a situation in which war will escalate.,,327 
In these pages, following Operation Protea, the Natal Witness published a number of strikingly diverse 
views and claims about the truth of militarization in Angola. It notably did not speak directly against 
the SADF incursion and appeared to have largely embraced a sense of just cause and the fears of 
terrorism and Soviet influence in the region. However, in its use of a variety of international sources, it 
conveyed to its public the fierce debates and contestations over truth that accompanied military actions. 
On this side of the border: Debates around internal terror, Soviet infiltration and the ANC 
Paralleling news in conjunction with the South African border wars and the discourse on the continent' 
were reports in relation to internal threats to South Africa. This perceived internal threat was directly 
related to events on the border, as it was seen as another front of attempted Soviet encroachment into 
South Africa itself. It could therefore be perceived as an extension of the border wars and awareness of 
this is thus vital in understanding discourses around Operation Reindeer and Operation Protea. Anti-
government organisations believed to be infiltrated by 'communists' were the perceived internal threat 
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for the South African government and their supporters. This included organisations such as ANC and 
Pan African Congress (PAC), which had been banned since the 1960s. The identified internal threat had 
a significant effect on the discourse regarding the South African border wars. I will discuss this briefly, 
looking through the pages of the Natal Witness from two sets of dates: 6 May to 16 June 1978 and 27 
August to 12 September 1981, which roughly correlate with the two military manoeuvres in question. 
On 6 May 1978, the Natal Witness reported a possible Russian influence inside South Africa. The 
article reported that two 'terrorists' had been arrested and found with Russian weaponry. "The arrests 
were confirmed by the head of Special Branch, Brigadier C. Zietsmann, who said Russian weapons and 
ammunition had been used.,,328 On the same day, a black teacher living in Pretoria was reported to have 
been charged under the Terrorism Act. A witness at the school claimed that, "Mr. Mbatha said that 
black people would have to fight the whites to get back their land. He said the whites were armed. So 
don't get too close to them. He told the students how to put petrol in a bottle with sand and matches to 
throw at them." 329 The article described how Mr Mbatha was accused of attempting to assist South 
African citizens outside South Africa to be placed into military camps. "The students would go from 
Swaziland to Mozambique for the military training camp and then come back to South Africa and fight 
the whites.,,33o 
Three days later, the Natal Witness continued its coverage ofthe man described as "Terror Teacher". It 
reported that Mbatha was accused by the state of encouraging violence against whites and promoting 
communism. 
The teacher claims, the witness said, that blacks in South Africa were oppressed and that Mozambique should be an 
example to countries under oppression. He said that FRELIMO and the blacks in Mozambique had fought the 
Portuguese and had driven them out and that blacks in the Republic should fight to get back their land. Mr Mbatha 
allegedly praised communism, saying that the people (under communism) all enjoyed the wealth, e.g. a country on 
an equal footing, and that it should be introduced to South Africa.331 
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In a follow up article two days later, the Natal Witness documented the headmaster' s evidence that Mr 
Mbatha was a "terrorist". The headmaster disclosed that, "one of his teachers accused in the terrorism 
trial- had attempted to get passports for a number of pupils so they could go to Swaziland.,,332 
These articles relate the external context of the South African border wars to what was happening in the 
country at the time, and this is similarly seen in the debate over the role and nature of the ANC. From 8 
May 1978 to 24 May 1978, the Natal Witness published a series ofletters by the public concerning the 
nature and policies of the ANC both before and after its banning. This debate included discourses on 
communism in South Africa and definitions of violence. On 8 May 1978, a letter by Mrs. A.C. 
Whitfield referred to the nature of the ANC before being banned by government. She claimed that 
communists who were linked to the Soviet Union and intent on invading South Africa had infiltrated the 
ANC. 
The ANC became a front organisation for the Communist Party in their campaign aimed at creating unrest and 
revolution in SA. A communist document stated that the "Liberation movement" was to be headed by the ANC and 
its fighting wing the Umkonto - Sizwe. The government became intransigent because of the infiltrated ideological 
communist doctrines of the ANC militants and not the other way round, as liberals continue to have us believe.333 
The writer asserted that the militant character of the ANC was exposed at the Rivonia treason trial of 
1963-1964. "Revolutionary violence was exposed without a shadow of doubt at that trial and to make a 
statement that the ANC was always in favour of non violence is blatant propaganda.,,334 On 10 May, the 
Natal Witness printed a response to Whitfield by C.O Gardner, who appears to have written an earlier 
piece to which Whitfield was responding. Gardner asserted that the ANC only turned to violence once 
banned and that Whitfield' s account did not prove that wrong. "My main assertion was that the ANC 
turned to force only after it was banned. None of the facts she offers (not that I accept them all) 
contradicts this central statement.,,335 In addition, Gardner concurred that there was communist 
influence in the ANC but disagreed over its extent. "It is true that there were communists within the 
ANC in the years before it was banned, but it is not true that the whole of the ANC was under 
332 SAPA. 'Headmaster gives evidence at terrorism trial ', Natal Witness 13 May 1978 p 3 
333 • , ' , • 
A.C. WhItfield. ANC was a front for the Reds ', Natal Witness 8 May 1978 p 6 334 . , , . 
IbId. 
335 C.O.Gardner. 'She missed the point', Natal Witness, 10 May 1978, p 8. 
102 
communist influence. Chief Albert Luthuli, for example, could hardly be described as a communist.,,336 
He also asserted that the ANC was not banned because of communists in its ranks "for the PAC was 
banned at the same time and that organisation was specifically opposed to communist influences.,,337 
Nine days later, Whitfield again wrote to the Natal Witness. In this second letter, she argued that the 
ANC had a long history of violence before its banning. She brought as evidence events such as the 
African mineworkers strike in 1946 and the 1952 Defiance Campaign to illustrate her points. Whitfield 
also acknowledged that the PAC was anti-communist but claimed that violence was the central tenet of 
its policy. 
The statement on the anti-communist stance of the PAC is quite correct. It was also anti white regarding its 
membership. But the PAC did not need the Commies. It was prepared to swim in the blood of the innocents. The 
PAC was banned for its public statements in support of violence and overthrow of the government.338 
In her view, the extent of the communist influence had been concealed from Albert Luthuli. "Chief 
Luthuli was deliberately kept uninformed of the extent of communist infiltration in the ANC.,,339 
Whitfield criticized the "Liberal Left" on the actions by the ANC and PAC. "I wish to conclude this 
correspondence by stating quite categorically that I refuse to be hoodwinked by the Liberal Left trying 
to whitewash the bloody revolutionary actions of infiltrated organisations by subtle means.,,340 
The May 24 issue had Gardner again disputing Whitfield, argued that she had a distorted view of what 
violence was. Actions, he said, which do not do bodily harm to anyone or destroy property, could not 
be construed as violence. 
I can 't escape the impression that Mrs Whitfield thinks that any activity by black people which might annoy or put 
out the dominating whites is by definition violent. She enumerates pass-burning, campaigns, strikes, the "defiance" 
campaign; but these events are precisely what I and most people would describe as tough but non-violent. Violent 
actions are those, which aim at deliberate destruction of human life or of buildings etc.34 1 
On the same day, a lVynne responded to Gardner. Vynne argued that the historical non-violence of the 
ANC was no longer relevant and that ANC was now waging a 'Marxist war' against South Africa, 
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which was directly supported by the communist powers. ''Never mind what the organisation stood for at 
is inception, the point is, what has it developed into? It is an undisputed fact that the ANC is at present 
engaged in an undeclared war against South Africa. They are sending trained and armed Marxist killers 
into South Africa to murder, plunder and commit sabotage.,,342 
The debate represented in this exchange shows that readers of the Natal Witness occupied a range of 
ground in relation to political change in South Africa and, more specifically, about the nature of black 
politics. The accusations by Whitfield, which tag all protest action as violent and communistic, are 
refuted by Gardner who, notably, appears to share an aversion to communism and violence. In addition 
who was involved in the debates is a significant factor to consider, especially with regard to the fact that 
C.O Gardner was a member of the Liberal Party of South Africa, as well as the chair of the Christian 
Institute. He later joined the UDF and eventually the ANC in 1990. For both, Chief Albert Luthuli 
appears as the ideal black leader, contrasting with the radical politics ofthe later ANC. This argument 
over the nature of the ANC and black politics displays the diversity of liberal responses to state 
militarization, political violence and black politics. Thus, this illustrates that liberal responses to many 
issues were not homogenous and liberalism cannot be categorised as a single homogenous unit. 
In 1981, such concerns continued to be aired in the pages of the Natal Witness. On 4 September, it 
published an article describing some arrests made over the finding of Soviet arms. The article reported 
that the men had been, "Held under Section 22 of the Terrorism Act, the security police said yesterday. 
Among the weapons found at the house in Botha's Hill were Russian made Kalashnikov AK 47 assault 
rifles, M 26 grenades and FN rifle and pistol and 2500 rounds of 9mm ammunition.,,343 On 16 
September, a story appeared that told of an attack on a farming couple in Boomval, attributing it to 
Soviet influence and "Russian weapons".344 It was titled 'Stabbed terror attack survivor tells of prayers 
in the sun'. The article described how "[Mrs.] and Mr. Steyn were attacked on the farm Boomval in the 
Nietverdiend district. Police later shot and killed two men armed with Russian weapons. The search 
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continued for a third man but it was thought he might have fled across the Botswanan [sic] border". 345 
The link to the border wars were implicit to readers in the motives attributed to the assailants, their 
killing by police and the idea that the escapee would have run across the border. What is clear is that, as 
represented in the pages of the Natal Witness, communist and terrorist threats within South African 
borders were seen as an extension of Cold War fears across the border. 
A frequent claim in both 1978 and 1981 was the link between Soviet influence and internal black 
militancy inside South Africa. The perception that South Africa faced conditions of extremity from all 
sides was clearly not merely an NP view, but was a radicalized fear expressed also by the 'liberal' 
readership of the Natal Witness. A strong part of the newspaper's oppositional politics was situated in 
the view that the government was perpetuating, rather than deflecting, communist influence and 
violence in the region. One of the chief dangers of continued 'racial policies' as fashioned by the NP 
was South African isolation from Western influence and a Western (capitalist) way of life. 
The Natal Witness published editorials expressing concern over cold war battles in Africa. For example, 
in 23 May 1978, the editorial 'Lessons of Kolwezi' described an incidence of horrific violence in which 
many people were massacred in Zaire. Initiators of the violence were rebels fighting against Mobutu's 
Zairian state. Angola supported the rebellion because of Zaire's support of the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNIT A) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), 
who had been enemies of the MPLA government in the Angolan civil war. There were strong 
suspicions of Russian and Cuban involvement. The author saw 'tribalism' as an opening for communist 
influence: "While it is still too early to draw firm conclusions from the confusion in Zaire, to us three 
things are clear. The communist bloc's exploitation of tribal grievances and secessionist aspirations in 
Africa had reached new levels of sophistication and daring". 346 The editorial also claimed that the 
situation would heighten pressure on South Africa to abandon its racial policies. 
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stiffening of resolve on the part of the West. Current Western strategy is predicated upon the belief that 
South Africa's race policies are a hindrance rather than a help to the West. Efforts to make conditions less 
346 'Lessons ofKolwezi', Natal Witness, 23 May 1978, p 4. 
105 
favourable for communist exploitation are thus likely to mean an increase rather than a decrease in pressure 
c.. h · 347 on the South Alncan government to c ange Its ways. 
South Africa's ' racial policies' were creating, in the view of Natal Witness editors, a dangerous distance 
from the protective powers of ' the West' in the Cold War climate. On 3 June 1978, an editorial 
asserted, "collaboration with the South African regime will be too much of an embarrassment to the 
Western powers in whatever efforts they make to counter the threat". 348 Two days later, an editorial 
titled' About time', discussed the increasing Cuban and Soviet involvement in the African continent. It 
stated that in countering communism ' the West' had to limit alignment with South Africa because of its 
racial policies. 
But what is clear is that the spectacular rise in their military power in Africa has become a problem, confronting not 
only Africa, but also the West. It is clear too that in attempting to counter that power, the West cannot afford to be 
seen as too closely aligned with South Africa. And that is a sobering thought.349 
Three years later, the view that apartheid heightened the communist threat continued to be expressed. 
This discourse is vital to understanding the Natal Witness 's reaction to Operation Protea. The 
uncovering by the SADF of Soviet involvement perpetuated fears of their infiltration. The trend is 
viewed on 3 September 1981 , where former British Prime Minister, Mr. Edward Heath was reported as 
stating that 
... political reforms in South Africa were significant but were not remotely adequate. No formula for a constitution 
will successfully defuse the growing forces of unrest if it does not provide for a universal franchise at national 
level. ,,350 
Heath elaborated, claiming that " [t]he fury and the frustration of the non-white population in South 
Africa which is born of the system of apartheid and fanned by the emergence of black majority rule 
elsewhere in Africa, constitutes one of the greatest opportunities.,,351 Heath proclaimed that the West 
would not help South Africa in the event of a revolution, as it would cause irreparable damage to their 
reputation. "Neither in peacetime nor in war would the West stand in strategic alliance with South 
Africa as long as it pursued a policy considered to be profoundly insulting to the rights of the 
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overwhelming majority of its people. To do so would violate our deepest principles, it would also have 
. . bl l':. I h t h ,,352 ummagtna e consequences lor racla armony a orne. 
The next day, the Natal Witness ran an editorial commentating on Heath's statements. The editorial 
reiterated that South Africa would face inevitable isolation and face a possible revolution without any 
assistance by the West if the government did not heed his warnings. "If our political leaders fail to heed 
this warning, if they allow themselves to be duped by the current congeniality of US-South African 
relations and a travesty of a rugby tour of New Zealand into believing that the worst is over, they may 
be in for a rude awakening.,,353 To add to the argument, on the same day, the Zambian President 
Kenneth Kaunda was quoted, claiming along the same lines, "There could be no peace in southern 
Africa while there was apartheid.,,354 
On 17 September 1981, Anthony Delius also linked South Africa's internal racial laws to an advancing 
Soviet threat, with examples drawn from both internal conflict and conflict on the border. 
Russian calculations about southern Africa are long term and take great cognizance of one major fact that of the 
situation there. The policy of apartheid and the apparent determination to maintain it by naked force by shooting 
Black youngsters in Soweto or Angolan soldiers in Angola makes white South Africa the diplomatic polecat of the 
world, especially of Africa and the third world.355 
Delius also claimed that if involved in a conflict with the South African state, Russia would be seen as 
defenders of African interests in contrast with the Americans whose image would be damaged if they 
were seen to be bolstering the apartheid regime. 
[fthe American or the Western powers generally want to get further tainted by the polecat in appearing to defend 
white South Africa (and by the same token apartheid), while Russians are seen to be dying or risking their lives to 
defend African integrity, Moscow must reckon it is gaining quite a lot in the long-term battle for a dominant 
influence in the continent.356 
Russia would have an easy time maintaining its hegemonic hold in southern Africa because it would 
rely on African sentiment against the apartheid regime. 
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Compared with difficulty up North the Russians would [in South Africa] regard their problems as child ' s pla~. 
Without having to direct too much energy from the Mediterranean and the Red sea, they can rely on the emotIOns 
aroused by apartheid and periodic South African raids to keep southern Africa's dependency on it and divide the 
Western allies.357 
On 26 September 1981, an editorial confirmed the Soviet interest in South Africa in a view aligned with 
National Party assertions. 
General Magnus Malan drew attention to the threat of encroaching Soviet imperialism. Having viewed on 
television the vast quantity of Soviet and satellite arms captured by the Defence Force in Angola, and having been 
shown by the cameras a Russian tank sailing along our shores, we do not doubt the reality of the threat.358 
Again, the editorial stated that the country' s racial policies needed to be changed if the country were to 
defend itself against communism. "It is a political cliche that we have to win the hearts and minds of 
the people. Are we succeeding? Vague promises of a verligte future are not enough. What is needed is 
an immediate and noticeable improvement in the lot of the black majority" .359 This kind of change was 
entirely within governmental power, and it was the reluctance for meaningful change that threatened 
society. 
Communist propaganda is making converts because it promises the black masses what they want. Many of these 
promises are so much pie in the sky. But the government has the advantage in that it can do something tangible now. 
But its counter to this threat is only to announce minor palliatives, such as an amendment to the liquor act.360 
The "shield" of the SADF on the border would not ultimately be a safeguard. 
Mr. Harry Schwarz made a realistic assessment of the situation when he described the Defence force as a shield that 
would protect the country for a limited period. Unless that period is used to carry out generous and imaginative 
reforms, we shall lose a battIe far more important than any fought on the border.361 
As illustrated in the editorials and opinion columns, the Natal Witness adopted much of the South 
African government discourse concerning the Soviet threat to South Africa. It expressed fears of a 
revolutionary black majority and the encroachment of violence. However, a central contention put it in 
formal opposition to the governments ' racial policies' , that apartheid was polarizing Cold War politics 
in the region, offering an advantage to Soviet style communism. Without significant political reforms 
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Africans would be tempted to align themselves with the Eastern Block, leaving white society isolated 
from the protection of the West. 
Conclusion 
Based on evidence found in its pages, I conclude that in 1978 and 1981 , the Natal Witness facilitated a 
discourse which reflected an alternative stance on the issues of the border wars and South African , 
militarization. Presenting itself as a rational and moderate voice - a voice between extremes of rigid 
racial supremacy and communist terror, it reproduced a view of itself as aligned to the West's analysis 
oflocal events. In the Cold War context, which framed discourse over the border conflicts and 
militarization, the liberal press expressed acute anxiety over 'communism' and ' terrorism ' and saw 
democracy as the solution. Monica Popescu asserted that "[a]fter the Iron Curtain descended and 
divided not only Europe, but political allegiances throughout the world, the two camps were taken for 
granted if not as the absolute representatives of good and bad political allegiances throughout the world, 
as least as necessary positions that even sophisticated writers were forced to take.,,362 
The most explicit theme in this chapter is an allegiance in the Natal Witness discourse to the principles 
of Western countries such as the USA and Britain particularly, for finding solutions for the conflict in 
Southern Africa. In addition, its embrace of Western values such as individual freedom, protection of 
property rights indicates that the Natal Witness tried to create an identity intrinsically connected to the 
Western world. It thus could have connected itself to what it saw in the West as a more Anglicized 
world of Britain and the United States, different to the excesses of Afrikaner nationalism and Soviet 
communism. This also furthermore fits with Heywood's definition of nationalism as being a cultural 
entity rather than a political one. The Natal Witness effectively integrated Western cultural viewpoints 
concerning political and military issues as part of its adoption of the Westernised Anglophone world. 
Thus it exposed a desire to be apart of the Westernised nations, an internationalized identity, feeling 
alienated from Afrikaner nationalist culture. 
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It furthermore transmits these aspects onto a liberal culture amongst white English speakers in Natal, 
thus serving as an agent for its cultural values. Further promoting this point is its implicit propagating of 
a view of Western nations as the upholders of civilised values such as peace, freedom, liberty and order 
in contrast to the communist East, the Soviet Union, black revolutionaries and Afrikaner nationalists. 
This sort of discourse illustrates the fact that the Natal Witness as an agent and a representation of an 
English liberal culture was still caught in 19th century imperialistic discourse, which sees the role of the 
West as civiliser. 
The Natal Witness 's role as a moderate and rationalizing voice serves part of the overall identity that 
English language speakers felt. However, the paper's arguments also demonstrate, especially, views 
belonging to the middle class. Therefore, even though there were indications that it was claiming to be 
for the working class and their objectives, this was never the case. Thus despite its petitioning for the 
end to the hardliner race laws, the Natal Witness and liberal interests still defended the capitalist class, 
fearing possible destruction in the potential clash of radical sides. This middle class also possibly feared 
the loss of their lifestyle, and a consequent loss of privileges. Despite their alienation from the National 
Party, the Natal English speakers were still benefiting from the capitalist system in place. 
The liberal stance is seen in the paper's support for the end of apartheid to curb the possible threat of 
communism. In this stance, the Natal Witness tried to create a discourse around Western ideology by 
quoting experts from the USA, Australia and especially Britain. This discourse was also used in its 
discussion of the Angolan and Namibian situations where the Natal Witness advocated a Western based 
compromise between SW APO and the South African government as well as between the ruling party in 
Angola and the MPLA. The fear of communism is certainly a feature of the class and cultural 
positioning of the Natal Witness readership. This is seen in both the opinion sections and articles from 
external sources. It can also be surmised that the Natal Witness viewed itself as an organ of responsible 
opposition, presenting a range of information and sources, with moderate editorials that offered an 
alternative to the official views. 
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Chapter 3 
1987: Die Rooi Gevaar, Total Onslaught and Cuito Cuanavale 
By 1987, the overall militarized system in South Africa had deepened substantially from earlier in the 
decade. This was influenced not only in relation to the momentum of anti-apartheid politics 
reinvigorated by youth activism of 1976 and to ongoing military action on the borders, but also by the 
presidency ofP.W. Botha. His position represented an increased influence on government by militarists 
within the party. Tomaselli and Louw in their paper, Militarization, hegemony and the South African 
media, 1976-1980, argue that the military had a large influence in the country: "[t]he military do not 
rule South Africa. They are only one part of the hegemonic bloc, but do have a major capacity to 
influence government policy.,,364 
In this chapter, I will discuss the Natal Witness 's coverage related to the South African Defence force 
incursions into Angola at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale with the ruling party of Angola the MPLA,365 
between September 1987 and March 1988. According to James W. Martin, this was the most significant 
land battle in Africa in terms of the number of combatants, since the Second World War.366 I will cover 
a sample of Natal Witness reports of this conflict, namely those falling between the dates of 2 November 
1987 and 14 December 1987. In this period, the key event discussed in the papers was Operation 
Modular, which was part of the SADF attempted takeover of Cui to Cuanavale. Significantly, the SADF 
clashed with the Cuban armed force directly in early December 1987. It was a time in which editorial 
and public opinion can again be seen as undergoing important shifts and forging a 'liberal' position in 
relation to specific events. 
364 Keyan Tomaselli and Eric Louw. Militarization, hegemony and the South African media, 1976-1980. p 4 
365 The MPLA were a militarist popular movement in Angola who fought for Angolan independence. It was 
thought to have espoused Marxist values. They eventually took over the governing of Angola in 1975 . 
366 Susan Herlin Broadhead. Historical dictionary of Angola, 2nd ed., p 14. 
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To get a better understanding of the discourse crafted within the Natal Witness during these weeks, 
changes in the international situation also have to be considered. At this period, the Soviet Union was in 
decline and was looking increasingly unlikely to retain its superpower status. This weakened the 
anxiety surrounding Soviet expansionism internationally and played a role in the change of discourse 
regarding the Cold War. Still, this did not prevent militarization of policies in relation to local attack, 
with PW Botha' s conception of ' total onslaught' figuring as a new communist threat. The ' Swart 
Gevaar', previously used as propaganda by the NP government, which had promoted the idea that South 
Africa was under threat by uncivilized black masses, was replaced by the 'Rooi Gevaar' . Botha 
believed South Africa was surrounded by hostile communist ' red ' enemies, who wanted to take over 
South Africa. In this conception, the Soviet Union was ultimately behind every extra-parliamentary 
opposition to the government, and movements such as the UDF and ANC were 'pawns' of the Soviet 
Union. 
Contested views on Cuito Cuanavale 
There were several themes, which threaded through the Natal Witness's coverage of the SADF and the 
battle of Cuito Cuanavale. These include national security, the question of government secrecy and 
misinformation, and the use of government resources. In many ways, these were discussions of 
costlbenefit around the single question of whether engagement on the border was justified. 
On 2 November 1987, an editorial titled ' Wasted efforts ' questioned the viability of South African 
operations into Angola. The editorial asserted that absolute victory was impossible as too much was at 
stake for the Soviet Union in terms of international prestige and credibility to allow their defeat. "One 
thing is clear; any talk of a 'decisive victory' must be discounted. The Soviet Union cannot afford to 
have MPLA defeated, and Luanda overrun by UNIT A. There may be strategic retreats, but there will be 
no surrender.,,367 The editorial objected to so many of the country's resources going into the Angolan 
civil war whilst other areas, such as disaster management, were being neglected. It additionally 
questioned the extent of the threat to South Africa if the MPLA did rule Angola fully. "South Africa's 
367 ' Wasted efforts ', Natal Witness, 2 November 1987, p 8. 
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resources are being poured into a war of dubious value at best. How much does our security hinge upon 
what happens in Angola? And, in the meantime, it is surely pertinent to ask where are the government 
resources for flood relief in Natal?,,368 This editorial illustrated scepticism about the importance of the 
SADF incursions to South African internal security and a scepticism around the ideology of total 
onslaught. 
On 3 November, the Natal Witness published justifications of SADF incursions made by the Minister of 
Defence, Magnus Malan. He contended that, "[t]hose who were harbouring terrorists had to remember 
SA was prepared to pay the price of freedom, in the interests of its people and its territorial integrity.,,369 
In a letter on the same issue, K. Asslop lamented the fact that so much taxpayer's money was being 
spent in Angola, essentially a futile and illegal conflict 
SADF's involvement in Namibia and Angola may seem on the surface of things, two separate issues. However it is 
time for the South African public to question how our tax money is being spent and to ask the government to 
account for the Rl million spent daily to maintain a war wruch is ultimately unwinnable? Bearing in mind Namibia 
has been declared illegal by the Hague court.370 
Asslop asked, "[ c ]ould this vast amount of money not be spent more wisely on urgent needs like flood 
relief, the establishment of secure, durable housing and the addressing of other needs created by the 
system of apartheid?371 This letter was a strong condemnation of the South African government for its 
continuing war in Angola and the waste of key assets. It also suggested that apartheid was the cause of 
public destitution. On 4 November, an editorial questioned the morality of ongoing secrecy of the 
authorities regarding the Angolan war, suggesting that it had deep, personal ramifications for the 
families of troops. Furthermore, it argued that it was unacceptable not to inform parents of the details 
regarding their sons' deaths and that a patriotic speech was not good enough. 
Were our troops readily involved in operations in support of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement, as foreign news 
agencies have been suggesting for some weeks? It is not good enough for General Magnus Malan in expressing 
sympathy to next of kin to talk in generalities about the "high price offreedom". The bereaved would surely wish to 
know exactly where their sons died, and in what cause. 372 
368 Ibid. 
369 SAPA ' The price offreedom ', Natal Witness, 3 November 1987, p l. 
370 K, Asslop. 'Money could be used more wisely', Natal Witness, 3 November 1987, p 6. 
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This suggested that the government was accountable to its citizens but it was questionable whether the 
potential victories were worth the costs. "Many would query whether strikes against SW APO, widely 
regarded in Namibia as a respectable nationalist organisation, are a worthy cause for which to be asked 
to lay down one's life. Certainly SW APO members would see themselves as being called to pay the high 
price offreedom.,,373 The welfare of troops again was at issue in a report on 11 November in which the 
SADF denied troop deaths. "The SADF has rejected as absurd and hodgepodge a report in the British 
Sunday Telegraph newspaper that five South African troops had been wounded by a cluster-bomb 
dropped by an Angolan fighter while they were withdrawing after the November 1 attack on a SWAPO 
base.,,374 The Natal Witness included the report from the Telegraph, which claimed that SAAF planes 
had been shot down while operating in Angola. "The report also claimed that two South African Mirage 
fighters had been lost in the past few weeks - one shot down in a dog fight over Cuito Cuanavale and 
the other lost to ground fire over the UNITA strong hold of Mavinga."m This report was an example of 
how the Natal Witness skirted censorship and how it laboured to hold government accountable to truth. 
Two days later, in a response relating to the SADF denials, an editorial appeared entitled 'The truth'. 
The editorial claimed that foreign news agencies and media reporting on SADF activities had been 
proven correct in the latest events and that government information had been deliberately distorted. 
The chief of the Defence Force has revealed that South African soldiers have indeed been pushed into offensive 
action on Angolan soil against Russian and Cuban troops. So the reports of news agencies, which we are so often 
told are unreliable and distorted, were true. So the reports given to the South African people by their own news 
media, which are prevented by law from revealing the full truth about such matters have proved to be unreliable and 
the statements of South African authorities to be distorted.376 
In addition to its criticism of secrecy and misinformation, the Natal Witness also addressed the issue of 
increased militarization in the South African government. This was significant because of its show of 
support for, and alignment with, foreign newspapers, which were criticized heavily by the South African 
government. The editorial on 13 November 1987, regretted that the SADF had taken over the running 
of government affairs. 
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South Africa's generals are contributing to a dangerous escalation of a conflict which threatens to become a major 
war. Whether they are doing so with the full sanction of the country's elected leaders, or whether like their Soviet 
counterparts in Afghanistan they are now their own masters, is unclear. Certainly, they are not restrained by 
democratic accountability to a fully informed electorate.377 
The editorial highlighted a liberal principle of government as accountable to its citizens and it suggested 
the military might no longer be under the control of the country' s elected leaders. Certainly, 
militarization should be kept in check. A day later, a tally of total deaths in the previous week was 
published. An increasing number of South Africans were dying in a dubious war. The author reported 
that "[ n] ine SA soldiers have now been reportedly killed this week, raising the total number of South 
African and South West African Territorial Force soldiers killed in the battle against Soviet and Cuban 
led Angolan forces in Cuando-Cubango province to 23".378 The article also included statements by the 
Angolan government owned news agency, Angop that the MPLA army were inflicting increasing 
damage on SADF and UNITA troops, a reality denied by the SADF. "Angola said yesterday its troops 
had forced UNIT A guerrilla forces into retreat and were inflicting heavy casualties on South African 
forces. The SADF denied allegations that 32 Battalion, a unit composed mainly of black soldiers 
formerly living in Angola, had suffered heavy losses. ,,379 
Controversy over South African involvement in the Angolan war was also the issue raised by Robin 
Hallett, an African historian working as a lecturer at the University of Stellenbosch who contributed 
articles to the Natal Witness. He described the SADF war in South West Africa as futile for South 
Africa and inhumane for all those involved. For him, it called to mind the suffering of combatants on 
both sides, "if you are a young Namibian - and a young white South African - forced to spend hot, 
uncomfortable and dangerous months in the 'operational area' of a colonial war that has been dragging 
on for close on 20 years.,,380 Hallett also claimed that the South African government aimed to oppress 
the Namibian people via tribal rule and thus keep full autonomy over Namibia. "Pretoria would clearly 
like to see an effective internal settlement ensuring the transformation of Namibia into an autonomous 
homeland whose authorities could undertake the work of repression needed to ensure that SW APO 
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should never come to power.,,381 He also described the extreme suffering of the Namibian people who 
had to cope with the ongoing militarization ofthe area around them. "The suffering in Ovamboland, as 
church leaders stress with growing anguish, is now immense. Their life is a daily struggle to escape 
from paralysing fear. Their land is an armed camp. Their ethnic leaders live behind wire fences and 
high sandbagged walls, protected from the people they claim to represent.,,382 Hallet's critique of 
military strategy was entwined with the secrecy and misinformation propagated by the NP government. 
"The merits of a strategy that seeks to achieve domestic reform by propping up militarised dissidents in 
. hb ' ,,383 a nelg ounng country. 
This column was highly critical of the South African government and very concerned with pointing out 
the excesses of militarization in South African society, and the tragic repercussions on both a 
humanitarian and political level. The Natal Witness also published Robin Hallett's defence of SWAPO, 
on the brink of effecting Namibia's independence, in which he implied that it would not be a threat to 
South African security. "SWAPO, working with the United Nations (UN) have drawn up elaborate 
plans for a post independent Namibia, plans which seem essentially pragmatic and remarkably 
moderate.,,384 He continued: "South Africa can hold Namibia only by committing more financial and 
military resources to shore up the complex system of adrninistration.,,385 This indicated a running theme 
in the newspaper's pages over the financial cost of the continued militarization of government policy. 
Prescribed repeatedly was a discourse of practicality and moderation, constructed against an extreme 
background of heavy military involvement. 
On 16 November 1987, the Natal Witness presented Malan's justifications for South Africa's role in 
combating MPLA and Cuban troops in Angola. It recorded his statements that the offensive would 







UNIT A there was no guarantee they would stop in the south east of Ango\a.,,386 The Natal Witness 
summarized his justifications for government secrecy over SADF offensives. 
He said the protection of the lives of South African soldiers was a priority for the army and that no unnecessary 
risks were taken. There had been great pressure from the media for details but "nowhere in the world are operations 
of this nature broadcast from the clock tower." This was for very clear reasons, like the safety ofthe troops and 
. I' 387 operatlOna circumstances. 
South Africa had a direct interest in the region for a numerous reasons, such as preventing a Soviet 
takeover of the region and ensuring South African security. Its hopes rested with UNIT A. 
If UNIT A emerged from the struggle with honour, then, it could be the start of a new chapter in the southern 
African context in terms of stability and progress. South Africa has a direct interest in this and that is why we took 
the latter (option), General Malan said. If the Cubans and Russians should destroy UNITA, there is no guarantee for 
us they will stop in the South East of Angola. With the weaponry available to them ... The road is open through the 
Caprivi Strip to Botswana, to Zimbabwe, Zambia and particularly also SW AlNamibia.388 
On the same day, there appeared another editorial strongly opposed to the SADF role in Angola, which 
indicated the Natal Witness was not in agreement with Malan's justifications of South African presence 
in Angola. The editorial commented on increasing fatalities and potentially high numbers of wounded 
among SADF and Namibian troops: "We are increasingly worried, not only for the fact that since 
September 33 South African and Namibian soldiers have died in combat (and no one knows how many 
have been wounded).,,389 The author asserted that the increase in Cuban involvement in Angola was a 
direct result of South African interference in the region. The article pointed out that the war was as futile 
as the American experience in Vietnam and other costly and indecisive conflicts. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that [Cubans] came in response to the South African invasion, not the 
other way round. More South Africans on the one side therefore, are very likely to produce more Cubans on the 
other. The logical consequence for us can only be to be sucked into the sort of situation, which the Americans got 
themselves into in Vietnam, and from which the Russians are now trying to exonerate themselves in Afghanistan. 
The hope of being able to inflict a once and for all defeat is as much a mirage as the naive confidence that the Great 
War was a war to end all wars.390 
Examples such as US involvement in Vietnam and Soviet involvement in Afghanistan provided 
compelling comparisons. Both conflicts had weakened and discredited the superpowers involved and 
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the editorial was once again stating that the conflict in Angola would be futile and harmful for South 
Africa. The editorial also asserted that there was no validity behind Malan's claim that southern Africa 
was under threat ifUNITA lost ground. "The Minister of Defence has suggested that present SADF 
action is safeguarding Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia from Soviet proxies. What is the 
evidence for this?,,391 Notably differing from editorial views aired six years previously, here was a de-
emphasis of the Russian threat to southern Africa and scepticism about the notion of 'total onslaught'. 
Still, significantly, there were concessions to that 'myth' but it was implied that South African 
aggression would be to blame if a 'fight with the Russians' ensued - the very possibility a threat to 
national security. 
While we believe that the "total onslaught" is a myth offevered nationalist imaginations, we can also not imagine 
Russia standing idly by while her proteges are being chased around the Angolan bush by South African troops. Her 
great power status alone must prevent any such occurrence. And getting dragged into a fight with the Russians is 
just about the last thing that South Africa needs right now.392 
A day later, Hallett again described the Angolan civil war as catastrophic and futile. He stated that 
"both sides" were to blame for the conflict. 
Fidel Castro's bold and courageous decision to send a large expeditionary force to Luanda was a direct riposte to the 
South African invasion. But the South African move was itself in part a response to earlier Cuban moves made at 
the request of the MPLA to counter growing CIA support for the FNLA. Only dogmatists - of whom there are on 
both sides - would populate this confusing stage with culpable villains.393 
The statement that all sides were guilty to an extent underlined the pursuit of a moderate and objective 
approach to analysis. He also underlined the intense suffering of the civilians in the conflict, and 
inferred that UNIT A strategy was mostly to blame. This description of UNIT A394 held important 
implications as the organisation received South Africa's full support. 
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Thousands of mines have been sown in abandoned cornfields from which hundreds of thousands of peasants have 
fled to the cities, making the once self-sufficient country heavily dependent on food imports. For UNIT A's strategy 
has clearly been to cause such devastation to the country's economy - a process that inevitable involved killing, 
maiming and orphanage thousands of children - that the MPLA will eventuality agree to negotiate.395 
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In conclusion, he suggested that apartheid needed to end before there could be peace in Angola. 
"Gloomy experts predict that the civil war in Angola could last another thirty years and the fundamental 
change in Angola is directly linked to fundamental change in South Africa. I cannot find any way of 
contradicting the logic of this forecast.,,396 This here shows an important linkage between the border 
wars and apartheid in the Natal Witness discourse. 
Two days later, the front page of the Natal Witness reported more deaths of SADF troops.397 On 21 
November 1987, an editorial lambasted the government over its policies and claimed that they were a 
consequence of the leaders of the SADF being allowed to make high-level decisions. 
The hawks seem to be in control. The incursion into Angola, the failure to curb RENAMO, and the menacing tone 
adopted towards other neighbouring states are all symptoms of the Magnus Malan syndrome. Survival according to 
this line of thought depends on keeping our neighbours destabilised and helpless.398 
This editorial again leaned in favour of the approach of the US and Britain. On 23 November 1987, 
Gerald Shaw criticized South African militarization, contending that South Africa could never hope to 
compete with the Soviet Union on that front, and he warned of a response by capital interests. "The cost 
to South Africa of seeking to match the sophisticated weaponry of a superpower is mind-boggling, not 
to speak of the human cost. It will in time cause the country' s business leaders to call a halt, denying 
the soldiers their toYS. ,,399 Shaw also drew on the comparison of the US intervention into Vietnam, 
claiming that a similar southern African disaster would be devastating for an already suffering civilian 
population. "By any criteria the prospect of a southern African Vietnam is daunting, given the scale of 
misery and devastation already visited upon the civilian populations of Mozambique and Angola.,,4oo 
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On 24 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported the South African government' s statement that it was 
willing to withdraw troops from Angola if all sides were prepared to follow suit.
401 
According to the 
report, 
It remained the Government's firm conviction that the only route to peace in the sub-region "lies not in sterile 
confrontation in international foraya outside our region, and still less via military confrontation inside our region. 
Rather it lies in the real willingness of all parties concerned to come together to address their differences and 
thereby contribute towards stability and progress within the region to benefit all our peoples.,,402 
Malan repeated his point that the SADF role in southern Africa was necessary for security purposes in 
the region. "South Africa is determined to defend its interests against foreign aggression in the regions 
and, as you know; senior representatives of many of the governments around this table have also visited 
the area. South Africa could not sit back and allow these forces to threaten its security interests by 
flooding the whole region with Soviet troopS.,,403 
On 26 November 1987, a letter, entitled "The price of freedom" from Black Sash 404 member Fidela 
Fouche, expressed anger at Malan's comments of 13 November. This letter set the issue of border wars 
within the social context of apartheid. Fouche claimed that Malan' s defence for SADF fighting in 
Angola was absurd as freedom and civilized order was not to be found in South Africa. 
Magnus Malan hopes to justify the killing and maiming of young men in Angola on the grounds that sacrifice is 
needed if we are to preserve freedom, democracy and civilised values. The fact that Malan speaks as if these ideals 
have already been achieved in South Africa (one can only preserve something that one has) shows him to be 
ignorant of what democracy and freedom are shows him to have , to put it mildly, an eccentric concept of civilised 
values.405 
On the same day, the Natal Witness printed another letter, which commented on the earlier editorial, 
titled "The truth". This letter, written jointly by Tony Balcomb, Anthea Garman and others, stated that 
South African domestic policy was destructive to economic growth. "We believe, in fact, that the 
course on which the government has set itself is a course that will lead to an increasing spiral of 
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violence that will hasten the demise of human and economic life inside and outside her borders.,,406 The 
writers also expressed their views on lack of public accountability and poor justification for the war. 
Commitment of hundreds of troops to fighting a war that is outside the borders of their country has to be soundly 
legitimised before a potentially suspecting public will accept it. So at best you put a blanket of secrecy over your 
involvement and at worst you lie about your involvement, while you give yourself time to shape up public opinion 
in such a way that when the truth does come out people will actually believe that when their sons die on the border 
(and there are increasingly more of these probably a lot more that we led to believe) they do so as heroes fighting a 
wonderful cause.407 
A link between conscription and secrecy is also highlighted here. These two letters were among those 
expressing direct opposition to a government, which they saw as fostering an inhumane society. Four 
days later, Fouche' s views were repeated in Shaw' s column, 'Pretoria's next move.' He strongly 
condemned the South Africa government for waging war in Angola, stating, "South Africa has no 
business to be in Namibia, never mind Angola, and certainly has no business to be invading Angola 
from military bases in Namibia, which it undertook to leave as long ago as 1978. It certainly has no 
business to get involved in the Angolan civil war.,,408 Shaw was sceptical of the fear of Soviet 
expansionism, claiming that South African intervention in Angola continued to fuel Soviet interest in 
the region. "If anything the South African intervention in the Angolan civil war has had the effect of 
vastly boosting the limited Soviet involvement in the region. And General Malan's public appropriation 
of the credit for saving UNIT A from the Russians has angered Dr Savimbi, making him look like a 
puppet ofPretoria.,,409 
Shaw also expressed his cynicism regarding South African military occupation of Namibia. "So far, 
military considerations have been decisive with the SADF much happier to have hung on to Namibia as 
a proving ground for new weapons and an ideal training ground for counter insurgency, not to speak of 
its ability as a killing ground to keep hostilities far from South African soil".4IO In making this 
accusation against the South African government, Shaw put forward a much more radical anti-
government discourse. On 2 December 1987, another editorial warned of destabilization in the 
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region.41 1 The next day, the government again justified its involvement in Angola, stating that "[t]he 
concept of pre-emptive strikes against SW APO bases in Angola remained decisive in preventing 
SW APO insurgents from operating freely.,,412 According to the official view, SWAPO's two-pronged 
propaganda strategy of spreading rumours about alleged South African atrocities and military attacks 
was meant to undermine the security forces in South West Africa. 
SW APO through an intensified propaganda campaign was trying to convey on the one hand that it was scoring 
military successes. On the other hand SW APO propaganda was trying to create the impression that there were 
problems with morale among members of the security forces and that they were committing atrocities. General 
Meyer said SW APO could not advance militarily and its insurgents were avoiding direct contact with security 
forces. 4 13 
On 7 December 1987, a reader named Cloe Gray wrote to empathize with soldiers stationed in the 
Angolan conflict, stating that she felt "a strong inner pain at the loss of so many young lives on both 
sides of the border. Their opinion needs to be publicised in all South African newspapers to try to bring 
sanity to the situation.,,414 A day later, Hallett, made his case against South African propaganda of 
Soviet Union expansionism. He argued that, 
Soviet policy in Angola cannot be properly assessed unless it is fitted up to the context of Soviet global policy. 
Recent development - particularly the arms negotiation with the United States - makes it clear that for reasons of 
the profoundest self-interest the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev needs a lessening in political tension 
throughout so that scarce resources can be diverted from defence to other areas of the economy. 415 
In its discourse on the SADF role in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, the Natal Witness created a much 
stronger opposition to the South African border wars than it had in 1978 and 1981. It had introduced 
many debates over the use of South African resources in a war whilst humanitarian aid was lacking for 
flood relief in Natal and basic rights for its black citizens. The editorials and columns also denounced 
the futility of the war and its long-term damage to South Africa on a financial level, and, as a part of this 
discourse, drew comparisons with US intervention in Vietnam and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 
It reported on troop deaths at Cuito Cuanavale, which highlighted the cost of the war to South Africans 
as well as Angolans. Another important aspect of public narrative was scepticism surrounding the fear 
4 11 ' Denials', Natal Witness, 2 December 1987, p 12. 
4 12 SAPA. 'Strikes at SWAPO decisive- SWATF.' Natal Witness, 3 December 1987, p 4. 
4 13 Ibid. 
4 14 Gray, Cloe. 'In agreement', 7 December 1987, p 7. 
41 5 Hallett, Robin. 'What are the Soviets up to?', Natal Witness, 8 December 1987, p 10. 
123 
of Soviet expansionism in which editorials and columns disputed the idea and suggested that the SADF 
war in Angola was not vital to South African national security. 
Its appeal to an international level also highlights a feeling of separateness from the rest of the country 
at the time. As Anderson, in his view on nations, states, "no nation imagines itself coterminous with 
mankind.,,416 Thus, the feeling of Natal as a separate province is characterised here. It also creates a 
feeling of an established connection as part of international peace movements. Perhaps a key part of the 
Natal Witness identity is seen here, namely, their linkage to the western world. Despite it being on a 
lesser scale, there was still an anxiety about a possible communist revolutionary takeover, therefore 
despite its venomous anti-war rhetoric, class interests of its readership still lie at the forefront of the 
discourse. 
Exposure: international and local sources 
The Natal Witness also aired the views of non-governmental sources from international newspapers, 
world bodies and prominent international personalities. As already documented, these sources included 
statements from Angolan authorities and reports from the Angolan media agency, Angop. This was 
significant as the Natal Witness was taking reports from a declared enemy of the South African 
governnlent. These international sources allowed the Natal Witness to report on issues that the South 
African government refused them to legally report on firsthand. These included reports of South 
African military losses, operations and alleged atrocities committed by the SADF and its ally UNIT A. 
Local organisations were also allotted space to express their views and the picture portrayed in the paper 
was of a climate of dissent and protest. On 2 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported on a protest by 
members of the Black Sash concerning SADF activity in Angola. "A picket protesting the presence of 
the South African Defence Force in Angola and South African aid for the rebel movement UNIT A was 
held in Church Street." 417 The slogans of protesters included messages such as "Bring them home". 
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This publishing could be seen as further evidence that the Natal Witness was trying to create an 
oppositional discourse, in line with its opinion pages. It published conflicting reports on casualties in 
the border conflicts. "An gop stated that government forces had killed almost 1 00 South African soldiers 
and shot down 29 planes and helicopters since South African army troops invaded areas of Southern 
Angola on September 2.,,418 Yet, went the report, UNITA had claimed "a decisive victory in its biggest 
battle ever.,,419 Beyond the numbers at stake was the very question of South African involvement. 
South Africa has acknowledged its troops are operating in Southern Angola to defend South Africa's interests in the 
region. UNITA, which on Friday claimed to have captured two Cuban airmen after shooting down their 
sophisticated MIG-23 jet, has made no mention of South African support. Angola, on the other hand, stated that 
Angola had so far resisted an onslaught of South African heavy artillery fire bombing raids and armoured car 
attacks. But it added that South Africa was massing forces for further Angolan attacks.420 
The Natal Witness also published accusations of atrocities committed by UNIT A: 
Angolan authorities on Saturday accused anti-government rebels of killing 100 civilians and wounding many others 
at a settlement in the central province of Huambo. The report said rebels of the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNIT A) attacked the settlement of Salanda, near the town of Tchinjene on October 24, 
killing and wounding inhabitants and destroying property.421 
UNITA was an important ally of the South African government, supported by it financially and 
militarily. The South African government praised Savimbi and UNITA in its propaganda. Judith 
Matloffpoints out that, "One of the great myths about Savimbi was that he was self reliant militarily and 
a phenomenal strategist. Nevertheless, he was dependent on the outside world and that was part of the 
problem with Jamba. South Africa had sought him out not because Pretoria liked him, but because 
UNITA was a convenient way to control the ANC and SWAPO.,,422 
The next day the Natal Witness recorded an SADF announcement that it had attacked SWAPO militants 
on the Angolan border. "More than 150 SWAPO guerrillas were killed in a SWAPO base, 'north of 
Ovambo' the South African Defence Force announced yesterday".423 However, the Natal Witness also 
covered SWAPO chairperson Sam Nujoma's denials on the matter. He was reported as stating that, 
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"[n]othing like this has happened. This is the same kind of deceit and lies that Pretoria always tells us 
when they want to cover up its military aggression in Angola.,,424 On 5 November 1987, the Natal 
Witness recorded statements by Angolan President, Dos Santos, denying the loss of as many troops as 
claimed by UNIT A. "Referring to reports that between 2000 and 4000 members of the government 
forces had been killed, he said not more than 300 had died.,,425 These battles over numbers offered the 
public a chance to doubt official South African national sources. 
Four days later, the Natal Witness reported on a UN statement attempting to pressurize the South 
African government into ceasing its occupation of Namibia. A week later, the Natal Witness also 
publicized Angop's assertions that South Africa's admission of involvement in the Angola conflict 
proved that it had been directly at war with the country. "The confession only confirms denunciations 
by Angolan authorities that Angola is the victim of an undeclared war carried out by the racist regime 
and it is not a civil war.,,426 
The Natal Witness reported on claims by papers such as the Namibian. On 21 November 1987, for 
example, the Namibian was disclosed to have published that a large number of South West African 
Territorial Force (SWA TF) troops had metaphorically thrown down weapons. "More than 400 SWA 
Territory Force members have "gone on strike" after refusing to fight on behalf of UNIT A against 
Angolan FAPLA forces, the newspaper Namibian has reported.,,427 According to the Namibian, "360 
soldiers had already been sent to the Walvis Bay military prison while another 48 had resigned." 428 But 
... [r]esponding to the allegations, the SWATF said in a statement that 47 members of 202 Battalion were discharged 
from duty at the end of the end of last month after they had failed to comply with military standards. Concerning the 
101 battalion in Ovambo, the SW A TF said there had been dissatisfaction among 27 members of the unit concerning 
their deployment last month, but since then, all problems had been ironed OUt.429 
The personal account of an anonymous source gave weight to the suspicion that the denials were 
fabricated. "In August this year we were transported to Mavinga to fight against our will on the side of 
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UNIT A.,,430 Accounts like this underlined the unpopularity of UNIT A as a movement. In the same 
article, the Natal Witness also reported on further allegations of "South African incursions deep inside 
Angola. ,,431 Reported in the pages of the Natal Witness, the Angolan authorities claimed that they had 
found evidence of attacks by South African pilots. "Angolan troops have recovered the remains of a 
South African still strapped in his seat after his jet was shot down near the SW AI Angolan border last 
week.,,432 
Strong UN opposition to South Africa's fuelling of the civil war continued to be aired. 
The UN Security Council considering Angola's charge that South Africa committed aggression against its territory 
was expected to vote on the resolution yesterday. South African ambassador Mr Les Manly said Pretoria was ready 
to withdraw its forces from Angola beginning on December 9 - if all foreign troops including Soviet and Cuban 
were recalled. Brushing aside this proposal, Argentina, Congo, Ghana, the United Arab Emirates and Zambia 
addressed their draft resolution to the South African invasion.433 
Anger at the secrecy of military practices across the border was fuelled when, on 3 December 1987, the 
Natal Witness documented claims by the Angolan government that Prime Minister Botha had illegally 
entered the country a few times. "South African president made three secret visits in the early 1980s to 
the headquarters of UNIT A, the Mozambiquen [sic] news agency reported yesterday.,,434 This was 
backed up by a UNITA officer' s statement which "claimed that Mr Botha while Prime Minister of 
South Africa, had visited UNITA's headquarters at lamba in south-eastern Angola in 1981, 1982 and 
1983.,,435 Six days later the Natal Witness published a denial by the Angolan President that Cuban 
troops were in the country to help the war effort against UNIT A. The report quoted a government 
spokesperson denying a fresh Cuban battalion had arrived to help fight against UNITA.436 
The publishing of non-governmental sources both hostile and oppositional to the South African 
government had the overall effect of discrediting official sources. It signalled that the Natal Witness 
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was indeed intent on fuelling an oppositional perspective. The publishing of overseas newspapers was 
significant as these papers were heavily criticized by the South African government. Use of external 
sources could be a way the Natal Witness wanted to keep the government in check. The general distrust 
of government sources in the opinion sections seemed to give the foreign sources greater value, 
demonstrating the deep uncertainty about the political truth of militarized action in this period. 
Factors affecting perceptions of the border wars 
In 1987, the dangerous internal security situation in South Africa had intensified with the ANC sabotage 
and bombing campaigns in the country. The internal threat from the ANC included attempted sabotage 
on perceived vital government facilities such as communications, justice and defence networks. This 
included the setting off of car bombs in Johannesburg one outside a Magistrate's Court and on a SADF 
compound in May 1987 and again in July of that year. The government discourse linked this internal 
unrest to the South African border wars, claiming it as an extension of 'Rooi Gevaar'. All together, 
there were thirteen pieces in the Natal Witness dealing with the ANC guerrilla warfare in the period 
covered by my sample. 
On 2 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported on suspected ANC activity on South African borders. 
According to the Argus newspaper, "[ c ]hildren from the Cape Peninsula aged between 14 and 18 have 
been smuggled out of South Africa by a highly organised African National Congress cells and given 
extensive training in neighbouring countries before infiltrating back into their communities.,,437 The 
Natal Witness also reported on a disclosure by MP Patrick McKenzie that "he had correspondence from 
the parents of youths recently arrested for allegedly committing acts of arson, attempted arson, public 
violence and attacks on homes of policemen while "acting under the influence of the ANC".,438 Also on 
2 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported on the charges pressed by police against an ANC man 
who allegedly shot an SADF soldier dead. "An African National Congress man who shot dead a South 
African soldier pursuing him and two colleagues across the border into Swaziland is to be 
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prosecuted.,,439 On 6 November 1987, a story was aired that reported a petition by ANC members to be 
tried as prisoners of war rather than common criminals or terrorists. "The court had heard evidence that 
the ANC was a signatory to Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention, he said. The protocol regulated 
armed conflict, and the accused therefore fell under international law . 440 
On 20 November 1987, the Natal Witness printed a letter by a member of the public which decried the 
release of Govan Mbeki: "What does one say of a government which releases an unrepentant convicted 
member of a terrorist organisation while presumably still being subjected to the 'total onslaught' .,,441 
Five days later the Natal Witness printed an accusation by the Minister of Finance for South Africa that 
Botswana was shielding ANC militants. "The African National Congress had asked Botswana to allow 
its territory to be used as a conduit for infiltrating insurgents into South Africa.,,442 Between 25 and 28 
November, the Natal Witness also reported on a trial of an alleged South African spy in Zimbabwe. 
This was the trial ofMs Odile Harrington, accused of spying on the ANC in Zimbabwe. It was alleged 
that she worked for the covert security forces in South Africa. She was found guilty and given a 25-year 
sentence by Zimbabwe's High Court. 
Also reported on 25 November was the killing ofthree ANC members who were found to have been in 
possession of Soviet made weaponry. "Weapons of communist origin were found in the house along 
with the bodies of the three men - as yet unnamed after police stormed the building.,,443 Claims by the 
South African government, that " ... the African National Congress had asked Botswana to allow its 
territory to be used as a conduit for infiltrating insurgents into South Africa" appeared in a separate 
article.444 
On December 9, the Natal Witness reported the US embassy spokesperson's assertions that Botswana 
was not guilty of harbouring ANC militants, despite allegations to the contrary. "The United States is 
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completely satisfied that Botswana to the best of its ability, is maintaining its longstanding policy of 
preventing the use of its territory for incursions against any of its neighbours.,,445 Two days later the 
Natal Witness reported on a police raid on ANC members. "Four suspected ANC guerrillas were killed 
in a pre-dawn raid on a house in Soweto Port Elizabeth yesterday, and a quantity of arms and 
ammunit ion was seized.,,446 The paper also reported that "[a]rms included an AK-47 with three spare 
magazines; a Soviet made hand grenade and a Star 9mm pistol and magazine.,,447 On the same day the 
Natal Witness reported on speculation by the ANC of a possible attack on them by the South African 
government. "South Africa is planning a campaign of attacks and assassinations against ANC militants 
in neighbouring countries over the Christmas period.,,448 Although the Natal Witness did not provide 
much comment in this section, its discourse on the Angolan wars indicated that it did not support the 
government discourse on the ANC. 
Reporting on trials, events of sabotage and accusations of and by the African National Congress, the 
Natal Witness kept its publics aware of the dissent raging throughout the country in this period. With 
commitment to the legitimate role of reporting various views under a principle of objectivity and 
balance, it also gave its readers indications of the regional and local state of affairs, signalling the 
international condemnation and growing protest, and the government's weakening hold on legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
The Natal Witness expressed a more critical oppositional voice on the South African war in Angola than 
it had previously in the years 1978 and 1981. The most significant part of the discourse was the 
increased scepticism about South Africa's role in Cuito Cuanavale. This was coupled with its rejection 
of the South African claims that the Soviet Union was expansionist in its aims in southern Africa and 
further, and included arguments over the flow of resources into the Angolan war, including young lives 
that were being lost. Another aspect was their support for a Western solution to the crisis in Southern 
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Africa, which favoured UN involvement and a negotiated Western settlement. This chapter once again 
touches on the ongoing Anglophone identity crafted within the Natal Witness at the time. Its appeal to 
Western international thought indicates alienation from the Afrikaner nationalist government. 
Anderson's point of how no nation ever adopts an aspect of coterminous relations is further illustrated 
here. The paper's view also indicates a desire for South Africa to be part of the West, modelling a 
similar approach to governance. What is also expounded here is a moderate middle road approach 
seeking rationalism; this was promoted as part of the white English liberal identity. This is also 
consistent with its interests as a social class. Both extremities from rightist and leftist politics would 
have threatened these class interests as they could have precipitated a revolution or a possible invasion 
of the country by socialist forces such as Cuba. The values of freedom, equality and liberty are seen 
here in the Natal Witness as forming a key part of the identity of English liberals. However many 
theorists such as Tomaselli, and others have dismissed this sort of attitude as pretentious. 
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Chapter 4 
Militarization on the doorstep: 
Conscription and the UDF-Inkatha war 
With the border wars escalating, the Natal Witness reported on the issue of conscription and protests 
against it. Under the Defence Act of 1957, all white men over the age of 18 were required to do 
compulsory military service for nine months. This was extended to two years in 1980. It was an issue 
that hit close to home for white, English speaking people in Natal whose sons and brothers were legally 
compelled to serve in the SADF. Another key issue with a provincial focus was the violent conflict 
between Mangosutho Buthelezi's Zulu nationalist organisation Inkatha and the ANC-supported UDF, 
which was fought bitterly in the townships around Pietermaritzburg, as well as many other locations. 
This conflict occasionally spilt over into the 'white areas' of city centre and the suburbs. 
Debate and discourses over military conscription 
There were several points of discussion regarding the debate over conscription in the Natal Witness 
during 1987. These featured in the opinion columns and non-governmental sources. One theme centred 
around the distress over young men dying on South African borders. Another is found in several 
articles, which suggested alternatives to combat such as conscription in the health and emergency 
services. There were also calls for an extension of the current conscientious objection provisions. The 
conscription law at the time allowed white men to abstain from military service based exclusively on 
religious reasons and some voices in the Natal Witness called for this exemption to be extended for 
those not willing to serve in the SADF for political and moral reasons. 
An important narrative regarding resistance to conscription was around the figure of Doctor Ivan Toms, 
a medical doctor and former officer in the SADF, who refused his repeat call-up for the army after his 
initial service of two years between 1978 and 1980. Toms was a prominent provincial voice against 
apartheid in the 1980s and a cofounder of the End Conscription Campaign CECC)o The ECC was an 
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organisation launched in 1983, which vigorously opposed the conscription law in South Africa. It 
aimed to counsel potential conscripts on their choices and it regularly held rallies against the apartheid 
system and the South African wars in Angola. A key ally of the UDF, it also launched campaigns 
against the SADF war in Angola and occupation of Namibia. Significant events included the campaign 
against SADF troops in South African townships. Even more significant however was its banning by the 
South African government, which sparked much domestic condemnation from many sectors in the 
country. 
On 3 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported Tom's refusal, on political grounds, to fight in the 
SADF. He was reported stating that he would be fighting for an institution whose values were contrary 
to his faith. "1 am a Christian trying to live out my life by being true to my faith. 1 have seen the evils 
and injustices of apartheid and 1 know that the SADF is the ultimate upholder of this evil system.,,449 
The article additionally recorded his alleged harassment by the SADF in their continuous call-ups to 
him. "Since then my lawyers have sent the SADF a letter saying in effect that it was harassment to 
repeatedly call me up and then withdraw the call-up and that it was psychologically disruptive.,,45o 
The next day, an opinion column featured Ivan Toms and the harassment question in its discussion and 
aligned itself with Toms' cause. "He has for more than a year been the victim of a campaign of growing 
harassment, which he believes is directly linked to his highly publicized stand as an objector. In 1986 
he narrowly escaped serious injury when wheel nuts of his car were deliberately loosened, and a wheel 
came off as he was driving.,,451 It also reported his belief that the authorities were using covert actions 
in a bid to make him relent. "Dr Toms believes the harassment was aimed at 'cracking' him before next 
week's call-up, forcing him either to leave the country as some objectors have done, or to accept an 
SADF uniform.,,452 On the same day, a notice was published in the Natal Witness advertising that Ivan 
Toms would be speaking at an ECC meeting on his reasons for refusing national service. It notified that 
"[a] military officer, Dr Ivan Toms, will be talking in the city today on why he will not serve in the 
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South African Defence Force again. The talk has been arranged by the End Conscription Campaign and 
h bl·· I d ,,453 t e pu IC IS we come to atten . 
A report on the meeting on 5 November 1987 further set out Tom' s moral objections. This article cited 
his reasoning that he would fight for the underprivileged and suppressed people in the country. "Dr 
Toms concluded his talk by saying, "1 have decided 1 must make a stand. For me the side of justice and 
honesty is the side of the poor and the oppressed and that is what 1 want to be on." 454 Another point 
covered was the need for an expanded definition of the law regarding conscientious objection as seen in 
the publishing of his quote. 
Speaking at a public meeting, Dr Toms, who was an officer in the South African Defence Force, told the meeting 
that only religious pacifists may be exempted from military service in forms of existing legislation. "I hope my 
stand will add a little to the pressure already, on the government to change the legislation and broaden the definition 
of conscientious objection to include political and other objectors." 455 
The Natal Witness also reported on Toms' support for his organisation the ECe. The paper reported his 
statement that many conscripts faced an ethical dilemma over their induction into the SADF. 
Toms also stated his support for the ECC, "I support the End Conscription Campaign's call for constructive 
alternative service for all objectors. ECC is concerned about the dilemma conscripts face and knows that many of 
them have no other choice but to go to the SADF". He added, "I am involved in counselling service and there has 
been a dramatic increase in the number of conscripts who grapple with moral problems when faced with a call up. 
The interesting thing is that these people are no longer simply educated university graduates." 456 
The Natal Witness 's generous coverage of Toms is indicative of support for his cause and that of the 
ECC. Five days later the Natal Witness reported on Catholic objections to the current law on 
conscription. Added to the debate were their suggestions for an alternative service for conscientious 
objectors. 
We repeat our call to the authorities to alter the law concerning compulsory service, to allow conscripts to object 
doing military service not only on religious grounds but also on conscientious grounds. We also call for an 
alternative to the law, which would allow conscientious objectors to do community service for a period equivalent to 
the period of military service.457 
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Three days later the Natal Witness reported a supporter of Toms' statements on his decision not to serve 
in the SADF. It stated that Toms chose not to serve because the SADF made war on its own people. 
"Dr Toms felt he was doing the right thing, one has to make a stand in a civil war. One has to take 
sides.,,458 On 2 December 1987, the paper continued to update readers on the activities of the ECC and 
to show itself as an active, vocal voice in its promotion. It gave information on another upcoming 
meeting of the organisation concerning the situation in Angola. "Current events in Angola will be 
highlighted at an End Conscription Campaign meeting tomorrow. Speakers include Mr Pierre Cronje 
(MP) who will address South African involvement in Angola.,,459 Around the issue of conscription, the 
Natal Witness was taking an explicitly activist stand. 
The Natal Witness, in an editorial, introduced another element in the argument on conscription 4 
December 1987. The author argued that vital skills were being wasted in South Africa because many 
young men who did not want to be conscripted into a dubious war left the country. 
But there is very little hope of stemming the flow, let alone reversing it, while conscription hangs over the heads of 
young men, who very understandably are not willing to risk life or limb in dubious military escapades. Until the 
authorities come up with the option of doing National Service that is truly national as distinct from military, the 
brain drain can only continue.46o 
In July and August 1988, there were several debates in South Africa over the continuation of military 
conscription. This was largely because South African involvement in Angola was at its end and peace 
talks were on the agenda. The government rej ected calls for an end to conscription much to the 
consternation of many liberal and left wing agencies in South Africa. In August, the South African 
government banned the ECC - a move that activists protested vigorously. The Natal Witness discourse 
on conscription in 1988 was steeped in this context. 
One of the prominent narratives in the paper's reportage on conscription in 1988 was that of David 
Bruce - a member of the ECC who was sentenced to six years injail for refusing to do military service, 
based on his conscientious objection to fighting for an army that he felt bolstered the apartheid system. 
On 26 July 1988, the Natal Witness reported on his sentencing at the Johannesburg court. The article 
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documented his personal reasons for refusing military service and further reported that it was the first 
time a conscript had refused this service on political grounds. "Bruce had objected on grounds that the 
SADF upheld a racist political system. He is the first conscript to have objected to military service on 
grounds other than religious or pacifist.,,461 The article also described his purported patriotism to South 
Africa as well as his supporters ' actions in the courtroom. "Bruce told the court he regarded himself as 
committed to his country and to fmding a future for South Africa without racism. Supporters wearing 
yellow button holes reminiscent of those worn in solidarity with Vietnam draft dodgers, packed the 
courtroom.,,462 His commitment to patriotism held an important place in the article as those who 
refused military service were frequently labelled as unpatriotic by the South African government. This 
denoted that the Natal Witness saw an alternative form of patriotism to the government line, one that 
valued community service as a form of patriotism. 
The next day the Natal Witness recorded the reactions to Bruce's sentence. The article covered the 
views of prominent figures such as Dr Alan Boesak, a leader of the UDF and anti-apartheid activist; 
Helen Suzman, leader ofthe PFP; and Alan Wynand. "Helen Suzman viewed the savage sentence with 
deep dismay. Dr Alan Boesak ... in a message of support read on his behalf expressed great admiration 
for Bruce. National Democratic Leader Mr Wynand said the refusal to do military service should not 
result in a jail sentence.,,463 The article also described additional support by liberal activist 
organisations. "Other messages of support came from organisations including the Johannesburg 
Democratic Action Committee and the National Union of South African Students." 464 Thus, these two 
articles reporting on left and liberal voices demonstrated a strong anti-government approach by the 
Natal Witness. 
Another narrative in the conscription debate was the sexual assault on Toms in Cape Town's Pollsmoor 
Prison. For his stand the previous year, he had been incarcerated for refusing to serve in the SADF. On 
27 July 1988, the Natal Witness reported on his application for a transfer because of the assault. "Jailed 
conscientious objector Ivan Toms has applied for a transfer to Pretoria Central Prison after an alleged 
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sexual assault in the Pollsmoor Prison showers.,,465 The article also reported on the reaction of an 
anonymous member of Black Sash to the attack. "A decent moral person such as Ivan Toms should not 
be treated as a common crirninal.,,466 In December 1987, Toms' stance was reported in the Natal 
Witness and he was generally venerated as a hero in the paper' s pages. This story highlighted the plight 
and sufferings of those who refused conscription. It showed that the Natal Witness continued to 
strongly back their cause. On the same date, the paper informed the public of a booklet produced by the 
ECC.467 The article gave details of the book and its reasons for publication. 
The booklet outlines options available to conscripts as well as the rights of conscripts within the SADF. Local ECC 
spokesperson, Kathryn Strachan, said the booklet contained information relating to the sorts of questions that were 
regularly asked by conscripts. She said it had been produced as a means of distributing advice on conscription more 
widely.468 
The trend continued in the printing of a letter by Fidela Fouche and Pat Merrett on 3 August 1988 - both 
members of Black Sash. They addressed the issue oflvan Toms' sexual assault in prison. The writers 
berated the government for putting Toms injail despite his numerous deeds for South Africa and called 
for alternative service for conscientious objectors. 
We consider it abhorrent that a man, who has been imprisoned for nothing more than his high moral principles, 
should have been subjected to such a gross violation of his person. Surely incidents of this kind in themselves, 
should give those who support conscription, serious reason to question the nature of the punishment inflicted on 
conscientious objectors. We reiterate our call for alternative service.469 
The next day, the Natal Witness reported on conscripts rejecting military service in reaction to Bruce's 
sentence. It reported, "more than 140 young white conscripts from all over South Africa yesterday 
made a public declaration refusing to serve in the defence force and calling for alternative service for all 
conscientious objectors.,,47o The article further quoted Dr Patrick's statements concerning conscription. 
Significantly, his brother had been killed while doing service for the SADF. The article recorded his 
assertions that conscripts were government pawns used to maintain oppression in South Africa. "Our 
actions in the SADF served the interests of the South African government in its need to commit this 
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injustice in order to maintain white supremacy.,,47I It also cited Mr Timothy Mosdell's comments and 
viewpoints on the SADF role in the Angolan war: "He said he believed that war was fundamentally 
wrong, particularly if one is fighting an unjust war.,,472 Mosden had formerly served in the SADF, 
which gave impetus to his credibility as a source. The Natal Witness further reported that serving in the 
SADF went against Modsen's convictions: "He said that he had become convinced that the aims and 
methods of the SADF were contrary to his moral convictions and it would be unsuitable for him to serve 
in the SADF again.,,473 The paper went on to record his statement that the SADF was the upholder of 
apartheid: "Speaking for the Natal section, Patrick said they were opposed to apartheid and believe that 
the SADF contributed to upholding this unjust system.,,474 Thus, the Natal Witness included the 
important moral argument against having to serve in an army that supported apartheid. This was 
emphasised by the fact that Mosden had served in the SADF, which gave impetus to the argument 
against conscription as it suggested that he had learnt his convictions from serving in the SADF. 
On 5 August 1988, the Natal Witness recorded comments by Mr Wilhelm Liebenberg, the chair of the 
organisation (unnamed by Natal Witness) in which 143 conscripts refused to do military service. 
Liebenberg said that "[t]he action was a largely spontaneous response to the harsh six-year sentence 
meted out on David Bruce, the presence of SA troops in Angola and the lack of acceptable alternatives 
to compulsory military service he said. Furthermore, no national Eee office bearer took part in the 
action,,475 
In the same article, the Natal Witness reported on the attention given to the Eee by government, which 
included possible legal action against the organisation. The article provided a comment on the action by 
Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, that "[t]he EeC's actions are receiving attention. 
However, I have not got any indication on when and if there will be any action taken.,,476 A day later 
the Natal Witness reported on statements by Magnus Malan, the Minister of Defence, rejecting an 
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adjustment to conscription on any grounds. "He repeated his statement of earlier this week that no 
citizen could decide on his or her own which laws to respect. This was his stand on the ECC and 
individuals who evaded national service.,,477 The Natal Witness also recorded his assertions that the 
ECC was an enemy of South Africa and its defence force. 
"The ECC aims at disrupting SADF activities through a negative influence on the positive attitude and morale of 
national service. The loyalty of men doing national service "weighed more heavily than their individual political 
outlooks and the so called unjustness of our society." Organisations which disrupted the tradition and pride of the 
SADF were anti-South African, Malan said.478 
On the same day, the Natal Witness discussed objections to military service by the group of 143 who 
displayed solidarity with David Bruce. The editorial stated that the Nationalist hard line policy had led 
to a backlash against conscription. 
It is another example of the miscalculations to which the Nationalists are prone. They evidently believe that 
' kragdadigheid' can accomplish anything. Make punishment sufficiently severe and all forms of dissent will end. 
Yet history teaches the opposite. Whenever a regime enforces policies that are seen by the public to be harsh and 
unjust, martyrs will be created.479 
The editorial lamented government closed-mindedness on the morality debate over conscription. "The 
government has been repeatedly urged to take into account political as well as religious objections to 
military service, but has refused to do so, unable to accept that there may be moral and ethical values 
beyond its understanding.,,48o This editorial shows antipathy to the uncompromising attitudes and 
authoritarian behaviour of the South African government. 
On 8 August 1988, the Natal Witness publicised a Black Sash protest against conscription. It recorded a 
spokesperson's statement that "military conscription caused much suffering for many youths and 
families.,,48I This article combined with previous ones was a further demonstration of the paper's 
support for organisations opposing conscription such as the Black Sash and the ECC. A day later, the 
Natal Witness published three letters concerning the sexual assault on Ivan Toms in prison. The first 
letter, by a member of the public, claimed that Ivan Toms was wrong to evade national service and that 
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the govemment could not make any exceptions: "As far as I'm concerned he must accept the fruits of 
his folly. The poor taxpayer will have to pay for his six-year sojourn in prison. I'm definitely one of 
those who feel it unfair that some should be granted exemption while others have to serve." 482 The 
second letter by Buck Taylor pointed out the absurdity of the law and its implementation in the South 
African judiciary by providing two contrasting court sentences found in the Natal Witness. "Two reports 
of the Natal Witness. One: July 26 1988 - refusing to serve the SADF in any capacity on moral grounds, 
David Bruce was imprisoned for six years. Two: Found guilty of murder, Joan Marais was sentenced to 
imprisonment for four years. Justice is done." 483 The use of irony by Taylor was a powerful 
commentary on the irrationality of the South African law regarding violence. This is also seen in the 
third letter by G.A Derby Lewis, which commented on the Ivan Toms incarceration. The author 
questioned, "[w]hy are conscientious objectors held with common criminals? Why was this prisoner not 
offered adequate protection despite his earlier complaint of harassment?,,484 The author pointed out the 
sacrifices that Toms made: "This man is a hero. If it is the law that out-standing South Africans be 
treated in this shameful way, because of their moral repugnance for military service, then the law must 
be changed. At the very least, our courts must be given the discretion to sentence a period of 
community service instead of jail.,,485 
On 12 August 1988, the Natal Witness reported on support for conscription objectors by leading church 
members in South Africa. "Senior Durban church leaders have expressed support for the 143 conscripts 
who last week announced they would not do military service in the South African defence force. ,,486 
The article also cited comments of Mrs Mary Burton, President of Black Sash, regarding the conscripts' 
stand. She said that the "young men who were not prepared to serve in the defence force should be 
given the choice of altemative service. ,,487 On 15 August 1988, the Natal Witness publicized segments 
of a speech by Adriaan Vlok in an address to a religious youth group. He played down the issue of 
conscientious objection in South Africa citing that there were only a few who decided not to serve, and 
the quality of those who did service was superb: "Those who objected to national service were so few 
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that they made headlines when they refused their call-ups he said. "The calibre of young men who 
joined the security forces was remarkable.,,488 A day later, the Natal Witness recorded a statement by 
Mr Breytenbach, the Deputy Minister of Defence, which refuted rumours of conscription reduction. 
"The African National Congress was, if anything, trying to increase the level ofviolence.,,489 
On 17 August, the Natal Witness reported on the ECC response to the government refusal on ending 
military conscription. The organisation emphasised the loss of skills for South Africa. "By not granting 
alternative service, thousands of skilled professionals will continue to leave the country, while others 
choose to waste away in jail. South Africa cannot afford this loss.,,490 On the same day, the paper 
speculated on the possibility of ending conscription: "If the government is unwilling to consider a 
reduction at this stage would it not be reasonable for it to do so once South Africa withdraws from 
Namibia? Having been relieved of the burden of occupying that country, the SADF could surely do 
with far less manpower than it has at the moment.,,491 Added to that, it would be economically 
beneficial for the government to do this: "A shortening in the period of conscription would not only save 
a vast amount of money but would also free human recourses for productive economic activity." 492 
Thus, both these articles continue a key argument that conscription resulted in a loss of valuable human 
resources, a key argument against the law. 
On 22 August 1988, the South African government officially banned the ECC. On 23 August 1988, the 
Natal Witness reported on Alan Hendrickse's views concerning the banning of the ECe. Hendrickse 
was a member of the Labour Party that was the dominant party in the Coloured House of 
Representatives within the tri-cameral parliament in 1983. As a result, he was frequently attacked by 
the ANC and UDF for collaborating with the government despite his pledged opposition to apartheid 
policies. The featured article reported his attack on the ban. "Condemning the restrictions as another 
step on the road to totalitarianism by a government unable to take cognisance of opposing views, Mr 
Hendrickse said the organisation was entitled to oppose conscription while the army is seen as 
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supporting apartheid policies.,,493 The article also quoted a spokesperson for the PFP saying that the 
"banning was the action of a desperate and dictatorial govemment.,,494 These viewpoints once again 
raised attention to the moral issue around serving in a defence force that propped up the apartheid 
system. 
On 23 August 1988, the Natal Witness addressed the ECC banning. The editorial asserted that the 
resistance to conscription depended not on political preferences but an 'abhorrence' of an unjust system. 
"In South Africa objections to the call up are not based on petty political differences but on rejection of 
a system that is universally deemed to be abhorrent. Rightly or wrongly the SADF is seen as defending 
and supporting apartheid and people have refused to serve because their conscience will not allow them 
to.,,495 It also emphasized that the number of conscripts actually motivated to serve was very low. 
As long ago as 1975, Mr P.W Botha, as Defence Minister, acknowledged that only 20% to 30% of conscripts were 
highly motivated - in that 3000 men failed to report for duty. By 1985, after large scale deployment of troops in the 
townships, the figure had jumped to 7589 for the January intake alone. Since then accurate figures have not been 
made public.496 
The editorial assured that banning the ECC would not work and would take away a responsible source 
of protest. "By effectively banning the ECC, the government has blocked a legitimate channel for those 
who have doubts about defending apartheid. This is unlikely to stop conscripts from refusing to 
serve.,,497 The next day the Natal Witness reported on the ECC response to the ban on the organisation 
by the government. A representative stated that "[t]he action was being considered in the light of 
spurious reasons given by Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, for the effective banning of the 
organisation.,,498 The article also mentioned the further opposition to conscription. 
In Durban and Pietermaritzburg yesterday, 15 people signed a declaration calling on the government to allow 
alternative service for all recruits. The list was released at a press conference to focus on alternative forms of 
service, the stand taken by 143 conscripts who earlier this month refused to serve in the SADF and the restriction of 
the ECe. Sapa reports that during a meeting at the University of Cape Town yesterday 20 men said they would join 
the stand taken by the 143 others.,,499 
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The next day the Natal Witness printed the views of Magnus Malan, concerning anti-conscription 
supporters. The article reported his statements that national service evaders were aiding the terrorists. 
"By choosing to side with national service evaders and against the SADF, people played right into the 
hands of the terrorists who wanted to murder innocent South Africans. These syrnpathisers were also 
choosing to side against stability and order necessary for the broadening of democracy."soo 
On 26 August 1988, the Natal Witness reported on statements from university representatives 
condemning the government ban on the ECC. The paper carried the University of Natal's official 
position as conveyed by its Vice Chancellor, Professor Booysen. "It remains unwaveringly committed 
to the view that matters of social concern such as these should be the subject of free speech". SOl The 
Wits University Vice Chancellor stated, " ... conscription affected thousands of lives of our university 
students and it was a legitimate subject for debate."s02 The article also cited the Rhodes University Vice 
Chancellor Dr Derek Henderson: "It is natural that (students) should want to debate and even express 
themselves in strong terms on what is an important moral issue and in which their lives are at stake."s03 
These statements give insight into the values of the Natal Witness on issues such as academic freedom 
and general freedom of speech. The article also quoted the South African Catholic Bishops Conference 
(SACBC) statements, which put forward the view that the government was becoming out of touch with 
the present youth. "Anyone who had close contact with white youth in recent years would only be too 
aware of the increasing anguish that young men underwent as they faced the issue of national 
service."s04 
On 29 August 1988, the Natal Witness printed assertions from Magnus Malan that attack on national 
service in South Africa was effectively support for communist objectives. "When it attacked national 
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service, the ECC was supporting the most evil of systems, communism, which was aimed at the 
oppression of men, the suppression of religion and the subjugation of nations."sos 
Further indicating its support for the movement on 30 August, the Natal Witness informed the public of 
an ECC meeting. "A meeting to protest the effective banning ofthe End Conscription Campaign will be 
held today at the University ofNatal.,,506 The next day the paper reported on the meeting proceedings, 
quoting a university representative. According to the representative, the ECC was a response to the 
unjustness of the system and its consequent grievances. "The End Conscription Campaign (ECC) was 
the manifestation of the moral dilemma facing conscripts to the Defence Force in South Africa."so7 The 
story indicated the grievance against fighting in a defence force that was working to uphold an unjust 
system. The article further reported his comments that "[t]he ECC would not have been silenced if it 
was merely a fringe group of universal pacifists agitating that South Africa should not defend itself 
against foreign aggression."so8 This gives further evidence that the Natal Witness discourse on the ECC 
sought to portray the organisation as morally just. 
On 2 September 1988, the Natal Witness reported on the alleged harassment and smear campaign by 
the SADF on the ECC. The article quoted Mr Sydney Kentridge, a representative of the ECC: "The 
SADF's argument that the courts had no jurisdiction was a dangerous assertion of power and could be 
likened to the pretensions of a South American Junta."S09 In the 1980s, the South American continent 
had military takeovers in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. This was his frame of 
reference for what the South African state had become. The article further reported on the SADF's 
admission of producing smear pamphlets: "The SADF has conceded distributing smear pamphlets as 
part of its covert actions to counter ECC activities."slo This not only showed antipathy against 
conscription but also illustrated concerns over South African society's militarization as well as the 
excesses of the authorities interfering with the rule of law. The rule of law dictates that the law is above 
everybody including the authorities and is an important aspect of liberalism. 
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This narrative of coverage reveals that the Natal Witness clearly took an active role in alerting the public 
to ECC activity and generating a discourse of opposition around the issue of conscription. It showed 
strong support for the idea of alternative service for those conscientiously opposed to military service. 
Two features in this discourses included dispute over the flow of South African human resources and 
the number of young men avoiding service by migrating from South Africa. Its coverage of the troop 
deaths in the Angolan war, as outlined in Chapter 3, seemed to highlight this viewpoint further. When 
the ECC was banned the Natal Witness produced editorials rejecting this move indicating a strong 
support for the ECC. Its articles focusing on protests against the banning backed this up. The support 
for the ECC was largely two-fold, being in sympathy with its objectives as well as setting out to defend 
the rights of free speech. Free speech is seen as a component in liberalism and is linked to the overall 
notion of individual freedoms. 
, 
The issue of the paper's role in galvanising an English-speaking, white public is raised by these 
discussions. Anderson describes how print capitalism helped fuel nationalism in communities. "Nothing 
perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print capitalism, which made it 
possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves, and 
to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways."SII The concern for the moral dilemmas and 
lives specifically of young, white men conscripted to fight outside of a just war context highlights the 
way that concerns about political violence were being debated in a much less abstract context than 
before. 
The UDF-Inkatha conflict 
In the second half of this chapter, I will discuss the Natal Witness's coverage of the Inkatha-UDF 
conflict in Natal. The UDF was a liberation organisation founded in 1983 with the overall aim of 
dismantling apartheid. It was a broad alliance of women's, youth and church organisations as well as 
trade unions. This organisation was popular in black townships across the country and became the 
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most prominent liberation movement against apartheid in the 1980s. Inkatha was a Zulu nationalist 
liberation association, which, while opposing apartheid, competed with other forms of black 
opposition and took a stand against strategies - such as the disinvestment campaigns, workers strikes 
and boycotts - that threatened capital investments in the region. It was linked to both the homeland 
government body of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and to regional development initiatives, such 
as the Buthelezi Commission, which focussed on economic growth in KwaZulu. 
This conflict between Inkatha and the UDF started in 1985 and centred on the Pietermaritzburg district 
with most of the violence breaking out in the townships surrounding the small city. Matthew Kentridge, 
in his book, An unofficial war: inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg, describes this conflict as civil war 
and explained that the Inkatha-UDF violence was a battle towards post-apartheid political dominance in 
the province. At this time, the apartheid state looked as if it was coming to an inevitable end and both 
sides were fighting for their future stake in the new system. Kentridge states that Pietermaritzburg, as 
the capital of Natal, was important to Inkatha's overall regional dominance and Buthelezi would fight 
hard to keep it.S12 In my analysis of the Natal Witness, I will describe its representation of issues around 
police involvement in the crisis, the role of SADF troops in the Pietermaritzburg townships, where they 
were sent in to contain the violence, as well as the general nature of the conflict and the organisations 
involved. 
Because of security laws prohibiting news of unrest without official approval, the process of reporting 
the UDF-Inkatha conflict was very difficult for newspapers. Despite the press having evidence of 
police bias towards Inkatha, they were not allowed to publish it. An example of this is given by 
Kentridge in an interview with a member of staff at the Natal Witness. The reporter described that there 
was "a lot of evidence of police assisting Inkatha, but we can't report it."S13 Furthermore, the press 
found it difficult to fmd first hand accounts of the violence as they were excluded from areas of unrest. 
The restrictions on coverage extended to photographs - for example, pictures of buildings damaged by 
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the violence could not be published without consent by the authorities. Reporters were also subject to 
intimidation by police who would regularly confiscate materials and cameras. 
On 4 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported on the court case of David Ntombela. In the 1980s 
Ntombela was an alleged notorious warlord who was a leader in the Inkatha movement. He was widely 
considered responsible for much of the violence in Zululand at the time and was alleged to have 
attacked both UDF supporters and suspected ones. In a story by Strini MoodleySl4, the paper reported 
an attempt to have a restraining order placed against him by a Mr Mandla Mkhize, who claimed that he 
had murdered his two relatives. "Mr Ntombela and other men had come to his home on October 9 this 
year and allegedly murdered his mother Mrs Angelica Mkhize and his sister Miss Petronella Mkhize. 
Mr Mkhize's application was supported by a number of affidavits in which witness's accounts of the 
killings were given."SIS The article also documented claims concerning the lack of police action around 
Ntombela's killings. "Mr Mandla Mkhize alleged that Mr Ntombela and others had been released 
shortly after they were arrested."SI6 On the same day the Natal Witness reported on a gun given illegally 
to an Inkatha leader by a high ranking member in the South African security services: "A Slangspruit 
Inkatha leader had received a firearm from a member of the security branch of the SA police."SI7 
On 5 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported on the defamation trial where Buthelezi was suing the 
newspaper Frontline for its assertions that Inkatha was an organisation run by thugs. Buthelezi stated 
that he "had no personal impis who were thuggish operators". "My commitment to non-violence is my 
entire life, he said."SI8 The organisational nature was benign in design: "Inkatha was organised in a 
paramilitary way like the boy scouts but no violence was involved."SI9 Frontline countered that Inkatha 
was acting not only in self-defence when attacking rivals, and gave statistics from a PFP report, which 
stated that Inkatha members were in the minority of violence victims. "Mr Edwin Cameron, for 
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Frontline, read Dr Buthelezi statistics from the PFP unrest monitoring report. "Of the 89 killed in the 
Pietermaritzburg townships and September this year, the local K waZulu representative has identified 18 
as members of Inkatha."s2o 
The accusation as accounted in the Natal Witness provided evidence that Inkatha were by no means the 
passive victims in the conflict. On the same day, the Natal Witness reported on Cosatu's assertions that 
Inkatha was deliberately destroying political rights in the townships. "A campaign of violence is 
organised to destabilise the democratic processes in Pietermaritzburg's townships."s21 Further, "[a] 
legal team had been appointed to examine the recent conflict in the city and had found that a warlord 
phenomenon had emerged in the townships."s22 The trade union, a UDF aligned actor, stated 
"Conservative organisations like Inkatha that had their political legitimacy challenged as a result of 
these campaigns and [in response] initiated the violence."s23 However, the Natal Witness also carried 
denials of intimidation and coercion in their recruitment of members by Inkatha's secretary. "Dr Oscar 
Dhlomo denied that Inkatha were killing people and forcing them to join the organisation. He accused 
the UDF of being dishonest in its intentions" S24 
The next day the Witness reported that SADF troops had been deployed in the Pietermaritzburg 
townships allegedly to control the violence between Inkatha and UDF. The story quoted the SADF 
spokesperson, Commandant Ian Buck, who stated that, " ... the SADF does act in support of the SAP in 
the maintenance oflaw and order."s2s It also quoted the mayor of Pi eterma ritz burg's statements on the 
situation: "I am very, very sorry to hear the news, but I am not surprised. From meetings we have had 
with leaders ofthe organisations involved, it is clear that they have no control over the situation."s26 
The paper also reported on Inkatha's support for the initiative with its representative stating that there 
was no other option available to them. "Under normal circumstances Inkatha was against the army 
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becoming involved in the townships. However both the organisations have failed to solve the problem 
and we must try harder than ever before to come together so that we can demand that the SADF moves 
out of the townships."s27 However, it also quoted Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) 
secretary general, Alec Erwin, as saying that the army would only heighten the tension and conflict 
around the townships. "More troops or police will only exacerbate the situation as the residents are 
suspicious because of their harrowing experiences they have had."s28 The Natal Witness also recorded 
UDF spokesperson, Mr A.S. Chetty' s claims that the 'warlords' were the main problem and they were 
the ones needed to be dealt with to solve the situation. "The well known perpetrators are well-known 
warlords linked to Inkatha. All that is required is for these men to be apprehended and that does not 
need mass police and army."S29 Thus, the Natal Witness carried debates around the militarization of 
local life, and brought discourses around the SADF closer to home as well as suspicions that the SAP 
was working with Inkatha to destabilize UDF opposition. 
The SAP denied these latter allegations: "We deny the general statements that the police allegedly 
refused to act against vigilantes, that we refuse to protect residents, and that we refuse to intervene in the 
clashes."s3o They further stated that it was neutral politically and did not side with any organisation. 
"We have made it clear that the SAP is apolitical and impartial."S31 On 7 November 1987, the Natal 
Witness printed further allegations that the SAP was not doing anything to stop an Inkatha 'warlord' 
named Sichizo Zuma who had committed several violent crimes against the community. It cited Mr 
Mkhize - an alleged victim who had complained that the police did not take an interest in prosecuting 
Zuma. "He said it appears to the applicants that the South African Police had neither the inclination nor 
the will to intervene to protect them or their community from Mr Zuma as they have on several 
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On 7 November 1987, a Natal Witness editorial provided comment on troops moving into 
Pietermaritzburg townships. It favoured this solution, suggesting that the deployment of troops in the 
townships was unavoidable: "Violence and counter violence has become intolerable and the leaders of 
the black organisations have lost control over their follower. Faced with such a situation, the authorities 
cannot be blamed for choosing the option of sending in the troopS.,,533 The editorial also acknowledged 
that the SADF would be seen as upholders of apartheid. "The reputation ofthe troops will suffer as a 
result; they will be seen as the upholders of the system that is to blame for the whole sorry mess."S34 
Therefore, despite acknowledging the possible repercussions, the editorial did recognize the move as 
unavoidable, thus suggesting a possibly different line on the SADF as opposed to the SAP. 
On 12 November 1987, the Natal Witness published a letter by an anonymous author, which petitioned 
for more information on the crisis in Pietermaritzburg. The letter spoke of the rising number of deaths 
in the conflict. "Since the beginning of the year more than 150 people have been killed in the 
Pietermaritzburg region in acts of political violence, more than 50 of them in October alone. Hundreds 
more have been injured and thousands driven from their homes."m The letter also emphasized the 
suffering of the people there and effects on the economy. "In many areas organised life is breaking 
down, the education system is collapsing, and residents are living in a state of permanent fear. 
Pietermaritzburg' s economy is also beginning to suffer."s36 The writer criticized the police for refusing 
to detail information, which kept the Pietermaritzburg population ignorant of the violence around them. 
Again, as in the case of conflict across the border, the issue of secrecy was raised, this time in relation to 
military actions in the province. "The police are giving out a minimum of information: the emergency 
regulations thus act to foster ignorance, rumour-mongering and complacency in an already isolated 
white community."s37 Significantly, he blamed the press for their lack of analytical information, only 
reporting at face value. "The press, though prevented by the emergency regulations from publishing 
details of the violence, is free to investigate and comment on the background. It has done little of 
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this."S38 The letter implored both the government and press to allow for a more rounded picture of what 
was actually happening and the reasons for it happening in the Pietermaritzburg townships. 
The Pietermaritzburg Democratic Association called on the government to lift the regulations which prevent the 
people of South Africa from knowing what is happening in their own communities. It calls on the press, especially 
in Natal, to inform the public of the real causes of the violence which is destroying community life in the 
Pietermaritzburg region.539 
The letter finally laid blame on the apartheid system as the main instigator of the violence in South 
Africa and called on white organisations to be more vocal against the government's apartheid policies. 
"It calls on the white community through its organisations and public representatives to put pressure on 
the Government to begin to dismantle the structures of apartheid which are the real causes of political 
violence in South Africa."s4o 
The next day the Natal Witness published Inkatha's claim that the UDF had not responded to a proposal 
of peace talks by the organisation. "Inkatha has challenged the United Democratic Front to explain why 
the organisation has not responded to a proposal for participation in a joint monitoring committee at 
checking violence."s41 The paper also published the petitions for clarification on the UDF policies 
regarding violence and democracy. "The UDF must make its position clear. Does it believe in 
democracy and does it believe in non violence and if it does, is it prepared to meet with the leadership of 
Inkatha to end violence." S42 
On 17 November 1987, an editorial criticized police arrests during the peace talks, saying that this was 
hindering the process. It also suggested that this discredited claims by Buthelezi that his organisation 
was a main target of the police. "It needs to be said that the authorities' action in detaining members of 
the UDF currently involved in peace negotiations in Pietermaritzburg serves to undermine Buthelezi' s 
position and lend weight to Cosatu minister' s claim that it is being victimised."s43 What this statement 
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pointed out that the peace meetings would be severely disrupted because of the SAP actions. "Peace in 
the townships will be difficult enough to achieve as it is. It will never be achieved if one side is to be 
summarily deprived of its leadership. Both Inkatha and the UDF agreed that their talks will only 
succeed if leaders are given a mandate by their followers and are able to report back on them."s44 The 
author further stated that the police role " ... should be to crack down hard on the actual perpetrators of 
violence, and leave the politicians alone to try and resolve their differences."s4s Continued allegations 
of police bias and disruption of peace talks continued the next day. Thus despite being prohibited from 
reporting directly that the SAPS were in league with Inkatha, the Natal Witness nevertheless was able to 
find ways around this. This not only gives an illustration of its opposition towards the South African 
authorities but on a deeper level, how its exposure of SAPS activities and government wrongdoings 
played a key part ofthis paper's identity, that of being a watchdog in society as well as a shield against a 
totalitarian authority. 
An article documented that "[a ]nother 18 United Democratic Front and Cosatu members were detained 
yesterday - only two days before the start of crucial peace talks aimed at ending the violence in the 
city's townships."s46 The article also gave an overall estimate of the number of arrests for that week. 
"A total of 38 UDF and Cosatu members have been held since Friday including two key people in the 
talks: UDF Natal Midlands joint Secretary Mr Martin Wittenberg and Mr Skumbuzo Ngwenya."s47 The 
report further emphasized the timing of the procedure and suggested that the disruption of peace talks 
had been deliberate, and that police were working against the UDF. "The police raid took place while 
the Chamber of Commerce, Cosatu, and the UDF were discussing the first of the peace talks which were 
to be held tomorrow."S48 
Two days later, the Natal Witness published the SAP response to press criticism. The press secretary for 
Minister of Law and Order, Leon Mellet denied that the arrests were to disrupt peace talks and denied 
political bias. "If people are being arrested, it is in connection with crimes that have been committed 
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and not because of their membership of any political organisation.,,549 The Natal Witness also quoted 
National Party MP in Pietermaritzburg, Brian Edwards, who stated "[t]o my knowledge the police are 
doing their utmost to defuse the situation.,,55o However, on the same day, in an article titled "Detention 
- hit UDF quits peace talks", the Natal Witness gave a report detailing how police arrests had made the 
UDF temporarily pull out of the peace negotiations because of a loss of important members. The article 
quoted Mr A.S. Chetty, chair of the UDF Midlands committee, who claimed that it was impossible to go 
on with the peace talks because of the arrests. "How can we sit at a negotiating table when those 
involved in the process are being detained?,,55I It also cited Inkatha spokesperson, Mr V Ndlovu's 
criticism ofthe arrests. "I don't see the point of these detentions; the problem won't be solved by 
detaining these people.,,552 The Natal Witness also published the PFP's condemnation of the arrests. 
"The situation in Edendale demanded the direct involvement of the leaders ofinkatha and the UDF to 
bring about peace. Detaining the leadership of the UDF sets back the talks and disrupted, rather than 
contributed, to law and order.,,553 The PFP declared, "[p]eople who have been involved in criminal acts 
must be brought to trial. But leaders who are involved in sensitive negotiations must be set free to help 
bring about a sense of normality to the lives of the people in the townships.,,554 
Also on 20 November 1987, the Natal Witness called arrests by police a 'strange logic'. The editorial 
marked the suffering of the people around Pietermaritzburg and warned of potential trouble to come into 
the city. "For how much longer can ordinary men, women and, more disturbingly, children be expected 
to live out their daily lives in a state of permanent fear? How much longer before the city becomes 
flooded with refugees? And how much more remote becomes the prospect of ultimate peace amongst 
our damaged and brutalised young?,,555 The editorial also criticized the role of police, questioning "[b]y 
what strange logic can they carry out on the one hand their peaceful missions, yet with the other 
systematically remove from the scene leaders attempting to bring together the warring factions?,,556 It 
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also questioned the criminalization of leaders by the security forces. "To label them wholesale as 
criminals as Brigadier Mellet has done is further to strain our already stretched credibility.,,557 The 
author finally added that these arrests would lead to repercussions both in the short and long term. "We 
shall maintain our belief that detaining leaders and those ready to negotiate a truce is short-sighted folly, 
guaranteeing to exasperate an already intolerable situation." 558 Thus, strong criticism of the SAP is 
shown in this period. 
On the same day Richard Steyn, editor of the Natal Witness at the time, gave a detailed analysis of the 
civil war in Natal in response to a letter sent the week earlier. In his column, he defmed it in crudely 
Cold War terms as a conflict between communism and capitalism. "At the local level it is a dispute 
over strategies to replace apartheid. At a higher level, it is the clash of world views - over not only the 
make-up of the future South African society, but whether that society should be capitalist or 
socialist.,,559 He also outlined the two different strategies adopted by these organisations which he 
stated provoked a clash of interests. 
Because it has no resource base to offer rewards to its supporters the organisation (UDF) has to build support by 
articulating grievances, and by mobilising grassroots oppositions in the townships to anything it regards as 
supportive of government, apartheid or anti-worker (i.e. capitalist interests). Here it runs headlong into Inkatha 
whose considered strategy is to work within state run institutions to achieve social and political reform.56o 
Steyn defended Inkatha, explaining that it was perceived as being a government lackey because of its 
middle path strategy, which predisposed it not to support popular resistance activities. "Precluded by its 
position in the middle from supporting populist resistance to government policies, Inkatha has become 
an open target for those who depict it as a handmaiden of apartheid.,,56I Steyn denied that it was clear 
who was responsible for starting the violence. 
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Thus, Steyn himself tried to create a centrist approach, with social breakdown explaining the 
criminalization of youth: "An as yet unexamined aspect of the conflict is the activity of young township 
thugs, the lost generation deprived of education, jobs or money who bitterly resent others going about 
their daily lives in relative peace and prosperity."s63 
On 23 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported that peace talks were still on despite setbacks. 
"Tomorrow' s peace talks are still on despite the fact that a number of political and trade union leaders in 
the city have gone into hiding following the detentions of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and 
Cosatu leaders."s64 The article also gave details of the statistics in the detentions. "Almost 300 people 
have been detained since the beginning of November, forcing several mid-level leaders ofUDF and 
Cosatu into hiding."s6s A day later the Natal Witness reported on the continued violence giving details 
of the gruesomeness of the assault on a man: "A man was stabbed to death and decapitated by a group in 
Inandi. Another male victim, also stabbed and decapitated, was found in Ashtown."s66 
On 24 November 1987, the Natal Witness again published a letter, which condemned police 
involvement in sabotaging of peace process, as well as an assertion that the police were being distracted 
by crimes that are more trivial. "Not only have they carried out a superbly timed swoop on leading 
UDF peace negotiators at precisely the moment when there was apparently a danger of negotiations 
getting somewhere, but they have also managed to arrest some 289 people for crimes like loitering and 
gambling."s67 The letter was bitter in its criticism: "Loitering, standing around doing nothing is one of 
the major social evils facing South African society today. Why take on the warlords and arrest the 
known hitmen when it is so much easier to arrest students for standing around and chatting on the 
pavement?"S68 Another letter that day was from Sarah Nuttall, who wrote of ' doubts ' about the motives 
of police arresting UDF leaders. The letter speculated the possibility that the police were deliberately 
sabotaging the peace process to suit their own ends. "Are we to assume by the actions of the security 
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police, which we regard as inappropriate and unjust, that the latter do not want peace talks to proceed? 
Does what they have termed black on black violence suit their own ends in what continues to be a 
repressive society?"s69 It further argued that the detentions were not justified as learnt by experience. 
"Finally, I wish to take this opportunity to address those readers who think they have done something 
wrong, as it were, in order to be detained. To us who live and work with the students who have been 
detained in the past and are in detention at present, it is clear that the contrary is true."S70 
On 26 November 1987, the Natal Witness reported on charges faced by Inkatha members for violence. 
"Two ofthree Inkatha leaders who were interdicted earlier this month from assaulting, killing or 
intimidating various residents from the surrounding townships are already facing criminal charges.,,571 
The Natal Witness also speculated on the possibility that police were failing to charge Inkatha warlords, 
reporting and discussing Cosatu' s allegations of them doing so. "This action follows allegations from 
the UDF and Cosatu that police have failed to take action against Inkatha warlords in the townships. 
However, details of the charges against Mr David Ntombela and Mr. Sichizo Zuma are not known and 
charges have been laid against a third leader Chief Zuma."S72 Two days later the Natal Witness 
commented on meetings between Inkatha and the UDF. "Statements made by UDF and Inkatha 
condemning the violence and especially such practices as forced recruitment are encouraging indeed.,,573 
Nonetheless, the editorial was cautious. "However it is going to be extremely difficult to unravel the 
web of vengeance and anarchy in which our townships are ensnared."s74 Thus, the editorial speculated 
that there was going to be a lack of control in the townships. 
On 1 December 1987, the Natal Witness reported on a speech by Mr. N gwenya, joint secretary of the 
UDF Midland's branch, at Edendale in which he encouraged more harmony with Inkatha members. 
"He said ordinary members ofInkatha were not the enemy of the black community and emphasised that 
unity was the main weapon for establishing peace and democracy."s7s He also identified apartheid as 
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On the same day, the Natal Witness covered Buthelezi's views: "The UDF and Cosatu are not worthy of 
the status of organisations to whom Inkatha needed to be reconciled.,,577 The article recorded his blame 
of the UDF for fomenting violence during peace talks: "It is their choice that death keeps us apart. 
There is no reconciliation with a spear being in your throat or with a match setting alight the 
necklace."s78 Violence, he said, was the policy of the ANC. "The violence in the city's townships 
epitomised the real intentions of the ANC, the chief said. His people were dying hideous deaths because 
they wanted to make townships a no-go area for Inkatha."s79 
On the same day, an editorial in the Natal Witness speculated over the modifying nature of the Inkatha-
UDF conflict. This editorial addressed the despondency of Pi eterma ritz burg's mayor regarding the 
violence, but stated that it was no longer a simple matter: "The mayor is probably correct when he states 
that the continuing violence is no longer a straight fight between Inkatha and the UDF. All around the 
city traditional structures of control appear to have broken down as rival factions, not necessarily 
associated with either organisation claim territory for their own."S80 However, the editorial emphasized 
the need for talks to continue. "Under the circumstances it is easy to despair. But the latest killings 
emphasise only that more, not less, talking is required. At this point, it matters not who started the 
slaughter. What is clear however is that neither the emergency regulations nor the security forces are 
able to restore peace?"S81 
On 4 December 1987, an article by Yvonne Grimbeeks82 recorded that two prominent businesspersons, 
Paul van Utriecht and Rob Pater, were involved in peace talks - both motivated by their concern that 
violence affected the local economy. "Most strategic planners now no longer talk about the aim of 
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business being of maximization of profit but rather talk in terms of maintaining the flow of resources. 
We believe quite simply that the persons most affected by the violence are our workers and our 
customers."S83 They speculated on a possible solution to the violence. "Both the men agree that the 
solution lies with the community and that any involvement on a national level- either from this 
government or any other organisation is not desirable."s84 This article depicted a possible anxiety over 
the threat to businesses, which would have affected the social class of Natal Witness readership. 
From June 1988 to September 1988, the war between Inkatha and UDF revived after a period of relative 
calm. On 27 July 1988, the Natal Witness reported on violence around the Pietermaritzburg townships, 
which had led to more deaths. The article reported on an Inkatha meeting that deteriorated into violence. 
"A meeting on Sunday in Gezobuso called by ChiefShayabantu Zondi, a senior member oflnkatha, in 
an attempt to resolve differences and end the fierce fighting in the area, resulted in attacks on homes 
after the crowd had dispersed."s8s Two days later the Natal Witness gave an analysis on political 
violence in Natal and its record statistical high so far that year: "Political violence has flared again in 
Natal and five more deaths reported yesterday has made July the bloodiest this year."S86 The 
commentary also detailed the incidents from Hammarsdale and Sweetwaters: "In the latest incidents, a 
group stabbed a man to death in Sweetwaters and another sustained serious stab wounds when he was 
attacked. Two were killed and another injured in separate incidents at Henley Dam after groups 
attacked with pangas."S87 The editorial speculated that the conflict was caused by a recent forced 
migration of people into the townships. "Tensions which have wracked Natal townships have been 
exacerbated in the area by the influx of 600 people who were moved to make way for the Inanda 
dam."s88 
That same day, King Goodwill Zwelethini (traditional monarch of KwaZulu) was reported as having 
"called on his subjects in the unrest tom area around the city to resolve their differences and to show 
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respect for one another.,,589 On 3 August 1988, the Natal Witness began its report on the court case 
between the family who lived in Sweetwaters and Mr Ncgobo, an Inkatha supporter, who was alleged to 
have killed or participated in the murder of two family members. The narrative pointed out that it was 
the second death in the family since the application for restraining orders against an Inkatha member. 
"Mr Ernest, the second son to have been killed since his family applied for the interdict.,,59o The article 
detailed the testimony ofMr Mthembhu that his father's dying words proved an Inkatha member, 
Ncgobo, had done it: "The court heard that in his dying moments Mr Ernest had identified his killer as 
one of the respondents, Mr Ncgobo.,,591 The next day the Natal Witness continued its coverage on the 
trial, this time reporting the alleged assaults by police on the family. The journalist reported Mr's 
testimony that the police, with an Inkatha member, were guilty of assaulting his family. "They were 
then sjambokked and assaulted in other ways and then arrested in connection with an incident 17 weeks 
earlier, in which one of his sons, Simon, had been shot and injured by an Inkatha man".592 On 6 August 
1988, the story of continued. Inkatha insisted that the court action was a ploy to discredit them. "A 
submission from the family applying for protection from three Inkatha men was an attempt by the ANC 
and UDF to bring Inkatha into disrepute was dismissed in the Supreme Court.". The article quoted Mr 
Justice Alexander explaining why the claim was not viable and that "he had problems with the 
submission as it could not prove that the complaints were without substance.,,593 
On 9 August 1988, the Natal Witness reported on a peace initiative between Inkatha and UDF members 
in the Western Cape. "The initiative had not been widely publicised as the idea was to keep the talks as 
low key as possible.,,594 The story also quoted Imbali town councillor Ben Jele: "We are not trying to 
keep anything secret, and we don't want any premature statements or publicity to damage the chances of 
success.,,595 The family court case was also in the news that day. The Natal Witness journalist reported 
allegations that lawyers had been intimidated: "Supporters of three Inkatha men at the centre of an 
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interdict in the city have allegedly threatened and intimidated lawyers acting for the applicants."s96 The 
reporter also documented, Mr Mkhize' s lawyer's [lawyer not named] statements that a number of 
"Inkatha supporters were coming to court with weapons."S97 Further, "he had received reports of subtle 
and unsubtle threats being made to the family attending the hearing."s98 The article also aired an 
Inkatha counter-claim that "[t]wo women were told by UDF people that they would be killed ifthey 
came and testified against the applicants."s99 
One the same day, the Natal Witness devoted two more articles to the trial, the first being Mr "s 
explanation of his feud with Inkatha members. The article concerned reported his statements that the 
only reason Inkatha attacked him and his family was because of his refusal to join Inkatha: "All 1 can 
say regarding Inkatha is that (Abdul) Awethu (an Imbali town councillor) was pleading with me for a 
long time to join Inkatha, but I did not because I have seen the fruits of what Inkatha is doing.,,6oo It 
also explained his reasons for not reporting the incidents to the police: "I had adopted that attitude 
because when I reported other matters to the police, they had regarded them as trivial. I rather told my 
attorneys. So often 1 reported to the police, but nothing happened.,,6o l The second article detailed Mr 
Ncgobo's court appearance for his alleged murders of two of the Mthembhu family. "An Inkatha 
member who was temporarily restrained by the Supreme High Court from killing members of an Imbali 
family appeared in court yesterday in connection with the death of one of the family members.,,602 The 
next day the Natal Witness provided comment on these events in an editorial. It asserted that courts had 
a responsibility to quell these actions. "The courts should therefore not hesitate to use their contempt 
powers to mete out severe punishment to intimidators, and the police must also play their part in 
protecting citizens from violence irrespective of the source.,,603 This editorial thus admonished the 
police for failing to adopt a neutral role, in light of the suspicion that police were siding with Inkatha. 
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On 11 August 1988, the Natal Witness continued its documentation of this trial. The article publicised 
Mr's revelation that they had thrown stones at Ncgobo: "Under rigorous cross examination about the 
incident yesterday, Mr Mthembhu said they threw stones at Mr Ngcobo after he started shooting, and 
while they were retreating from his car.,,604 It also reported from Ncgobo's lawyer. "The crowd Mr 
Mthembhu was with blocked the road and stoned Mr Ncgobo. He also said a shot was fired at Mr 
Ncgobo. He pointed out that no mention had been made of stones being thrown in either Mr 
Mthembhu's or his brother's affidavits.,,605 Justice Alexander "said he found it difficult to understand 
how it was possible to flee from Mr Ngcobo, while at the same time attacking him with stones.,,606 It is 
clear that the Natal Witness's commitment to airing various views on events was also determined by a 
severe lack of clarity on what was happening. A 'white paper' reporting on violence in racially 
segregated spaces perhaps explains why editorial voices were less clear on the morality of various 
'sides' in comparison to its much less neutral reporting on the ECC. 
For example, a column by Robin Hallett, appearing on 12 August, speculated on the confusion behind 
the rebound of violence between Inkatha and the UDF in Pietermaritzburg. 
"The reasons for this escalation are not clear. Sources in the trade union movement maintain that there was never any 
peace that people have not stopped killing, and that large security has merely kept the lid on the pressure cooker and 
that now after simmering fiercely for a few months is starting to boil again.,,607 
This also highlighted scepticism about the effectiveness of the security forces' ability to quell the 
violence. Hallett emphasized that the state of anarchy had continued: "It is also evident that respect for 
the law has not been re-established.,,608 Hallett also quoted Brigadier Prinsloo on the changed nature of 
the conflict. "Now there are smaller groups focusing on specific people, homes and families as targets. 
This makes the violence more difficult to prevent.,,609 Prinsloo claimed " ... the troublemakers and 
provocateurs have filtered back into the greater Pietermaritzburg area.,,610 However, Hallett drew on 
sources, which " ... attribute[d] the upsurge to yet another forced recruitment drive by Inkatha. They say 
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similar tactics in September 1987 caused the huge increase in violence then and is doing so again. ,,611 
This indicated a prominent journalistic viewpoint that Inkatha was predominantly to blame for the 
violence. The issue of police favouritism towards Inkatha was highlighted in the column' s claims that 
the police were deliberately confiscating weapons of the UDF. "The claim that the police have taken 
their weapons - such as they were and now Inkatha has free reign in the conflict and is intensifying their 
conflict.,,612 Hallett also emphasized the police were predominantly Inkatha supporters: "Among the 
special constables (kitskonstabels) were a large number of Inkatha members and supporters. One was 
interdicted by the Supreme Court against perpetrating acts ofviolence.,,6 13 This criticizes the police role 
in the conflict and this is further emphasized by its critique of the arrests, which Hallett claimed 
damaged the peace process. This led to a breakdown in the peace talks organized by the chamber of 
commerce. 
On 13 August 1988, the Mthembhu trial was again in the pages of the Natal Witness; this time it was 
reporting a police officer' s eyewitness account of murder. "Inkatha Youth Brigade leader Mr Sichizo 
Zuma shot and fatally injured a son of the Mthembhu family from close range and then told his 
colleagues not to stone the man, so he could shoot the dog himself. ,,614 The reporter also quoted Mr 
Zuma' s lawyer who said he "was ambushed and attacked by members of the Mthembhu family. ,,615 It 
went on to describe the provocation by Mr Mthembhu: "When he went outside he observed Mr Simon 
Mthembhu armed with a bush knife and a stick. Mr Mthembhu had struck the back window of the 
vehicle and then went to the driver' s side.,,616 On 18 August, the Natal Witness continued reporting on 
' both sides' of the violence. The first report was on the Inkatha school, burnt down allegedly by UDF 
supporters. "Inkatha officials said yesterday that the school had been burned down and those classes 
were continuing in one of the remaining classrooms.,,617 The Natal Witness also reported an attack on 
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an Inkatha youth, and quoted from an Inkatha spokesperson that he "[w]as attacked by a boy who is not 
a scholar. He (the assailant) stabbed Cele after accusing him of being a thelewini (Inkatha vigilante).,,618 
On the same day, the Natal Witness reported on building tensions within the greater Pietermaritzburg 
areas. "Bloodshed will prevail in Sweetwaters if people killed in clashes with supporters of the local 
Inkatha are brought into the area for burial.,,619 On 20 November 1988, this story continued with a 
request by a family in Sweetwaters for police to provide protection during a funeral. "The Masango 
family request for protection follows the circulation of leaflets warning Sweetwaters residents not to 
bring into the area bodies of those killed in clashes with local Inkatha supporters.,,620 The report 
covered the Induna's denials of his warnings to the Masango family. "Mthalane said that it was 
incorrectly reported yesterday that he had warned the Masango family not to hold a funeral in 
Sweetwaters. He said when members approached him to report the death ofMr Masango; he had told 
them he was not their Induna.,,621 
The next day, a column by Martin Williams commented on the inept handling of the violence by South 
African authorities. Williams cited a monitoring group who predicted rightly that violence would occur. 
"A spokesman for a Durban monitoring group says, 'If something is not done immediately I fear the 
death toll could rise every day.' Since then, there have been several ugly incidents, including one, 
which left ten dead. Another spokesman told New Nation that chiefs in the Molweni area are trying to 
drive out newcomers, who are refugees from other violence in Natal.,,622 Williams maintained that " [i]f 
monitoring groups can predict violence, authorities should be able to act in time to prevent violence,,623 
On 24 August 1988, an article stated that " ... at least 1000 people have been killed in the greater 
Edendale since the start of unrest last year.,,624 From a hearing in the magistrate ' s court, the Natal 
Witness cited H.R Upton, a captain of the SAP, that " ... the number of unrest related murders rose during 
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the past two months. The number of murders during July and August is 52.,,625 This indicated the 
amount of attention the conflict was getting in the Natal Witness. 
On 2 September 1988, the Natal Witness published more statistics of violence-related deaths. "Eleven 
deaths were reported following incidents of political violence in and around the city at the weekend,,626 
This added to the overall death toll " ... for July, with at least 20 deaths occurring in the townships around 
Pietermaritzburg and the other nine in Mpumalanga and Hammarsdale.,,627 The article cited Dr Peter 
Kirchhoff a member of P ACSA 628 on the state of the unrest: "There has been a definite increase in the 
unrest, and this has been borne out by the growing number of refugees." 
Conclusion 
In 1987, the Natal Witness attempted to steer a mid-path in its coverage of conflicts between Inkatha 
and the UDF in Natal. It printed editorials and columns that criticized the SAP for arrests of prominent 
UDF members thus stalling peace talks. It also printed articles suggesting police were deliberately 
siding with Inkatha. In addition, the Natal Witness included criticism of secrecy over the conflict by 
authorities. The further issue was the view of moderate black opposition, which the paper indicated was 
a breakaway from the Inkatha movement that had been seen as advocating for a peaceful solution in 
South Africa before then. By July 1988, the violence in Pietermaritzburg had spread to other areas and 
the newspaper continued to criticize the authorities for the lack of action as well continued suspicions 
around the police role in the violence. 
As indicated by the relatively large number of editorials and articles on this issue, it can be surmised that 
the Natal Witness acted in its role of enlightening its community of the violence in areas literally in the 
neighbourhood. The white community in South Africa as well as in Natal has often being seen as 
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insulated from events that were happening very close to them. The Natal Witness acted to expose the 
violence to its readership. Another part of its discourse in this period criticises the police violence. 
However, one of the most significant trends was its breaking with vocal support for Inkatha, in contrast 
to the previous year when the Natal Witness was more supportive of moderate black resistance such as 
Inkatha. This is significant especially concerning the PFP's relationship with Inkatha since 1985. The 
alliance had been formed because Inkatha adopted pro-market policies as well as its purported ideology 
of resistance to apartheid by constructive engagement. In the same period the Natal Indaba was 
launched, which involved a planned alliance between big business and Inkatha with a view of creating a 
federal state in South Africa. The coverage in the Witness serves as an indication that some elements of 
liberalism were moving away from moderate black politics and gravitating more to the UDF. 
What stands out in coverage of local violence is not the lack of ability to verify information and the 
strategy; but rather the ability to report allegations and accusations on each 'side' . In contrast, the 
coverage of the ECC suggests that the Natal Witness presented an almost activist position on 
conscription and the misinformation about activities on the border. Both situations point to historical 
conditions in which secrecy and misinformation prevailed. The press worked within a sense of 
professional boundaries of balanced, objective reporting. Editorials and letters speculated more openly 
about circumstances. Yet, overall, the manner of reporting on events, allegations and accusations as 
they unfolded modelled a kind of middle-path or neutral position. It demonstrates too the gap between 
the world of white conscripts, where calls for meetings to discuss viable options for family members 
could be explored, and the alienation from black suffering in the violence, where meetings to negotiate 
conflict remained more distant. However, interests of the Natal Witness 's readers as a social class would 
have played a role in the discourse. 
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Conclusion 
In his book, White Power and the Liberal Conscience, Paul Rich has argued that South African 
liberalism was very adaptable to changes in the political environment and has concluded that" ... the 
overall assessment of South African liberalism must not be guided by, as many liberal historians have 
imagined, the simple ability to keep certain political values, but by the way particular situations are 
confronted.,,629 The overall theme of my work bears out this observation. My focus has been on the 
textual production of South African liberalism by the English language press in the period of 
militarization from 1976 to 1988 through a case study of the Natal Witness. Through a narrative 
documenting the content of newspapers during key clusters of events, the thesis describes how a variety 
of formats and sources in this newspaper aired information, debates and themes around issues of 
violence nationally, trans-nationally and within the region that was local to the press. In my view, my 
description of four key periods of social militarisation in South Africa supports the idea that opposition 
was fluid and constrained, but still important as a medium for public debate and the airing of crucial 
information. 
From June to July in 1976 the Natal Witness gave scathing appraisals of the South African government 
apportioning to it the majority of blame for the Soweto uprisings. It largely dismissed the government 
line that agitators had caused the uprisings and instead perceived government actions as the real cause Of 
violence. It also revealed insight into the living conditions of black people during that time. This 
combined with coverage of progressive individuals, such as Nadine Gordimer and Bayers Naud6, does 
indicate a strong oppositional discourse in this period. 
In 1978, the Natal Witness discourse on militarisation was sceptical but largely supportive of the South 
African raid into Angola. In 1981, this discourse changed with its increased doubt over the 
constructiveness of SADF incursions into Angola. This was combined with much more exposure of the 
South African border wars in its opinion columns. In 1987, this had turned to general hostility and the 
629 Paul Rich. White Power and the liberal conscience: racial segregation and South African liberalism, 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984) p 123. 
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viability of the South African role in Angola was questioned. As time progressed, hostility increased. 
Another issue to study pertaining to the South African border wars and militarization is the response of 
this liberal paper to the ideology of 'total onslaught', which began in 1979 with the presidency of P .W. 
Botha. In 1981, the Natal Witness partially embraced this ideology of the South African government 
but also argued that apartheid was encouraging potential communist revolution in South Africa. In 
1987, columns in the Natal Witness spumed 'total onslaught'. The strong hostility towards SADF 
incursions into Angola and its occupation of Namibia, suggests that although the Natal Witness was 
ambivalent about liberation movements, it was nonetheless a strong opposition towards the NP. These 
conclusions support the findings of Helen Suzman, David Welsh, Gerald Shaw and other defenders of 
the liberal English language press. Related to the war in Angola and South West Africa, were the 
arguments in the Natal Witness that apartheid was exacerbating the threat of communism and Soviet 
expansion in South Africa, particularly in 1978 and 1981. In 1987, this progressed to arguments that the 
South African involvement in Angola and Namibia was an explanation for Soviet presence in southern 
Africa. This was essentially an example ofliberalism's responses to violence and conflict in the 
southern African region. 
Related to the theme of flexible responses to political violence are the Natal Witness discourses on black 
opposition and the idea of power sharing. This issue is illustrated in 1976 where the paper mainly 
recorded the viewpoints of perceived moderate blacks and negatively portrayed those who used violence 
against the system of white domination. In 1978 and 1981, the paper displayed ambivalent support for a 
SWAPO-Ied government. In 1987, there was stronger support for black opposition in southern Africa, 
but of a particular - moderate - type. This was helped by SWAPO's acceptance of Western based 
solution which would have ensured a free market system and was in keeping with Western interests. 
What clouded the Natal Witness's line towards SWAPO was its discourse on SWAPO's military 
actions, which it most often portrayed as 'terrorism'. However, support for a moderate SW APO 
government was an indication that the Natal Witness saw the need for negotiation between moderates in 
the southern Africa struggle. As Paul Rich states in his book, Hope and Despair, "[i]t became clear 
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that a far more direct engagement had to take place between intellectuals in South Africa and the 
I I·· I t ,,630 popU ar po Ibca movemen s. 
All these issues give insight into the potential discourse on a future ANC led government that also 
followed a predominately Western-backed system, which involved adopting a free market system, 
turning away from socialist ideologies and halting its military struggle. The discourse on the SWAPO 
led government thus gives insight into the position of liberalism in relation to apartheid and the 
liberation movements in South Africa. Adding to this knowledge was my research into the debate over 
the nature and role of the ANC in the Natal Witness pages of May to June 1978. The argument was 
over the ANC use of force and its linkage to communist activity. However, this was grounded in the 
view that both violence and communism were morally wrong. 
The discourse by the Natal Witness on black opposition gives impetus to Ruth Tomaselli's view on the 
English press in South Africa, which she viewed as ambivalent towards the apartheid system and reform 
and as only favouring that which would suit their own social class. Despite this, the paper nonetheless 
presented an ideology radically different to the South African government discourse. This correlates 
with Elaine Potter's view that the English language press did offer an independent voice to South 
African politics. 
Building on what is seen in the development of the Natal Witness discourse on black opposition and the 
views of Paul Rich, the 1987 Natal Indaba was an extremely important event. The Indaba was a 
proposal by prominent businesspersons and Inkatha to adopt a power sharing agreement in Natal. There 
was a hope among its participants that apartheid in Natal would end. This was a liberal response to the 
situation of escalating violence in South Africa, in which liberals foresaw the need for power sharing. 
Rich commented on liberals' views on violence by giving the example ofthe multi-racial South African 
Liberal Party's formation in 1953, as a reaction to growing racial conflict. "The move indicated a more 
general state of political despair to which liberals had been driven in the mid 1950s, as the portent of 
630 Paul Rich Hope and despair: English-speaking intellectuals and South African politics, 1896-1976. 
London: Academic Press, 1993, p 209. 
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racial disaster loomed over the horizon.,,63 I He documented the thinking behind the move by liberals. 
"Both sides were ultimately seen as barbaric and seemingly limitless in their capacity to inflict violence, 
and no positive alternative society could be seen to emerge out of this. It was also the type of race 
violence that was not seen to have any implicitly revolutionary implications.,,632 We can see, through 
my sample of Witness coverage, the forging and transforming response to different kinds of violence 
and the shifting and debating of a liberal position in Natal. 
Related to the militarization of South African society was the issue of conscription. In 1987 and 1988, 
the Natal Witness' s position illustrates its solid opposition against South African society'S militarization. 
In this period, the paper took a firm stance against military conscription making suggestions of 
alternative community service for conscientious objectors. In its opinion pages, it demonstrated support 
for the Eee and its objectives. This opposition showed the antipathy towards the South African 
government' s political policies, no doubt because of the impact on liberal middle class Natal homes. On 
this issue, it brings into question the view of Kader Asmal that liberalism was lukewarm in its 
opposition, in which he cited a lack of support for the Eee as an example. The South African 
government tried dirty tactics against the Eee and the Natal Witness took a stand against it, 
condemning the authorities ' excesses. 
Another important issue was the Natal Witness's hostility towards the police force - most particularly 
seen, in my sample, in 1976 and 1987. In 1976, the Natal Witness discourse was critical towards the 
police action in Soweto and attributed the escalation of violence to the police. This hostility continued 
in 1987 where the Natal Witness blamed police action for interfering with the Inkatha-UDF peace talks. 
Its editorials and opinion pages also hinted at the time that the police were siding with Inkatha, when 
overt accusations would have been illegal under censorship laws. Reasons for this animosity include 
police hardline tactics against protestors - which was contrary to the liberal values of the Natal Witness 
- as well as SAP' s deliberate siding with Inkatha. 
631 Paul Rich. White Power and the liberal conscience: racial segregation and South African liberalism p 129. 
632 Ibid. ' 
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Possible ethnic prejudice by English speakers is highlighted in reporting on the 1976 Soweto uprisings 
where the issue of the compulsory use of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction was at issue. In the 
editorials and columns of the Natal Witness Afrikaner nationalism was explicitly attacked. Some 
arguments from the letters even suggested, however, that the Afrikaans led government were oppressing 
the English people in South Africa. This issue was not seen explicitly; however, it is nonetheless an 
interesting commentary on the nature of liberalism on this matter. It could also be speculated that the 
Natal Witness's opposition to government was connected to English hostility to Afrikaners and any 
government that was not English-language dominated. However, based on the articles there is not 
enough evidence for a conclusion on this question. In possible relation was the issue of conscription 
where white English men were forced into an Afrikaner dominated army by an Afrikaner nationalist 
government. 
The issue of censorship was significant in my overall research and weighed heavily on what the Natal 
Witness could publish. This affected its reporting of police and SADF activities as well as political 
violence in South Africa. The Natal Witness was able to skirt these restrictions on the media by 
extracting articles from foreign media as well as statements from the heads of states, particularly from 
the UN and OAU, which reported on SADF activities and accused them of many atrocities in the 
Southern African region. In 1976, the Natal Witness featured these foreign reports on the police and 
government conduct in the Soweto uprisings. In 1978 and 1981, the paper published statements from 
the Angolan president Dos Santos on the SADF activities in his country. This was seen in reports on 
Operation Reindeer where a view was that the alleged military camp attacked was in fact a refugee base. 
This was followed in 1987 when accusations of SADF atrocities were frequently displayed in the pages 
of the Natal Witness. In addition to this, it published viewpoints from SW APO as well as reporting on 
allegations of atrocities by its key alley in Angola, UNIT A. This leads to another issue of the Natal 
Witness discourse on UNIT A. Although it did report atrocities by UNIT A, it did not provide much 
comment on the matter. However, these reports do lead me to conclude that it adopted a hostile line 
towards UNIT A. 
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Liberal idealism is another issue to discuss in my research of the Natal Witness. This sort of idealism 
stood for individual rights and human dignity; however, the newspaper's ideals were also tightly 
attached to its social class. This is seen in 1976, 1978 and 1981 where the Natal Witness petitioned the 
government to get rid of harmful racial laws that undermined human dignity. However, this was 
limited, as it did not address the economic aspects of the capitalist system at hand. Connected to this 
would be how much in touch the Natal Witness was with the working classes in South Africa. In 
Chapter 2, I have shown how the Natal Witness pointed to economic causes of the Soweto uprisings. Its 
discussion on the social conditions for the black population suggests that the Natal Witness was in tune 
with the country's majority despite its social class. This was not the case in 1978 and 1981 where 
anxiety around the communist threat in South Africa meant that the paper was mainly representative of 
ideological leanings around capitalism. In 1987, this discourse was not dissimilar and seemed to 
express more worry for its social class. It could be speculated that the Natal Witness mirrored the views 
of its readers, as expressed in the variety of letters. Thus, based on my findings, liberalism was largely 
out of touch with the black majority despite its exposure to their social and environmental conditions. 
Finally, the Natal Witness demonstrated an Anglophone cultural nationalism, which is implicit 
throughout these chapters. Opposition to the government is articulated with the sense that like-
mindedness is to be found overseas, in the West, the source ofliberal civic values and humanitarian 
decency. There is little evidence of a questioning of class or racial privilege, or of a sense of complicity 
with an economy founded upon a white supremacist order. Writers like Gerald Shaw, Antony De1ius 
and Donald Woods, as well as strong defenders of liberal values, such as the editor of the Natal Witness 
from 1976 to 1990 Richard Steyn, are voices of impassioned, but always reasoned, opposition. Paul 
Rich described Natal as historically a power-base for liberalism. The Natal Witness gives us a view of 
how a liberal English language newspaper was a medium for generating liberal discourses and for the 
presentation of a particular notion of political change and social order. It constructed a moderate path 
particularly in moments when it reported on clearly defined and militarized sides, but over time and with 
the militarisation in its own province, this gave way to more out rightly activist voices. The issue 
demonstrated in this text is the evolution of the nature of liberalism, which as Rich describes, has had an 
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